

"Come on, we're going to go out and play golf."

I said, "Oh, General, I've got a lot of work to do."

"Come on out, we're going to play. I don't want to play, really, I want to talk to you."

So the two of us went out, ourselves, and used ^{a golf} ~~the~~ cart. While we hit the ball around for 18 holes, we worked out our relationships, our working relationships, for the whole eight years, in that golf cart, right there, in about three hours.

Very simple. He said, "You'll know everything I'm doing, and I'll keep you fully informed. If you ^{get} ~~have~~ any questions, don't shoot off your mouth before you have ^{the answers} ~~questions~~. If you have anything you don't know the answer to, come to me and I'll tell you."

It was as simple as that, and for eight years I knew everything he did, and if I wasn't in his office when he made a decision, even including the Secretary of State, he'd tell John Foster Dulles, "Stop in at Jim's office as you go out and tell him what we decided."

We talked about Korea. He talked about Korea, there. And this was two days after he was nominated. He said, "If we don't get some settlement before I become President, I'm going to go over to Korea." That's all he said, and "Just keep that quiet."

When he'd tell me to keep things quiet, I'd keep them quiet.

for the first day the group stayed there --(most of them went back)--to follow up and get ready these documents and a lot of other things, and the President-elect stayed there really to get a rest, because those days in Korea were pretty tough. He didn't get much sleep and there was a lot of tension and everything like that, and he just relaxed for about two days or so, two or three days. I had my own pool with me that I'd be reporting to, and the Hawaiian reporters came over, but there wasn't much that was doing. He had a reception out at Kanohe for the Governor and the people in Hawaii, and we invited the local press to that, but he had no press conferences. The major thing was that he was just relaxing, playing some golf, taking it easy. So I didn't have much of a work-over there.

Q: Actually, had he taken any rest up to that time, after the election?

Hagerty: No. This was the first time. The Hawaiian thing really was the first time he'd gotten three or four days by himself.

Q: On this question of your security clearance, do you happen to know if any of your predecessors at the White House had such a high security clearance?

Hagerty: Oh, yes. They all have. They have to. It's what they

call Q clearance, which is the toppest, the top one. Steve Early, Joe Short, Charlie Ross, my predecessors, had the same clearance. They had to have it. You're dealing with top secret information and documents, and every press secretary has it.

But at the time, on the President-elect staff, what I'm pointing out is that only myself, Pete Carroll and Jerry Parsons had the clearance, and Emmett Hughes did not. And I'm quite amazed at some of the stuff he writes. But that's neither here nor there.

Q: One other question, back at Korea, who was the main person who prevented that big parade from taking place?

Hagerty: I guess, all of us. I suppose -- who was our ambassador there? He saddled him with it. Was it (John) Muccio? I think it was Muccio. He just told him, "Look, we've got all of these things." Actually it was settled to some extent the last day we were traveling around. We went to the 1st FCK Division, and Syngman Rhee went with us, and they put on a fire power demonstration of taking a hill. We were on one hill, here, and then they put this demonstration on, on the other hill. And these damned Koreans were using live ammunition, with their troops going right up. It was Syngman Rhee, and Mr. Rhee presented the Korean flag to the President, got the photographs and things like that. So that sort of took care of it. And his schedule was such that

Q: Yes.

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Hagerty: Well, the television was a very simple thing. It depended upon the evolution of television and its technical facilities. We ~~didn't~~ ^{opened} the press conferences up for film -- and Mr. Kennedy went one step further, ^{right away} on live. ^{later developed} But we didn't open it up to film, because in the first two years, they didn't have the fast film that they ~~had~~, and to have a press conference lit up for the film at that time, you'd have had to light it up like a Hollywood premiere, and that would destroy it. But in October of 1954, Eastman Kodak and the television industry came to me almost at the same time and said that they were experimenting, going to experiment for three months with the new film, which was the forerunner of ^{Tu-X} ~~Eriax~~, and that they could shoot with not much difficulty in light like this, or very little light, with just a couple of floodlights.

I reported this to the President and said, "Look, this may be what we've been looking for." He said, "Well, keep in touch."

They tried it out for three months. Then they came and asked to see me, the television industry, with the representatives of two film manufacturing companies, Kodak and AVACO. They said that it worked. I said, "Can you show me?" and they said "yes" so I went over to a studio, and they shot and developed it, and the lighting was good.

So I went back and told the President, "I think this is going to work." He said, "Well, see how it works in the press

conference room we use." So we went over and we set up a dummy press conference. We didn't tell the news men anything about this. I posed as the President, and we had our cameras in position in back, and we shot stuff, and I answered questions for about 10 minutes. Then we got a fast reproduction or processing of the film. Then I had them come back, and we set it up in a room in the White House, down in the cellar, the camera and the film, and Sherman Adams and the President came down and took a look at it. He didn't say anything. He just said, "Thank you." I said, "I'll let you know."

The President called me in. I think this was on a Wednesday or Thursday -- Thursday, it was. It was right after ^{a weekly} ~~the~~ press conference. He said, "Set it up for next Wednesday."

So I called these fellows back and said, "Meet me" -- I think at 8 o'clock at night or something. So they came back in, and I said, "Fine, we'll set it up next Wednesday."

They said, "Are you kidding?"

I said, "No. Set it up. But I want it kept quiet until I publicly announce it."

So that Tuesday, the next Tuesday, at my afternoon press conference -- the television people all knew about it, and they were all there-- and one of the newsmen, I forget who it was now, said, "Hey, you got a lot of television people in here at this press conference, Jim."

And I said, "Yeah. I want to make an announcement that

the world . It's a good institution.

But with television, they cannot change it, or it's difficult to change what a man says, when people see and hear him say it. And it keeps the record straight.

Q: Now prior to bringing television into the Presidential press conferences had radio been in? Did radio tape everything?

Hogarty: No. No, and the first thing I did, with the President's approval -- up until the time Eisenhower held his first press conference, all of the other Presidential press conferences were all in indirect quotes. You could not quote directly. If it was a phrase or something, you had to get permission to even quote a phrase. Well, I talked with many of the newsmen and the President during the President -elect period and I just said, "This is ridiculous. This is absolutely ridiculous." And he agreed. So the very first conference we had, I said, "We will take a stenographic copy of this, and everything's on direct quotes."

Later, we hired, or the ^{newsmen} hired a professional stenographic firm, and I approved it, so that they could get the transcripts faster. You know, it's ridiculous to stand up in front of 200 newsmen and have everything in ^{indirect} ~~indirect~~ quotes. I mean, instead of saying, "The President said, 'I shall go to Korea,'" you had to write, "The President said that he would go to Korea." Well, this ^{was} ~~is~~ ridiculous.

Then, as soon as we did that, then our first thing was taped ^{next step} ~~taping~~

for
~~the radio, which was the next step, when~~ we permitted them to tape, and then I would designate sections. (Ideally, I did it at the networks' request) of national and international interest. They couldn't care less, ^{for example,} particularly on radio where they didn't have as much time, if he was talking about the dredging of the Delaware River at Trenton, in answer to a specific question that was very important to Delaware and the Delaware River -- they couldn't care less on a national radio network, in Denver or Los Angeles or New York or places like that. So we started first with radio, and then we went in, as soon as the film was developed, into film for television.

But it's more evolution. We wanted to do it, but we couldn't do it until we did. And it took two years for them to get the fast film, as far as we were concerned. Then, as it developed, when Mr. Kennedy came in, we had the equipment in Washington and we had the facilities, and we had a new State Department ~~xxxx~~ auditorium which he used. He couldn't have gotten live equipment into that Indian Treaty Room that President Eisenhower used. We could put film cameras in a bank on the back, but we wouldn't have had the room to put live television cameras into the room that he was using. In the new State Department auditorium you can put anything in. So it's evolution. Each press secretary will take advantage of all of the news media, to see that whatever the President says gets the widest distribution. As wide as possible, with the least chance of distortion.

Q: This concludes the interview with James Hagerty, March 2, 1967.

The missile system had not come into the development that it now is, and neither did field weapons. They were just starting to be developed at the end of Eisenhower's administration. The delivery system, if you want to call it that, has become much more sophisticated. But at any length, any time he's talking about force, he is not referring to nuclear weapons.

Now, there some of the newsmen I think get confused. They always bring up the question of nuclear weapons in any discussion with the General. And his answer is, "Look, I'm not going to give the enemy, if it's going to be an enemy, blueprints on what I'm going to do." They assume that this means nuclear weaponry. But I have had many talks with him, and I've never heard him mention the use of nuclear weapons in any warfare that we're talking about at the present time.

Now, if our country was threatened, if we had a world war similar to World War II, then all bets are off. But at the present time, this misunderstanding on what General Eisenhower's been saying lately does not include the use of nuclear weapons. It's conventional weapons -- which are bad enough.

Q: Does what you've said about his plans for possible "hot pursuit" and the other measures -- does this mean that he thought that up to that time the war had not been conducted vigorously enough?

Wagarty: He thought we were fighting in Korea, to a certain extent,

Command, and that ^{where} was his headquarters ^{where} there, even though it was in Panama. He was a lieutenant general. I came in and he said, "Yes, Hagerty?"

I said, "I need ~~some headquarters and I want 200 rooms~~ at the Tivoli Hotel."

"Out of the question. Can't have it."

Well, I knew I was coming back with the White House advance party, so I didn't do much arguing with him. I got back to Washington and I reported to the President what we set up. He said, "Did you have any problems down there?" I said, "Only with the Lieutenant General, our fellow down in Panama in the Caribbean Command."

He said, "What happened?" and I told him the story. He said, "Oh, I know ^{him} that fellow. Don't worry about it. I'll tell you how to fix ^{it} him. Remind me, the day before you go down on the White House advance party, and I'll fix it up. You'll have no trouble."

So I reminded him, "You told me to remind you."

He said, "Oh, that's right," and he rang for Bill Draper, who was air force aide and commander of the plane which we were taking down. Bill came in and he said, "Bill, you got a four star plaque?"

Bill said, "I've got plaques for everything, Mr. President."

He said, "Well, get a four star plaque, because the press secretary has a protocol ranking of four stars, in the line of things, and put it on the plane, and don't land at Timenkin, land

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campaign was finished and after we ~~had started~~ the invasion of France, ^{had been successfully launched,} De Gaulle was going to fly to French soil--to the south of France. Everything was all set.

General Walter Bedell Smith, chief of staff to Eisenhower--who was then in Africa--came in and said, "Oh, my God. General de Gaulle won't go!"

Eisenhower said, "Well, what's the matter?"

"Well, De Gaulle says he's not going to go in an American plane--it has to be a French plane!" They didn't have any French planes at that time. They were all American or British planes down there.

General Eisenhower said to General Smith: "Bedell, get the General in the ~~xxx~~ salle d'honneur at the airport. Then get a sergeant, give him some paint, go out and paint the American stars off that plane, and put the ^{French} ~~Greenish~~ tricolor on the plane." That is exactly what they did.

After a reasonable length of time to allow the sergeant-artist to do his work, they led General de Gaulle to the plane and said, "General, here's your French plane."

He said, "Thank you very much." And he went on his French plane over to France.

The second ~~xxx~~ story is about when Eisenhower came into Paris, ^{after its liberation from the Nazis.} De Gaulle had preceded him, as you remember, and had

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established the Free French Army headquarters in Paris. Eisenhower came in as Supreme Commander.

As De Gaulle told me, he said, "I really should have called on General Eisenhower. But General Eisenhower did me the great honor of calling at French headquarters the ~~the~~ first day he was in Paris."

This is Eisenhower at his best, understanding the sensibilities of a person, understanding national pride, and understanding the whole ball of wax in dealing with people and with troops and with countries. President de Gaulle told me these two stories through an interpreter. He must have still been impressed. There is no other reason why he told me these stories.

This isn't to say that President Eisenhower and Charles de Gaulle did not have their disagreements. Indeed, during the Eisenhower administration, General de Gaulle pulled the French fleet out of the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] fleet in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. But, at least, there was a rapport between the two men.

I often heard President Eisenhower, in talking to people who were publicly criticizing De Gaulle, saying, "Now, just a minute, gentlemen. He's a proud, stubborn man. But if the chips are down, he's going to be proud and stubborn on our side." This again shows the way Eisenhower had a great

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Question:

us, we always had to let the Signal Corps know where we were. You're on duty 24 hours a day. The President is on duty 24 hours a day, although he gets maybe a little more sleep than his staff, providing the President can ever ~~xxx~~ sleep with the problems he has on his mind all the time. I just don't know how anybody as President of these United States since World War II can sleep. But like their staffs, they grow into the momentous responsibilities they have. Each President does it his own way.

Q: Did the President have any habits like cat napping or post-lunch napping before his heart attack?

Hagerty: Yes. You want to remember one thing: He was a trained military man. Trained military men can cat nap and sleep on picket fences when they have to. Many times they would force themselves to lie down.

Each President uses something different for a change of pace and relaxation in his job. Mr. Roosevelt had Warm Springs and boating, for example, among other things. Mr. Truman used to take the presidential yacht down the Potomac over the weekend. Mr. Eisenhower had golf. Mr. Kennedy had boating, Hyannisport, Palm Springs, and golf. Mr. Johnson has his ranch in Texas. So each one has a different way.

I told him I didn't expect him to do anything about it but I wondered if he wished to have a statement that night. Again he said, "No, look, a statement by myself as President on the death of Stalin is not one where you go off the cuff. ~~en~~ -- I think we'd better have a meeting on it early in the morning, not tonight, ~~early in the morning~~, first thing in the morning, and if you will round up so and so and so and so -- "

I think he asked me to call the Secretary of State back ^{at the meeting in the morning} and either have ^{at} the Secretary of State or the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the Russian side ^{at} of the State Department; ~~in~~ Bobby Cutler who was secretary of the National Security Council, General Andrew Goodpaster who was the President's staff man ^{who} ~~that~~ handled the confidential cables, the secret cables that come into the White House; myself; and I ~~think at the time~~ ^{was} C.D. Jackson, who ~~was~~ at that time ^{was} working with the government on, for lack of better words, ~~the~~ statements that related to the then hot or cold war, depending upon what month you were in. ~~We had a meeting and~~ ^{When} ~~as~~ you might xsuspect, ~~however~~ ^{When} I called these individuals ~~and~~ we had a general discussion on the phone ^{about} ^{Presidential} what the ^A statement should entail. ~~And in the morning~~ ^{USA result of these} before I went to bed that night I had a preliminary draft ^{it was} ~~from~~ conversations, ~~and had it~~ ready for the President when he came over to his office. ~~Remember~~, I think it was about 7 o'clock in the morning, something like that.

Hagerty: No.

Q: I was wondering, again a sensitive matter, if you had anything further from a public relations standpoint on the U-2?

Hagerty: Nothing except what I said before.

Q: On another speech, General Eisenhower's sort of farewell speech, what do you recall of that speech on the military industrial complex?

Hagerty: Well, I would think the genesis started the day he became President ^{and picked up} ~~and~~ throughout his eight years, I was privileged ^{with him} ~~again~~ in private conversations, and I think by now it's established what those private conversations were, ^{They occurred mainly while we} ~~that were~~ were traveling ~~many times~~ and I was the only staff officer, because where the President was, the press was ~~and~~ we had many, many, oh, hours and hours over the years ~~to be~~ alone, in a plane, in a car, in a hotel suite, for breakfast, for late dinner, where he would, to some extent just let his hair down and I'd listen. ^{The military industrial complex} ~~And this~~ was a rising concern to him, as I say, from the day he became President. It was about, I would say, midway through his second term when he started to say, "Jim, I'm going to make this speech. I'm going to make it ^{as} the last ^{major} speech before I leave office." That speech was straight Eisenhower, and it was

written, drafted, redrafted, off and on, ^{almost} ~~almost~~ for a year before he gave it. Maybe the words "drafted" are not quite correct, but it was outlined in his mind and in conversations, ^{that} ~~and~~ I can always remember, when ~~I saw~~ ^{he was} the actual written drafts that ~~he was~~ working on and going over and the final text as delivered on the air, ~~varied~~ varied very little from the discussions, the private discussions, that we'd had over the years. It was expanded and spelt out more in detail, but it was, ~~I would think~~ ^{same} ~~that this was really the product of being President for eight years and thinking about this problem.~~ I personally believe that in time, in time, it can be one of the most important speeches that an American President has ever made. It certainly contains a warning, and it certainly contains a prophesy that if we continue on the road this world is going, that we're going to be in serious trouble.

So I think it is one of his truly great speeches, ~~but again,~~ ^{this private conversation on the} ~~I repeat,~~ I can recall starting to talk privately about this ^{subject} ~~in his talking to me,~~ which sometimes ^{were his} ~~was~~ just thinking out loud. ~~I can remember this almost, I won't say from the day he became President, but on the first time we went away for any length of time from Washington, where we had time alone. As I say, about two years before he gave it, he said he was going to make this as his final speech before he left office.~~

Q: How would you characterize President Eisenhower's mood as he