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Authority NND 128-1

By CE NARA Date 12/2/98

Box 598
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MAY 23 1952

Dear Al,

Walt Whitman, Chairman of the Research and Development Board, and Mr. G. E. Solandt, Chairman of the Defence Research Board of Canada, talked with me recently about a plan for assisting SHAPE by making top-level scientific advice and appraisal directly available within your high command. I understand from them that Van Bush may discuss this possibility when he sees you early in June.

Mr. Solandt and Mr. Whitman are meeting with defense scientists in England during the period of June 30 to July 9. You might consider it profitable to explore with them the value and practicability of their general proposal and how it might be implemented. I understand that they could conveniently visit you at SHAPE early in the week of July 6, or during the previous week if preferable to you.

Please let me know whether the suggested visit meets with your approval, and if so indicate the preferred time.

Sincerely,

(signed) Bill

DEPUTY

General Alfred M. Gruenther
Chief of Staff, SHAPE
APO 55
c/o Postmaster
New York, N. Y.

RDB COMBACK COPY 3D 1066



WWhitman/ojd/26 May 52
RDB 3E-1006 Ext 53400

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*Canada Trip of President
1958. Briefing Book
DDE: Records as President
Central Files Subject Series
Box 12.*

Supplementary Report

MACKENZIE, Chalmers Jack

CANADA

Atomic Energy Control Board

Member of the Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board since 1946 and its president since 1948, Mackenzie is one of Canada's most renowned scientists. He was president of the National Research Council of Canada from 1939 until 1952 and under his leadership that organization made an outstanding contribution to the Canadian war effort. In March 1952 Mackenzie became president of the new crown company, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, which had been organized to operate the project at Chalk River, Ontario. He resigned from this position in October 1953.

In addition to his numerous national commitments, Mackenzie has carried on an extensive consulting practice in municipal and structural engineering. He is a member of a number of public bodies, commissions and boards. The holder of many honorary degrees, he is the first Canadian to win the Kelvin Medal in the field of science engineering. Among other honors Mackenzie has been a director of the Canadian Geographic Society, a member of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research since 1935, and president of the Engineering Institute of Canada. A Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada in 1946, he was awarded the US Medal of Merit in 1947.

Born in New Brunswick in 1889, Mackenzie was educated at Dalhousie and Harvard Universities. He married in 1947.



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Supplementary Report

NICHOLSON, Leonard Hansen

CANADA

Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Commissioner Nicholson who has held his present position since 1951, joined the force as a constable in 1923. He became a member of the Advisory Committee for Northern Development for the Canadian Arctic in 1953 and a member of the Northwest Territories Council in August 1957. Before becoming commissioner in 1951, he spent 19 years in criminal investigative work as an inspector, superintendent, or assistant commissioner. Shortly after the outbreak of World War II he was lent to the Canadian Army and eventually became Provost Marshal, 1st Canadian Corps. For his services in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Northwest Europe, Nicholson was mentioned in despatches. He was demobilised with rank of colonel. In a public speech Nicholson has stressed the good relationship existing between the RCMP and United States law enforcement agencies, especially the F.B.I., and has spoken of the effort maintained by the force to combat activities of Communist groups and individuals.

Nicholson was born on June 8, 1904, in Mount Middleton, New Brunswick, where he received his education. He is a Freemason and a member of the United Church of Canada. Commander Nicholson married in 1930 and resides in Ottawa with his wife and two daughters.



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Supplementary Report

ST. LAURENT, Louis

CANADA

Leader of the Liberal Party and prime minister of Canada from 1948 to 1957, Louis St. Laurent announced his resignation as leader of the Liberal Party in September 1957, following the defeat of the Liberals in the general elections of June 1957. Because of failing health, he retired from active politics in February 1958 and did not run in the March elections; he has since stated that he will not accept any public office in the future, including the office of governor general for which he had been mentioned. A moderate Canadian nationalist throughout his career, St. Laurent is a strong advocate of close Commonwealth ties, although in office he backed measures which eliminated British constitutional authority in Canada. As prime minister, he consistently supported coordination of Canadian and American military and economic policies, and, as one of the original advocates of NATO, he urged the implementation of the economic clauses of that treaty. A militant anti-Communist, St. Laurent committed Canada to the Colombo Plan, extending aid to the countries of Southeast Asia.

After an outstanding career as a lawyer and law professor, St. Laurent joined the Liberal government of Mackenzie King in 1941 at the age of 59. Without the benefit of previous political experience, he served as minister of justice and attorney general of Canada for five years, and was responsible for the enforcement of the controversial conscription laws finally passed in 1944. In 1946, he became secretary of state for external affairs, a post which he held until he succeeded Mackenzie King as prime minister in 1948. A Roman Catholic of French and Irish descent, St. Laurent was born in Quebec in 1882, educated at Laval University, and was called to the bar in 1905. Small, quiet and serious-minded, he is meticulous and dignified in appearance. He married the former Jeanne Renault in 1908; he has five children and a number of grandchildren.



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Supplementary Report

MACKIE, Victor J.

CANADA

President and former Secretary of the Parliamentary Press Gallery, Victor Mackie is the Ottawa correspondent of the Winnipeg Free Press, one of Canada's outstanding newspapers. Stubby, balding and generally uncommunicative, Mackie is one of the most influential journalists in Ottawa, with a vast knowledge of the Canadian political scene. He has a good mind and a sharp tongue and can be considered basically friendly toward the United States.



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Supplementary Reports

McNAUGHTON, (General) Andrew George Latta

CANADA

Chairman of the Canadian Section, International
Joint Commission

General McNaughton, a prominent diplomat and military scientist who was one of Canada's outstanding military leaders until his retirement from the Canadian Army in 1944, was appointed to his present position as Canadian co-chairman of the International Joint Commission in 1950. Before this appointment he had served in a similar capacity on the Permanent Joint Defense Board. General McNaughton represented Canada on the UN Atomic Energy Commission from 1946 to 1950, and in 1948 and 1949 he was permanent delegate to the United Nations in New York and Canadian representative on the Security Council. McNaughton has always been most friendly and helpful to American officials. He has been a staunch advocate of close United States-Canadian cooperation in North American defense and in development of projects involving American-Canadian boundary waters.

Quiet in manner, efficient and energetic in his work, McNaughton is forthright in approach and sometimes stubborn on certain issues. While he was commander of the Canadian Corps overseas during World War II, his adamant opposition to splitting Canadian forces between the French and Italian fronts embroiled him with British General Montgomery and indirectly caused his retirement. His talents as a politician are questionable. When he was briefly minister of national defense in the Liberal government during 1944-45, his inept handling of the issue of military conscription, to which he was opposed, seriously damaged his prestige. Past president of the National Research Council, McNaughton is a man of considerable scientific attainment.

McNaughton was born in Saskatchewan in 1887. Commissioned in the Canadian Artillery in 1910, he graduated in electrical engineering from McGill University in 1912. He served in France throughout World War I, rising to the rank of brigadier general. He was appointed Chief of the General Staff in 1929. General McNaughton married in 1914. He and his wife had two daughters and three sons, one of whom was killed in action in 1942.



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Authority State Dept. Subject Guidelines
By <u>Y/KO</u> 6/26/97
NLE Date

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Security

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)	
Agency Case	NSC F 89-849
NLE Case	MR 89-205 #2
By	bx NLE Date 3/18/92

EYES ONLY

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SECURITY INFORMATION

June 11, 1953

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 149th Meeting of the
National Security Council on Tuesday,
June 9, 1953

Present at the 149th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of Defense Mobilization; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Item 1); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (Item 1); the Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (Item 2); the Telecommunications Adviser to the President (Item 2); General Collins for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Lewis L. Strauss, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Military Liaison Officer; Ralph Clark and J. J. Hitchcock, Central Intelligence Agency (Item 2); the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and Hugh D. Farley, NSC Special Staff Member.

There follows a summary of the discussion and the chief points taken at the meeting.

1. RESTATEMENT OF BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
(NSC 153; NSC Action No. 776-b; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 8, 1953)

Mr. Cutler traced the development of NSC 153 and earlier Council actions on this subject. He noted that, if adopted, NSC 153 would supersede all the earlier policy statements on this subject since the year 1948 and including NSC 149/2. However, he called the Council's attention to the fact that the present report contained an Annex listing United States objectives in the event of war with the Soviet Union, which had been taken from NSC 20/4. These objectives would accordingly remain valid, and the Planning Board had undertaken a reconsideration of them.

Mr. Cutler then read aloud to the members of the Council the General Considerations and General Objectives set forth in NSC 153, in the course of which he explained the difference of views with respect

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tionships, and in moderating extreme nationalism, with a view to aiding the orderly self-development of the peoples of the free world rather than to preserving the status quo."

NOTE: NSC 153 as amended subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 153/1.

2. ELECTRO-MAGNETIC COMMUNICATIONS

(Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 2, 1953; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "The Use of Radio as a Medium for Psychological Operations and the Impact of Its Use on National Security", dated March 26 and May 13, 1953; Memo for All Holders of May 13 Memo, dated May 18, 1953; : : : : NSC Action No. 710)

Mr. Cutler explained the background of the problem of electro-magnetic communications, noting that it had been a subject of disagreement within the Executive Branch for over two years. He reminded the Council that it had discussed this subject at its meeting on February 11, at which time it had directed the preparation of three reports, all of which had now been completed.

Mr. Cutler then informed the Council that Mr. Hyde, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and Mr. Pratt, Telecommunications Adviser to the President, were waiting to join the Council. He noted, however, that a new Telecommunications Adviser was about to be appointed to replace Mr. Pratt. Accordingly, Mr. Cutler felt it inappropriate that Mr. Pratt or Mr. Hyde should be present when the Council deliberated and made up its mind on the recommendations which had been based on Mr. Pratt's report. Instead, he suggested that he read each

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one of these recommendations and ask Mr. Pratt and Mr. Hyde, and Mr. Clark of the Central Intelligence Agency, to comment on or answer any questions which might arise. Thereafter, the experts would leave the room and the Council could determine the actions it decided to take.

At the conclusion of this exercise Mr. Pratt and Mr. Hyde left the Council, with the President's commendation for their assistance in elucidating the difficult technical problems.

Mr. Cutler then indicated that the Planning Board no longer felt itself in a position to recommend that the Council approve all six of the recommendations in its memorandum of June 2. He therefore suggested that the Council approve the first recommendation and the fourth. These were of the most immediate importance, and neither involved an additional outlay of funds. As for the other recommendations, the Planning Board recommended that the Council defer consideration pending further study by the Planning Board and the agencies concerned.

The President and the Council agreed with Mr. Cutler's recommendations, and the President again stated his anxiety to get over to the people who were doing research work in fields like this, that it was vital that their achievements remain secret. He was little short of aghast at the manner in which scientific developments of vital importance to the national security were publicized.

In response to this statement by the President, Mr. Cutler read to the Council a resume of the President's remarks made to himself and Mr. Gleason at the briefing earlier, which enlarged on the point that the President had just made and which suggested a course of action to deal with the problem (copy attached).

The President reaffirmed his views, and said, "Let's try to surprise the enemy for a change."

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the subject in the light of an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence and comments by the Telecommunications Adviser to the President and the Chairman, Federal Communications Commission.
- b. Adopted recommendations 1 and 4 of the Planning Board contained in the reference memorandum of June 2 on the subject.

c.

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- d. Deferred action on recommendations 3, 5 and 6 of the Planning Board contained in the reference memorandum of June 2, pending further consideration by the Planning Board and report early in July.
- e. Noted the President's desire that significant scientific developments resulting from research by a military department, which might have primary significance in time of war, should not be publicized; and that, in so far as practicable and appropriate, the results of such developments should be made available by the sponsoring military department to all military departments.

NOTE:

3. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR THE VOICE OF AMERICA WITH REGARD TO SOVIET JAMMING
(Progress Report, dated April 13, 1953, by the Acting Secretary of State on Pilot Operations of paragraph 3-b of NSC 6400)

The National Security Council:

Noted the reference Progress Report by the Acting Secretary of State on the subject.

4. THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO UNITED STATES AND NORTH ATLANTIC SECURITY INTERESTS IN ICELAND
(Progress Report, dated May 28, 1953, by the Acting Secretary of State on NSC 40/1)

The National Security Council:

Noted the reference Progress Report by the Acting Secretary of State on the subject.

S. Everett Gleason
Acting

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May 14, 1953

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 144th Meeting of
the National Security Council,
Wednesday, May 13, 1953

Present at the 144th meeting of the National Security Council were the following: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 1); the Director of Defense Mobilization; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 1); General John E. Hull, for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Adm. Lewis L. Strauss, Special Assistant to the President; Major General J. S. Bradley, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Item 1); the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion and the chief points taken at the meeting.

1. ELIGIBILITY OF REPRESENTATIVES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO RECEIVE CLASSIFIED U. S. SECURITY INFORMATION
(Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated April 24, 1953)

After Mr. Cutler had sketched the background of this report and explained the positions of the several departments in regard to the two major areas of disagreement, he asked the Attorney General to state the position of the Department of Justice.

Mr. Brownell commenced by admitting that the whole question of whether the United States should undertake to create an elaborate system of regulations to govern access by foreign personnel to classified security information, was a large policy question with much to be said on both sides. However, he emphasized that if the Government decided to create such a system, it should be as effective and foolproof as humanly possible. The present proposal was not completely effective. There were two glaring weaknesses in it. One was the proposal to confine regulations governing access by foreigners to classified

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)	
Agency Case	NSC 87-824
NLE Case	87-21542
By	740 NLE Date 1/17/91

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security information to access in the United States. The other was the exemption of a large category of foreign officials from the requirements to present an identification document. The Department of Justice still insisted that these two gaps should be closed if the Council were to approve the subject report.

The President stated that he would like for a moment to look at the problem of access as it affected military personnel. He pointed out that it is of no real use to give secret information to Generals and Admirals. It was the Lieutenant Colonels and the Majors on the staffs of these "big shots" who really did the work and who really required access to the classified information. It seemed plain to the President that as a result of this fact one presently found oneself in areas and in large groups where no security regulations of the sort envisaged in this report would be practical.

The Attorney General replied that the Justice Department was perfectly well aware of this point of view, and admitted that there were strong arguments in favor of giving up the whole attempt to deal with the problem in the detailed and elaborate way which the report recommended. He nevertheless reiterated his earlier position that if the Council adopted the proposed system it should be foolproof.

The President inquired what had inspired the present report, and Mr. Cutler replied that the attempt to set forth regulations to meet the problem had resulted from the Fuchs case. He noted the long period of time during which the several departments and agencies had been debating the issue, and said that the present report was the best effort that could be made to resolve interdepartmental conflicts. It seemed apparent, continued Mr. Cutler, that the present report pleased no one. He hoped, however, that if the Council refused to adopt the present recommendations, it would not hand the problem back to the Planning Board, which could not resolve a problem which the Council itself could not resolve.

The President again inquired whether any set of regulations, however carefully worked out, could really help us to deal with this type of security problem. Isn't the only solution, he went on, to be sought in the wisdom and care with which the senior officials of this

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Government apply the "need to know" principle? The President said he had very grave doubts as to the value of any rule of thumb to answer the issue.

Secretary Smith said that the State Department regarded the proposals in question as mere window-dressing. The Fuchs case really involved less the reliability of the individual than the reliability of his government. If we could not have confidence in the reliability of a government, how could we have confidence in the word of the individual official? The view of the State Department was that an effort should be made to set forth regulations which were as effective as possible without placing on Government departments and agencies an intolerable administrative burden.

In response to Secretary Smith's exposition of his views, the President replied that he thought there was a positive danger in setting down on paper a series of rules and regulations. If we did this, many officials would assume that if they followed the letter of the regulations they had done all that was necessary to discharge their responsibility for safeguarding secret information. Instead of the elaborate procedure outlined in the reference report, the President stated his belief that all that was necessary was a single tough paragraph warning our officials of their responsibility for protecting classified information.

Secretary Wilson stated his complete agreement with the President's position, and added the recommendation that officials who did release classified information to foreign visitors should make a note in the files of their departments of the fact and content of the release.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the principle of need-to-know was at the very heart of the present paper, as was the responsibility of the heads of departments and agencies. What had been attempted in the present report was to provide the heads of departments and agencies with reasonable guidance as to how to apply the need-to-know principle and how to discharge individual responsibility regarding the release of this information.

The Director of Central Intelligence stated his conviction that every official who released secret information to foreign personnel should himself carefully weigh the net advantage to this country of such a release of information, and should investigate carefully the person to whom the information was given.

The President stated his agreement with Mr. Dulles, and added that a written report of the information released should be made by the releasing official to his superiors.

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Secretary Smith stated his emphatic opposition to the proposal that these regulations apply to release of U. S. classified security information to foreign personnel outside the United States. It was wholly impractical for the State Department to operate with such a provision.

After further discussion, the President restated his belief that the present report was not a practical solution to the problem, and decided against referring it again to the Planning Board. He directed instead that the problem be referred to Mr. Cutler and that he come back to the Council with a short but tough directive of two or three paragraphs along the lines of the Council discussion.

The National Security Council:

Directed Mr. Cutler, with the assistance of the NSC staff, to prepare a revised directive, along the lines discussed in the meeting, providing that the head of each executive department and agency shall be responsible for ensuring that U. S. classified security information is made available to representatives of foreign governments only under the following conditions:

- a. On an absolute need-to-know basis.
- b. After determination that the furnishing of such information will result in a net advantage to the interests of the United States.
- c. After appropriate security checks have been made, to the greatest extent practical, with respect to the recipients of such information.
- d. The results of such security checks and the fact of release, if it involves security information classified "Secret" or higher, will be made a matter of official record.
- e. The information derived from such security checks to be made available to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. NEGOTIATIONS WITH SPAIN

(NSC 72/6; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 11, 1953)

After Mr. Cutler had explained the background of the negotiations with Spain for U. S. bases, with particular reference to the desire of the Defense Department to conclude the negotiations and

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Authority EO 12958

By JPLW NARA Date 9-13

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May 16, 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHAIRMAN, STATE-DEFENSE MILITARY INFORMATION
CONTROL COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Desirability of Releasing Certain Research and Development Board
Documents to the United Kingdom and Canada

1. Under MIC 206/29 the disclosure of research and development information up through TOP SECRET in classification, including program-type and catalogue-type information, to the United Kingdom and Canada is specifically permitted, provided certain conditions are met. This statement is concerned with one of those conditions, the question of benefit to the United States (paragraph II A (5) of MIC 206/29), as it relates to the release of certain RDB documents to those nations.

2. Within the provisions of the above policy statement, the release of certain RDB documents which are published each year to the Defence Research Policy Committee of the United Kingdom and to the Defence Research Board of Canada will be of substantial benefit to the United States. These documents are the Planning Guide, the Consolidated Program Guidance, and the Technical Estimates. The reasons for this conviction are set forth below.

3. It is critically important that the United States achieve and maintain qualitative superiority over the Communist nations in the weapons and techniques of war. The development of weapons for modern warfare requires in nearly every area the services of scientists and engineers of the highest training and skill. Our national resources of such people are not sufficient to let us pursue all the lines of development that appear necessary to assure that available scientific knowledge and talent are adequately exploited for the furtherance of military strength. Instead, we must most carefully select areas or problems where the need for improvement and the promise of effective results is greatest, and concentrate our talent there. The RDB denotes a major share of its effort to this question of determining the best over-all distribution of our scientific and technical resources among the multitude of pressing problems that are always at hand.

4. A similar problem of selection exists in the United Kingdom and in Canada, where the Defence Research Policy Committee and the Defence Research Board, respectively, are the bodies responsible, like the RDB in the United States, for constantly assessing the guiding the total application of research and development strength to military matters.

5. Because of the community of interests among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, all three nations have at various times been able to augment their individual resources significantly through common or complementary scientific and technological efforts directed toward military aims. World War II contains many examples of notable benefits derived by each nation from programs carried forward in the light of what each knew of the others'

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technological plans and accomplishments. Since World War II the need for such coordination of effort has increased; and it is likely to continue to increase because the demand for superior weapons, together with the difficulty of developing them, is growing steadily.

6. Under these conditions the total military research and development program of the United States should be planned to take full advantage of the intentions and capabilities of the United Kingdom and Canada. This cannot be properly done unilaterally. If the maximum common benefit is to be realized, each nation must plan its research and development with adequate knowledge of the total effort of the others.

7. Such planning cannot be done effectively on a piecemeal basis. In some individual areas information is now being freely exchanged among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. The very real benefits of this exchange are limited, however, to the particular areas in which it takes place. No kind of balance in the total military research and development effort of the three nations, to their common benefit, can be consciously effected unless each is acquainted with the over-all research and development aims and planning of the others.

8. The extent of benefit potentially realizable to the United States, if all United Kingdom and Canadian work were applicable to U.S. problems, would be an addition of about 50% to our own research and development strength. British military research and development effort, in equivalent man-years employed, is between one-third and one-half of ours, while the Canadian activity is approximately one-tenth of ours. Some of the potential benefit of common and complementary effort is already being realized through fruitful interchange in many areas. It is our belief that much more can be achieved through proper common knowledge of top-level research and development planning. Not all can ever be realized, of course, because certain United Kingdom and Canadian work is always likely to be inapplicable to our problems and because of specific restrictions such as those which exist in the field of atomic energy.

9. We can best capitalize on a measure of the scientific and technological resources of the three nations through exchange of the top-level planning and summary documents that show the broad aims, relative emphasis, general direction, and rationale of the research and development programs of each. The necessary picture cannot be seen through glimpses of separate bits of each program, but only through the perspective represented by the basic documents of the three top-level planning and guiding agencies.

10. For these reasons substantial benefit will accrue to the United States by the release to the United Kingdom and Canada of the three documents previously mentioned. This is a necessary step in the development of a body of common knowledge permitting each nation to plan in the light of knowledge of the over-all plans of the others. It is important that the similar annual

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documents of the other two nations be transmitted to the RDB. We are confident that they will be so transmitted, as indeed they have been in the past few years.

11. The documents in question can be briefly described as to content as follows:

a. Planning Guide. Contains the broad guidance of the RDB for the planning of military research and development in the United States. It gives certain general precepts to be followed in the light of the existing world and national situations; a breakdown of program areas with an indication of the importance attributed to each, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, in more detail, by the individual Services; and certain policy guidance deemed important for planning purposes.

b. Consolidated Program Guidance. Discusses the individual parts of the research and development program, providing technical guide lines for the further evolution of each part. It shows the general directions and pace which the Board considers desirable for the various parts of the program during the next year or two.

c. Technical Estimates. Provide a summary of the current program, together with estimates of the results expected and of the dates when these results will be realized.

12. Together, then, the three documents contain the general planning of the over-all U.S. program, the specific directions in which it is intended to move, the present status, and the expected results. These documents are generally of the program type. They present a totality of information that makes them especially sensitive from the security standpoint. For this reason it is proposed that they be transmitted to the United Kingdom and Canada in not more than three copies to each nation, for use only by the Defence Research Policy Committee of the U.K. and the Defence Research Board of Canada.

JOHN C. MORRISSEY
RDB Member
State-Defense MIC

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Authority EO 12958

By JPW NARA Date 9-13

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

7 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DON K. PRICE, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN

SUBJECT: Proposed Memorandum to Major General J. L. McKee including RDB Comments on Regulations Establishing and Procedures for Determining Eligibility of Certain Representatives of Foreign Governments to Receive U. S. Government Classified Security Information

1. Brief of Draft Regulations. The regulations are intended to provide a uniform procedure among the departments of the United States Government for clearing foreign representatives prior to their receipt of classified information. They are intended to be used in addition to existing regulations. The regulations are contained in five sections. The first has definitions of the various categories of classified matter. The second section excludes diplomats and consular representatives and high ranking official civil and military personnel of foreign governments from requirements of the regulations. The third gives requirements for clearance of persons who are to receive confidential and restricted information and a photograph and Identity Document and Official Statement from the individual are to be turned over to the FBI which agency will return the documents together with any derogatory information it may have for the use of the department or agency in determining whether the representative should be granted acceptance for the purpose of receiving confidential or restricted information. The fourth section gives procedures for clearance of persons who are to be given information higher than confidential. In this case an "agency check" is required in addition to FBI clearance. In the event it is necessary to release information prior to completion of the agency check this can be done if sufficient justification exists but the FBI check must be completed. A similar short cut is provided in Section II for release of confidential and restricted matter, but the documents required must first have been turned over to the FBI. In both cases it is required that all procedures be completed. Section V treats clearance of named representatives who are invited to participate in an agency's work. No documents are required from such individuals but preferably prior to the issuance of the invitation, the requirements of Sections III or IV shall be completed using such of the individual's personal history as can be obtained.

2. It is considered that the enclosed comments will improve the regulations, if adopted, and approval of the paper is recommended subject to these comments. The enclosed memorandum has been prepared with the assistance of Mr. Tanenbaum by the Liaison Branch of the Planning Division.

A. G. Pelling
A. G. PELLING

Captain, USN

Liaison Branch, Planning Division

1 Encl: Memo to Maj. Gen. McKee
(to be withdrawn and
dispatched)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Dr. Walker

DATE: 11 July 1950

FROM : Perry White

SUBJECT: VBush-Forrestal colloquy on joint US-UK planning of r&d

The attached exchange of memos between Dr. Bush and Secretary Forrestal in March 1948 represents the high water mark of expression concerning the benefits of joint planning.

Secretary Johnson has come out in favor of full and frank exchange of information; but the idea of joint planning was stressed exclusively in the attached memos, to my knowledge. Undoubtedly there is a large degree of joint planning in various fields. The memos attached may be relevant to Barry Carlton's problem.

EC 33/5

29 March 1948

MEMORANDUM TO HONORABLE JAMES FORRESTAL,
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

You inquired recently regarding interchange on technical matters with Britain, and whether there was any joint planning on programs.

We have an established policy of interchange with Britain and Canada at the operating level on all technical subjects, except for a few exceptions which are not of great importance. This operates on the whole fairly well. There has been some difficulty due to the fact that the machinery for exchange of reports and clearance of individuals is not now satisfactory from my standpoint, but I will make this the subject of a separate memorandum. There is no cross membership between committees of RDB and the corresponding British groups, nor do we have British visitors present at our meetings, although conferences between our groups and British visitors are of course in order.

During the war large economies were realized and better speed was made by reason of the creation of joint programs with the British, particularly in such fields as radar. The British contributions were by no means minor. Complete up-to-date interchange accompanied by understandings as to a division of effort worked well. It is evident that similar economies and some additional speed and progress might be obtained also during peace times by integration of programs.

The Research and Development Board in creating its unified programs has not, as yet, gone far in this direction. There is one set of very informal discussions under way at the present time between British representatives and the Chairman of our Electronics Committee. It is, however, entirely preliminary and will not necessarily lead to a program integrated with that of the British except by voluntary relinquishment of effort consequent on full interchange of information. It seems to me, however, that it is desirable to extend this effort, and to gradually work toward more complete discussions in connection with research and development planning. Some of this was discussed during my recent visit.

to Canada and it will again come up during my proposed visit to England with General Spaatz in May. I am not inclined to set up formal organizational machinery for this purpose, at least, until informal conversations have proceeded further. I would, however, like to have your assurance that, in working toward closer interchange on programs with the British and Canadians I have your general approval.

/s/ V. Bush
V. BUSH
Chairman.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12958

By JPLW NARA Date 9-13

CANADIAN JOINT STAFF

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

2RM/7/90

OFFICE OF DEFENCE RESEARCH MEMBER
1746 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

28 March 1951

Mr. McKay Donkin,
Consultant,
Research & Development Board,
Department of Defense,
Room 3E1015, Pentagon,
Washington 25, D.C.


Dear Mr. Donkin:

Pursuant to our recent conversation in respect of the time delay in correspondence and documents being forwarded to this office, I am attaching a list of those documents requested from U.S. Service Authorities during the month of November 1950 which have not yet been received. I chose the month of November as being fairly representative of the time delay, i.e., four months.

I am also enclosing a brief record of several RDB letters and papers, showing the dates they evidently left RDB and the date of receipt here.

It is hoped this information will prove helpful to you. If this office can be of any further assistance will you please so advise.

Yours sincerely,



(A. L. Wright)
Defence Research Member.

Encls. 2

10M-10-48 (1573)
H.Q. 2-0-264-1

(a) Bibliography of Bibliographies of RM/5/5 the Arctic.	13/11/50	ONR
(b) Bibliography on Interpreting Vegetation on Aerial Photographs.		
(c) A System of Keys for the Inter- pretation of Vegetation from Aerial Photography.		
Dr. H. O'Neill, Dept. of Botany, Catholic University.		

"Hirsch Report": Sections 1, 1A, and RM/4/5 2, entitled, Soviet BW and CW Preparations and Capabilities, by Dr. W. Hirsh.	14/11/50	FLO(ARMY)
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Information Relating to Mr. L. A. Seymour

1. Data transmitted by Seymour is routed through Army G-2 channels. In the G-2 reading panel, Navy and Air Force representatives select from his dispatches, those items of interest to their service. A second review is made by technical analysis and additions made to distribution list at discretion of the analyzer.

2. The Army has full time Canadian representatives at every appropriate installation, from the R&D Division of General Staff down to and including Field Force Boards. These representatives are all Army officers, many of them from the technical services. In addition, we have U. S. officers in Canada charged with promoting the exchange of information and specifically with coordinating our efforts in standardization of military equipment.

3. The Air Force has an exchange program that is coordinated in the Air Force Headquarters Staff. Canadian Air Force technicians are stationed at AMC. The AF and the RCAF exchange officers for routine duty assignments. Equipment and material is exchanged on a routine basis and we participate in an equipment standardization program.

4. Op 321K of CNO maintains close liaison with the Canadian Joint Staff at 1700 Massachusetts Avenue, which is similar to the British Joint Services Mission. Canadians may visit our Naval installations whenever they desire and usually do so on a temporary basis. No visit has been turned down so far. Example - pilot training in helicopters is going on at NAS, Lakehurst. Canadians have been invited to go on Convex which is a big operation. They often visit Key West and get ASW training there.

The Navy has 3 aviators in Canada on a more or less permanent basis. There are also other officers (1 Supply) now turning around and helping the Canadian Navy with their problems.

CNO feels that everything is being done to give the Canadians everything they want. Nothing they have asked for has been withheld.

5. All three departments are governed in the exchange of information with Canada by policy established by the Secretary of Defense. This policy is at this time most liberal.



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Office of the Army Attache
United States Embassy

Ottawa, Canada
12 April 1951

Dear Dr. Walker:

Several weeks have elapsed since your visit to Ottawa and I have heard nothing of any proposed changes in the situation regarding closer working relations of R.D.B. and D.R.B. Bill Barton has asked me several times if I had heard anything and of course I had to answer no.

Colonel Graling, the Army Attache, Ottawa, asked permission of G-2 (required) for me to visit Washington re this question. The answer was that there appeared to be no need for such a trip at this time. Colonel Graling feels I should go, but said I would have to take leave and go at my own expense in view of G-2's attitude.

If you are still interested in promoting a more direct exchange of information between R.D.B. and D.R.B., I suggest that you request that I be called to Washington for a conference. You may already have started machinery in motion which would eventuate in the same result. In Washington I could get together with your information people and work out suitable working arrangements. Then, if we presented G-2 with a simple workable system which would save their overloaded reading panel some work - and yet guarantee adequate dissemination, I don't see why they should object.

As it is now, almost every technical report is sent down through three separate channels and passed through three reading panels where representatives of the same bodies have to look it over. Practically all of my work is of direct interest to one or more of your agencies so it would seem logical for you to act as disseminator for all three services.

If agreeable to you, I could get down there for the week of the 23rd or later - with the exception of a few days the week of May 14.

With best regards,

L. A. Seymour
L. A. Seymour

P.S. I'm sending this as a personal note as it might get involved in chains of command if I sent it according to the book.
L.A.S.

Memorandum for Record

14 May 1951

Colonel J. R. Pritchard

Mr. L. A. Seymour, Office of the Army Attache, Ottawa, Ontario.

1. Mr. Seymour was in Washington on temporary duty with the Office Assistant G/S W-2, in connection with his duties as Scientific and Technical Advisor to the U. S. Army Attache in Canada. Colonel Merrill of the Technical Intelligence Branch, G-2, requested this office to discuss RHB-DEB relations with Mr. Seymour.

2. With the above request, as well as other RHB-DEB relationships, the basis, the following discussions were arranged:

- a. J. R. Pritchard, C. S. Weaver and Peregrine White.
(Subject - Exchange of information, RHB-DEB)
- b. Dr. Landsberg, Cante on GAG
- c. Dr. Chapman, Cante on H.R.
- d. Mr. Kopp (for Dr. Worthley), Cante on GW.
- e. Due to the short notice given us, we were unable to arrange a similar session with H. C. Fick on the subject of metallurgy.

3. During 9-10 May, Mr. Seymour spent approximately one day's time with the above RHB people and stated that his time with us was well spent. Information that we received from Mr. Seymour was general in nature and would be useful at some later date. At his request, we propose to furnish him a copy of our Consolidated Technical Estimates for transmittal (Seymour) if G-2 so desires.

J. R. PRITCHARD
Colonel, GSC
Foreign Intelligence Branch
Planning Division

JRPritchard/1d/71644