

review
your Address before the United
Nations General Assembly. We expect
that major changes will have to be
made early tomorrow to reflect the
outcome of the Schulz/Shevardnadze
meetings. The portion that will be
substantially revised is bracketed
(at page 7 through page 12).

We will have a new draft for your
final review as soon as possible
tomorrow. However, we thought you
would want the chance to give us
your thoughts on the draft as it
stands now.

M

Rhett Dawson


I think there is too much
anti-Soviet preaching in view of
what we are trying to achieve right now.

And toward the end perhaps I still
would like my "fantasy" - how quickly
our differences would wither and vanish
if creatures from another planet should
threaten this world. RR

Reagan



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Message 971 of 1143 | [Previous](#) | [Next](#) | [Up Thread](#) | [Message Index](#)

Msg # G

From: "Dr. Jack Sarfatti" <sarfatti@w...>

Date: Thu May 3, 2001 2:12 pm

Subject: Re: UFO Disclosure Project.

Alexander Konkretny from Moscow wrote:

```
> http://disclosureproject.org/
>
> Hi Jack,
>
> Is this a hoax or something serious? What do you think?
>
> --
> ÐÒÏÆÃÓÓÌÒ á.6.ëÏÆÒÃÔÏÛÊ
```

Well, this is a can of worms. In the world of covert intelligence nothing is what it seems in this Looking Glass War. Disinformation lie told as a truth. Misinformation is a truth told as a lie or a fiction. In all of these things there is a mixture of disinformation misinformation.

Greer himself seems to make his living as another New Age Carny Flu Head taking money from gullible people he keeps up all night trying contact UFOs with flashlights and telepathic meditation like little pre-teen Cub Scouts round a midnight campfire with marshmallows crackling listening to ghost stories about the Booga Ooga Men. Well least they get some fresh air! :-)

I do not know about the lineup of witnesses. I was asked to be one myself but I refused because I am against Greer's political agenda is to keep weapons out of space and to stir anti-American feeling. Akchurin, of the Moscow Academy of Science, may remember that I wrote him back in 1980 about US-Soviet cooperation in space including mut

defense against the extra-terrestrial threat that General Douglas M Arthur warned about in his last West Point Speech "Duty, Honor, Country". Indeed, Colonel Phillip J. Corso was simply following Gen Mac Arthur's orders. President Bush's Missile Defense Plan with Russia as a co-partner today is pretty close to what I was suggesting to Akchurin 20 years ago. The time has now come. President Reagan's se allusions to common defense against the ET Threat was in large measure due to me via two independent channels of influence into the White at the time.

Are UFOs real? Yes, I think so.

Are ET's friendly and no military threat to us as Greer says? No, not all of them.

Do we need a joint US-Russian-NATO military force in space? Yes.

Do UFOs have to make long trips through ordinary space to reach us?

See <http://www.nidsci.org/articles/davis/whip.pdf>

which when combined with M-theory of superstrings in hyperspace lowers the electromagnetic field strengths needed to bend space into a Stargate by many powers of ten I strongly suspect. This is the basis of alien ET super technology that has been rendering US, NATO and Russian Air Defense "impotent and obsolete" for the past 50 years - the dirty little secret that President Reagan alluded to publicly.

--

CREATE, COMMUNICATE, COLLABORATE
<http://stardrive.org>

Message 971 of 1143 | [Previous](#) | [Next](#) | [Up Thread](#) | [Message Index](#) | [Msg #](#) [G](#)

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"...The White House Presidential aides had learned to do this with Reagan. It was common practice to start up the engines of the helicopter on the White House lawn just as Reagan exiting the building. In this way Reagan couldn't hear the questions being yelled by reporters, and the government security people would be spared any more alien invasion remarks. Reagan aides tried to institute a new rule banning questions during daily "photo opportunities." They feared Reagan saying something they couldn't take back. The White House Press office sometimes even cleaned up "his oral meanderings" before a text was released for public consumption. This practise had to stop when the writers were caught taking out statements Reagan has made to a newspaper about how certain he was that Amegeddan was near. Donald Regan best described the White House fear of what Reagan might say, " the goddamnedest things would come out of him."

" Mayer and McManus in their book Landslide pointed out that high school audiences were the group that those around Reagan feared the most. In fact just prior to this speech at Fallston High School (where Reagan made one of his alien remarks) Mike Deaver had vetoed a Q and A with another high school "on the theory that Reagan would be 'too loose' and speak too freely." Former White House aide Judi Buckelew described the White House fear of high school students:

made the effort to be civil toward each other, they could not conceal their animosity. There were long periods when Mrs. Reagan would make a point of barely speaking to the chief of staff, except in formal tones of disdain. At other times, she would enrage Regan with her demands, based on the latest astrological portents, that her husband's appointments or travel plans be changed. Nor was it only the signs of the zodiac that prompted her to call with her complaints. According to Regan, if she was unhappy with a speech that had been written for the President, she would call to insist that it be changed; or if she was dissatisfied with a member of the staff, she would badger Regan to get rid of him.

Apparently, such demands even extended to Cabinet officers. Regan later wrote that Mrs. Reagan pressured him to force the resignation of Labor Secretary Ray Donovan in early 1985 when the legal problems from his days as a New Jersey contractor caught up with him. And later that year, she waged a similar campaign to banish Margaret Heckler, the secretary of Health and Human Services. "You know Ronnie will never fire her," Regan quoted the First Lady as saying. "He can't even talk to a woman in a stern voice. She'll just twist him around her little finger."

Such intrusive behavior not only exasperated Regan but puzzled him. He was aware that Nancy Reagan was not the first President's wife who had tried to wield authority beyond her sphere. Eleanor Roosevelt and Rosalynn Carter, to cite just two, were strong-willed First Ladies who were accused of exerting undue influence. But Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Carter generally used their leverage within the context of the marital bond. What Regan found so intriguing about Mrs. Reagan was that instead of appealing directly to her husband, she maneuvered around him and tried to pressure his advisers. That odd approach led Regan to conclude that either she understood that her husband could not be counted on to take decisive action, or that Reagan, believing her views on policy and personnel were not to be taken seriously, merely humored her in his genial way. Of those two possibilities, Regan rather hoped the latter was the case.

The cold war between Mrs. Reagan and the chief of staff lasted until the autumn of 1986, when it turned hot and flared into open hostility. The Iran-Contra scandal exacerbated it. Mrs. Reagan was furious at Regan for his tasteless remark about the "shovel brigade," with its clear implication that Regan and his beleaguered

staff had to clean up the garbage that had been left by the President. The First Lady was also contemptuous of his unseemly behavior in the face of the criticisms being leveled at the White House. From the day he took over as chief of staff, Regan had boasted that he was the man in charge. Yet now he was cravenly trying to shift the blame onto McFarlane and others—anyone but himself. Nancy Reagan resented it; as far as she was concerned, Regan had failed in his duty to protect the President and therefore should be fired. Bringing about Regan's ouster became a prime objective in her life that fall, one she pursued unrelentingly.

But Don Regan was tenacious, and he fought hard to keep his job and defend his reputation. Yet it was a battle he practically had to fight alone. His contempt toward Congress and the press left him with virtually no allies in those two vital centers of power. Even within the administration, Regan had few supporters outside his own staff. There, too, his arrogance and autocratic methods had alienated many officials. His most powerful ally in the struggle to resist Mrs. Reagan's efforts to oust him was, oddly enough, her husband. The President still relished the pleasure of Regan's company, the locker-room camaraderie and bawdy jokes that enlivened their daily conversations. Beyond that, he was responsive to Regan's argument that he should be kept on; because of the scandal, the White House already had been rocked, and the President felt that he needed his trusty CEO to help him through the rest of the crisis.

Mrs. Reagan, in the meantime, had summoned Mike Deaver to help pull the rope on her end of the tug-of-war. There was irony in that, for two years earlier it was Deaver who had been recruited by Baker to sell Reagan on the idea of the job swap that put Regan into the White House, which he did with his memorable line "Mr. President, I've brought you a playmate your own age." Yet now, Deaver lent his support to the First Lady's campaign to get rid of Regan.

When Deaver and Mrs. Reagan presented their case to the President in early December 1986, he rejected their arguments. Reagan stoutly defended Regan's performance as chief of staff. He said that all the criticism of Regan's handling of the Iran-Contra affair was a "bum rap." So the next step, Deaver and Mrs. Reagan decided, was to bring in an influential outsider whose judgment the President respected. The man they chose was Robert Strauss, the former chairman of the Democratic National Com-

Key Administration Officials

I Executive Office of the President (26)

Chief of Staff (& Asst. to the President)

Baker, James Addison, III 1/22/1981 - 2/3/1985

Regan, Donald Thomas 2/2/1985 - 2/27/1987

Baker, Howard Henry 1985-88

Duberstein, Kenneth 1987-89

Deputy Chief of Staff (& Asst. to the President)

Deaver, Michael K. 1/22/1981 - 5/10/1985

Thomas, Dennis 1985-87

Duberstein, Kenneth 1987-88

Counsellor to the President

Meese, Edwin 1981-85

Press Secretary

Brady, James 1/22/81 - 1/89

Asst. to the President for National Security Affairs

Clark, William P. 1981-83

MacFarlane, Robert C. 1983-85

Carlucci, Frank C., III 1982-85

Powell, LTG Colin L. 1986-89

Deputy Asst. to the President for National Security Affairs

Nance, James W. 1981-82

Poindexter, VADM John M. 1983-86

Small, Karna 1984-86

Powell, LTG Colin L. 1986-89

Negroponte, John D.

Asst. to the President for Policy Development

Porter, Roger B. (D.A.?) 1982-85

Harper, Edwin L. 1981-89

Anderson, Martin 1981-82

Svahn, John A. 1981-87

Hobbs, Charles D. 1984-88

Bauer, Gary L. 1987-89

Counsel to the President

Fielding, Fred 1981-86

Wallison, Peter J. 1985-87

Culvahouse, Arthur B., Jr. 3/21/1987 - 1/21/1989

Asst. to the President for Public Liaison

Dole, Elizabeth H. 1981-83

Whittlesey, Faith R. 1983-85

Chavez, Linda Gerst (Deputy Assistant) 4/21/1985 - 86

Maseng, Mari 1986-6/87

Range, Rebecca 1987-89

Asst. to the President for Legislative Affairs

Duberstein, Kenneth M. 1981-83

Oglesby, M.B., Jr. 1981-86

Ball, William Lock, III 1981-88

Asst. to the President for Presidential Personnel

Pendleton, James E.

Herrington, John S. 1981-85

Tuttle, Robert H. 1985-88

Asst. to the President for Political Affairs

Rollins, Edward J. 1981-83

Asst. to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs

Williamson, Richard S. 2/12/1981 - 88

Verstandig, Lee L. 6/1/1983 - 85

Daniels, Mitchell E., Jr. 3/26/1985 – 88

Asst. to the President for Political and Intergovernmental Affairs

Daniels, Mitchell E., Jr. 11/17/1985 - 88

Donatelli, Frank J. 1984-89

Asst. to the President for Cabinet Affairs

Fuller, Craig 1981-85

Kingon, Alfred K. 1985-87

Risque, Nancy J. 1987-89

Asst. to the President for Communications

Gergan, David R. 1/22/1981 - 1/15/1985

Buchanan, Patrick J. 1985-87

Griscom, Thomas C. 1987-88

Director, Office of Management and Budget (OMB)

Stockman, David A. 1/27/1981 - 7/1985

Miller, James C., III 10/5/1985 - 10/15/1988

Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget (OMB)

Harper, Edwin L. 3/3/1981 - 3/1/1982

Wright, Joseph R., Jr. 4/20/1982 - 1/21/1989

Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors (CEA)

Weidenbaum, Murry L. 2/27/1981 - 9/1/1982

Feldstein, Martin 1982 - 7/10/1984

Sprinkel, Beryl Wayne 4/18/1985 - 1/21/1989

Members, Council of Economic Advisors (CEA)

Niskanen, William A. 1981-84

Moore, Thomas Gale 1983-88

Jordan, Jerry 1981-82

Poole, William, VII 1982-84

Mussa, Michael L. 1985-88

U. S. Trade Representative (USTR)

Brock, William F., III

Yuetter, Clayton 6/28/1985 – END

Deputy, U.S. Trade Representative

MacDonald, David R.

Smith, Michael B.

Lighthizer, Robert E.

Woods, M. Alan

Holmer, Alan F.

Smith, Michael B.

Murphy, Peter O.

Samuels, Michael A.

Science Advisor and Director, Office of Science & Technology Policy

Keyworth, George A., II 1981-85

Graham, William R., Jr. 1986-89

Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Armstrong, Anne L. 1/13/1982 -

Chairman, President's Intelligence Oversight Board

Campbell, W. Glenn 1/13/1982 -

Physician to the President

Ruge, Dr. Daniel A.

Hutton, John E., M.D.

Mike James January 18, 1998

One of Ronald Reagan's National Security Staff members told Steven Greer point blank that if they didn't want the President to know something, they just lied to him (what can the President do?) Greer asked if they lied on a direct inquiry on a subject? He said oh, ya it's done all the time. He was very glib and cynical about it.

Steve Bassett & Steven Greer

1/18/98

Radio Show "Reality & Delusion"

~~WEEK~~ Mike James

Media Hubble Jan 5, 98

200 Press Releases ^{with} briefing of Clinton ^{confirming Hubble}

Debra Crane New York Post ^{statement}

Wash Bureau ^{NYT} did 2 principal stories on

Walter Hubble - interviewed Greer.

extensive briefing of WH staff not covered

One of Ronald Reagan's National Security ^{advisors} Staff Members told me if they didn't want the Press to know something, they just lie to him. It's done all

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (021117)			
1. telegram	from Pope John Paul II to the President Re: Shuttle Columbia (1p)	4/15/81	P1
2. memo (023170)	from Geoffrey Kemp to Richard Allen re: themes the President might want to stress on first shuttle launch and landing (4pp, including NSC profile sheet)	3/23/81	P1
3. cable (024444)	from Secretary of State Wash. to American Embassy Paris re: congratulatory message from Giscard d'Estaing re: launching of space shuttle (1p)	5/9/81	P1
COLLECTION:			
WHORM: Subject File			smf
FILE FOLDER:			
OS001 Space Flight (021000-025999)			7/19/94

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



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196

Buchanan director of Communications

198

Feb 1985 (controlled Public Liaison as

well)

Nixon created office of communication

1, 2

(message of day, polling) Ford wanted openness

134, 161, 194

^{RR} 1 1/2 yrs into pres, cameras allowed in, not

196, 197

reporters

Reagan & Bush Intelligence Chapter Six

CIA described Reagan and Bush as total opposites in "familiarity with and use of intelligence."

Reagan "had the least experience as a regular consumer of national-level intelligence of any President elected since the CIA was founded."

Bush "was completely familiar and comfortable with intelligence in a way that only a former director of Central Intelligence could be"

Reagan according to the CIA "brought to the presidency deep convictions about key national security issues and felt the need for only limited, very general intelligence information."

As a candidate Ronald Reagan received only one intelligence briefing. It was held Oct 4, 1980 at Wexford, a borrowed country estate where Reagan was staying.

DCI Stansfield Turner and three senior agency officials conducted the briefing to Reagan and Bush

the CIA described the event based on some of the participants as "a circus" - chaired scattered randomly around the room and people coming and going...one hour

"The CIA participants had the feeling that the Reagan camp had accepted the briefing simply because it had been offered and they had to do it. There was no evidence that anyone had the expectation that anyone had the expectation that the Governor would engage in an in-depth review of the substantive issues...most of the questions asked were by Richard Allen, National security advisor to the campaign

Briefed November 19 and 20th, December 11 and 15 at Blair House

Nov. 19 session so crowded around the table it was almost impossible to find a place to sit down December 11, not nearly as many questions as Carter had asked. Didn't last long

During transition Reagan and his aides felt that the offer for daily intelligence briefing might be an effort of Carter and his National security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to "put one over on him" They felt there was nothing they could learn that wasn't in the papers

Vice-President elect Bush worked to change the opinion

Mrs Reagan "displayed some uneasiness that she was not privy to what her husband was hearing" PDB...staffers that sat in on the PDB were never concerned with what it contained. They were just concerned "it didn't take too long."

As President elect Reagan was somewhat upset with reading all the foreign intelligence items which he could not do anything about yet but he "was most interested in the items provided him on how foreign leaders and government were reacting to his election"

Dixon Davis "The problem with Ronald Reagan was that all his ideas were all fixed. He knew what he thought about everything --he was an old dog."

Given a complex paper on the Palestinians, the different types, beliefs etc. Reagan commented "They are all terrorists, aren't they?"

Bush read the "current intelligence publication every day and requested a great deal of additional support for his meetings with foreign leaders

His staff tried to control his time...the CIA was cut off

"Intelligence support was provided to the President only indirectly through the national Security Advisor, except in those cases where the CIA Director himself had the chance to meet with the President."

The PDB went to Allen who gave it to Reagan

Washington Times, 3600 New York Ave. NE, Washington DC 20002, Tel: 202-636-3000.

The Washington Times is DC's other newspaper. It is owned by Rev. Moon's Unification Church and has operated at a loss since it started in 1982. If it weren't for the fact that they use the wire services for much of their coverage, their conservatism would be evident in almost every column-inch that they print. Their main function, it would seem, is to make the Washington Post more self-conscious and nervous about liberalism. It has worked beautifully -- the op-ed page in the Post during the 1980s was almost interchangeable with the Washington Times.

The Times was President Reagan's favorite paper, and Washington neocons fawned over them. When the Times was feeling their oats in the 1980s they became almost cocky, filling their pages with tributes to the wisdom and adventures of various anti-Communists. With the Post afraid to sneeze toward their Right, and the DC Left nowhere to be seen, the Times became a valuable source for tracking interesting people. Strangely enough, they were also more willing than the Post to print CIA names.

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Sheila MacRae
Carol Publishing Group
600 Madison Ave.
New York N.Y. 10022-1615

August 13, 2000

Dear Ms. MacRae,

I have written to ask you a couple questions about conversations you had many years ago with the late Jackie Gleason. According to William A. Henry 111, you shared an interest in psychic phenomena with Mr. Gleason and Jackie talked to you about it quite often.

As you probably already know, Jackie Gleason also had a very strong interest in UFOs. I am writing to see if you have any recollections about discussing this subject.

I am working on a manuscript that includes a long section on the US Presidents and their involvement in the UFO mystery. As you probably also already know Mr. Gleason had a close relationship with many Presidents. Mr. James Bacon stated that Jackie had said that he discussed the subject with four Presidents.

In addition Mr. Gleason had an experience in 1973 where President Nixon took him to Homestead Air Force Base and showed him a downed saucer and the bodies of the occupants. This story was told by his second wife, and Jackie told it to a researcher in Peekskill a year before he died.

I would appreciate anything that Jackie told you that would add to our understanding of his interest in UFOs. If you wish I will send you the section on Richard Nixon which details a few of Jackie Gleason's stories.

I hope you can help.

Sincerely



Grant Cameron
649 Silverstone Ave.
Winnipeg Manitoba
Canada R3T 2V8

"I was in a plane last week when I looked out the window and saw this white light. It was zigzagging around. I went up to the pilot and said, 'Have you ever seen anything like that?' He was

shocked and he said, 'Nope.' And I said to him: 'Let's follow it!' We followed it for several minutes.

It was a bright white light. We followed it to Bakersfield, and all of a sudden to our utter amazement

it went straight up into the heavens."

Reagan
Ronald Reagan, then Governor of California describing his alleged sighting of a UFO in 1974 to veteran newsman Norman C. Miller, then Washington bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal. This quote may be verified or at least verifiable, but as far as I know, there is no recording of this and none of the parties involved have come forward except for Reagan's Pilot (See Gov't Quotes). (Source: CSETI) It is interesting to note in light of this alleged report that on at least three occasions Reagan speculated publicly about how the nations of the world might come together in the face of an extraterrestrial presence.

—
Former U.S. President, Jimmy Carter, five-time nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize

"I am convinced that UFOs exist because I have seen one."

Carter
"It was the darndest thing I've ever seen. It was big, it was very bright, it changed colors and it was about the size of the moon. We watched it for ten minutes, but none of us could figure out what it was. One thing's for sure, I'll never make fun of people who say they've seen unidentified objects in the sky. If I become President, I'll make every piece of information this country has about UFO sightings available to the public and the scientists." --describing an alleged UFO sighting he had in October of 1969 to reporters while campaigning in 1976.

—
"As far as I know, an alien spacecraft did not crash in Roswell, New Mexico, in 1947. ... If the United States Air Force did recover alien bodies, they didn't tell me about it either, and I want to know."

Clinton
-U.S. President Bill Clinton--In reply to a letter from a child asking about the Roswell Incident.

—
"Yes." --Senator Goldwater's response to Larry King's question: "Do you think our government knows UFOs are real and are keeping this fact from the American public?"

—
"The phenomenon of UFOs does exist, and it must be treated seriously."

-Former Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev (Soviet Youth, May 4, 1990) *(I)*

Reagan
"I was the pilot of the plane when we saw the UFO. Also on board were Governor Reagan and a couple of his security people. We were flying a Cessna Citation. It was maybe 9 or 10 o'clock at night. We were near Bakersfield, California when Governor Reagan and the others called my attention to a big light flying a bit behind my plane. It appeared to be several hundred yards away. It was a fairly steady light until it began to accelerate, then it appeared to elongate. Then the light took

John Russellot

- ~~for~~ RR toured for general electric
- RR did a speech for Russellot

RR writes a great deal of his own material

Griscom

Dir. of Commun.

(1987-88)

John. H. Rousselot
Office of Public Liaison
Special Assist to President
and Deputy Director of
Defense (1983)

after two and a half hours of flight and some thirty miles past the Costa Rican border, a patrol of Sandinista soldiers, resting in the jungle after straying from their command, heard the sound of an approaching plane. Through a break in the clouds, they saw the old C-123 moving slowly toward them at an altitude of about eight hundred feet. Nineteen-year-old José Fernández Canales quickly set up his shoulder-carried Russian-made SAM-7 missile launcher. He fired. Seconds later the missile hit the plane's right wing. As the plane began spiraling down toward the jungle, a former U.S. marine named Eugene Hasenfus, standing by the cargo door from which he was supposed to kick out supplies for a parachute drop, made an instantaneous decision. He jumped. While Hasenfus floated to the ground by parachute, the plane crashed into the jungle. Three Americans died. Hasenfus survived and was captured.

In the wreckage Sandinista soldiers found logbooks and other documents linking the dead Americans with Southern Air Transport of Miami, an airline identified in the earlier CBS reports as involved in contra operations and well known as a former CIA charter airline. They also found an ID card that had been issued to Hasenfus by Salvadoran authorities. It identified him as an "adviser" in the "Grupo USA" group at Ilopango. Other documents recovered linked the crew with an office in Washington, D.C.

Soon Hasenfus told his captors that his real employer was not the "dummy" Enterprise company in Panama called Udall Resources, Inc., that ostensibly paid the bills; he believed he was working for the CIA on missions to drop arms to the contras. This news was immediately flashed to the world by the Sandinistas.

Hasenfus also identified the man who commanded the secret contra resupply missions in El Salvador for the Enterprise, a veteran Cuban-American former CIA agent whose code name was Max Gomez. In reality, he was Felix Rodriguez, another in the long line of Bay of Pigs connections with U.S. secret operations in Central America in the 1980s. Rodriguez had been in charge of Brigade 2506 infiltration teams for the Bay of Pigs invasion and continued anti-Castro clandestine work with groups headed by Manuel Artime in later years. José Blandón, the close aide to Panama's Torrijos and afterward head of Panamanian political intelligence for Noriega, said that Rodriguez had been involved with Israeli Mike Harari in the

early guns and drugs smuggling operations for the contras. Ramon Milian Rodriguez, the Cuban-American drug cartel money launderer from Miami and former accountant for Artime, also claimed that Felix Rodriguez had requested and received a ten-million-dollar contribution in drug money for the contras. This cartel money was funneled to the contras, Ramon Milian Rodriguez said, through a series of "front" companies he controlled in Miami. Felix Rodriguez denied it.

Moments after learning that an American had been captured after the plane crash, the CIA station chief in El Salvador dispatched a secret message to Richard Secord's top deputy in Washington: "Situation requires we do necessary damage control." Felix Rodriguez also immediately placed an urgent call to Washington, trying to reach his old friend and former CIA colleague from Vietnam duty Donald Gregg, then the national security adviser to Vice President George Bush. Gregg had worked closely with Rodriguez and North but denied that he was aware of the extent of the secret aid efforts for the contras; he knew firsthand only of U.S. covert assistance against the Salvadoran rebels. He emphatically denied that Vice President Bush, a former head of the CIA, knew or had been briefed about the contra operations that Rodriguez directed.*

In Washington Secretary of State Shultz flatly denied any U.S. involvement. The Hasenfus aircraft had been "hired by private people," he said, "who had no connection with the U.S. government at all."

Questions continued. So did the predictable barrage of press stories raising still more embarrassing ones. When Reagan next met with reporters, he was asked if the downed aircraft had any connection with the U.S. government. "Absolutely none," he told White House reporters. The president also said: "There is no government connection with that at all. . . . We've been aware that there are

*Later it was determined that Rodriguez had met three times with Bush in Washington while he was directing contra resupply operations from El Salvador. There had also been seventeen contacts or meetings between Rodriguez and the vice president's office. On May 1, 1986, Rodriguez and Bush met in Washington for what the vice president's scheduling memo described as: "To brief the Vice President on the status of the war in El Salvador and resupply of the Contras." Three years later Gregg testified that the memo must have been the result of a typist's error. Instead of "resupply of the contras," he said, the subject for discussion might

leading his briefing books for the 1983 Williamsburg economic summit.

To budget director David Stockman, Reagan "seemed so serene and passive," and "gave no orders, no commands; asked for no information; expressed no urgency." Stockman recalled that whenever there was an argument, Reagan would smile and say: "Okay, you fellas work it out." Martin Anderson remembered: "Essentially, he just responded to whatever was brought to his attention and said yes or no, or I'll think about it." One aide marveled: "He does not know in any specific way what most of us do or how we do it." Donald Regan maintained that "Reagan seldom criticized, seldom complained, never scolded. Not even the Iran-Contra debacle could provoke him into harsh words, much less subordinates who had let him down. Never—absolutely never in my experience—did President Reagan really lose his temper or utter a rude or unkind word. Never did he issue a direct order, although I, at least, sometimes devoutly wished he would."

When Frank Carlucci walked out of his first meeting with Reagan as his new national security adviser, a meeting in which Reagan had not given any clear guidance, Carlucci turned to his deputy Colin Powell and quipped, "Gee, Colin, I didn't think we signed on to run the country." "You didn't always get crisp guidance from Ronald Reagan," said Carlucci. "We would go back to our office and say, 'Now where do you think the president would have come out?'" He placed great faith in his subordinates. That was what exposed him to the abuses of Iran-Contra."

Reagan's detached, gentle "niceness" caused some of his officials to yearn for a boss who would blow his stack at least once in a while. "There's never been any discipline or rewards from higher up, no matter what you do," one aide lamented in 1987. "I've never heard 'Good job,' or been chewed out." "Nobody ever feared the old man," Ed Rollins observed, identifying one of Reagan's executive Achilles' heels. "He had their affection but not their respect." Reagan hated to fire people, as do most presidents. Donald Regan explained, "He could not bring himself to look somebody in the eye and say OK, you son of a bitch, if that's the way you want it, you've got it—You're fired." The result was that administration officials had to waste a great deal of time scheming and maneuvering, often with the help of Nancy Reagan, to finally push people overboard when Reagan couldn't act.

The Iran-Contra affair exposed the risks of Reagan's executive style, including his frequent detachment and over-delegation of authority. It was a tangled fiasco that severely damaged Reagan's presidency and triggered a congressional reprimand of Reagan's dangerously lax management style. The affair saw the breakdown of Reagan's national security apparatus, as NSC

officials sold 2,004 TOW antitank missiles and spare parts to Iran in exchange for three American hostages in Lebanon, with some \$3.8 million in profits going to secretly fund the Nicaraguan *contras*. The freed hostages were quickly replaced by three more kidnapped Americans. Reagan directly approved the arms sales to Iran as part of a deliberate strategy to improve relations with Iran and to facilitate the release of the hostages, but it is not clear if Reagan approved the diversion of profits to the *contras*.

In a White House organizational chart of the period, National Security Adviser John Poindexter, who supervised the Iran-Contra operation, is shown reporting to both Regan and Reagan—a bureaucratic confusion that led Poindexter, in effect, sometimes to report to neither of them. The responsibility for this muddle was Ronald Reagan's, since he signed off on it. Reagan admitted that "no one kept proper records of meetings or decisions," so he could not recall if he signed off on the first Israeli arms delivery to Iran before or after it occurred. "Reagan had a total incapacity to manage even the mildest detail," argued veteran White House official James Schlesinger. "He was an executive who could not execute. We probably have not had as good a chief of state since George Washington, but he was a dreadful, dreadful chief of government. He really didn't know what was going on most of the time. Therefore he was subject to manipulation by whomever he trusted."

Reagan's trusting, passive executive style left him wide open for both manipulation and miscommunication. A longtime Reagan aide said, "I'm a firm believer that he was at fault for not trying to find out what was going on, but to him it was just one act in a many-ringed circus, and it was either not communicated to him or it was communicated in a way that he just didn't connect." Veteran NSC insider Brent Scowcroft said that the reorganized second-term White House exacerbated Reagan's biggest executive flaw: "He does not have an inquiring style about him." Scowcroft speculated that Reagan could have approved the diversion of arms profits to the *contras* without realizing it.

The report of Reagan's own Tower Commission which investigated the scandal charged "at no time did he insist on accountability and performance review." The report noted, "The president's management style is to put the principal responsibility for policy review and implementation on the shoulders of his advisers. Nevertheless, with such a complex, high-risk operation and so much at stake, the president should have ensured that the NSC system did not fail him. He did not force his policy to undergo the most critical review of which the NSC participants and the process were capable." The majority report of the congressional committee investigating Iran-Contra was

Before he resigned as Reagan's third national security adviser, Robert McFarlane shook his head and said, "He knows so little and accomplishes so much." Years later, McFarlane's bewilderment grew. In 1991, he mused, "Jimmy Carter just by default left him this legacy of a readiness on the part of the American people to spend money on national security. Number two, he happened to serve at a time when the Soviet Union collapsed. He contributed to that, but he is the beneficiary of something that was not of his own creation, at least not entirely. All in all, and I'm just talking about foreign policy, there isn't anything you can really say that Ronald Reagan—by dint of intellect and skill in diplomacy or imagination—did." "You couldn't figure him out like a fact," wrote George Shultz, "because to Reagan the main fact was a vision."

Reagan's struggle to achieve his vision of a soaring American economy was only partly fulfilled. When he took office, the economy was in its worst shape in forty years. Under Reagan the longest expansion in U.S. peacetime history occurred, without serious inflation, creating over 16 million new jobs. The inflation rate, 12.5 percent in Carter's last year, was down to 4.4 percent in 1988, and the unemployment rate was reduced from 7.1 percent to 5.5 percent, while the prime interest rate fell nearly six points to 9.3 percent. In the process, Reagan's military spending spree ignited huge deficits, and tripled the national debt to \$2.7 trillion. "Every budget that I submitted to the Congress is lower than what the Congress was proposing," Reagan argued in 1991, "and every one of my budgets was put on the shelf, and they called it dead on arrival."

In his last Oval Office interview as president, Reagan was asked to describe his presidency in one line. "We won the Cold War," he said quickly. Richard Allen argued, "The democratization of the world occurred under Ronald Reagan. Not only eventually in Russia and the Soviet bloc, but Taiwan, the Philippines, Korea, all of Latin America democratized." Robert Gates argued, "It was Ronald Reagan who made the critical strategic decisions to return to negotiating with the Soviets, first in arms control, and then in negotiating solutions to a number of Third World conflicts, beginning with Afghanistan." In 1991, Margaret Thatcher announced simply, "He won the Cold War without firing a shot." In a 1996 *New York Times*/CBS poll, Reagan was ranked the number two president among Americans when asked who they'd want to run the country today. He placed second only to John Kennedy, and beat the next three (FDR, Truman, and Lincoln) by a wide margin. Scholars already revising their estimates of Reagan upward: in a 1997 *Chicago Sun Times* poll of historians, he ranked in the top third, at number ten.

Reagan was not a totally detached and disengaged executive. In what he

considered the most important functions of the presidency—superpower and congressional relations and communicating with the public—he was hands-on and effective in pursuing his radical vision. It was the narrowness of his executive agenda and attention that nearly killed his presidency.

Ronald Reagan's executive style was too trusting in human nature, and he clung to a flawed understanding of the chief executive's role. Halfway into his presidency, as the Iran-Contra scandal was about to break, he told *Fortune* magazine, "I believe that you surround yourself with the best people you can find, delegate authority, and don't interfere as long as the overall policy that you've decided upon is being carried out." By adopting this system he abdicated his responsibility to inspect his subordinates' work, to prod, to follow up, to ask tough questions, to clarify, to challenge assumptions, and most of all, to insist on accountability from his people.

Reagan demonstrated that even the greatest visionary must have his dreams tethered to an effective system for managing them. As an operational executive he was dangerously incomplete, but as a visionary executive in a turbulent time, America will see few stronger than Ronald Reagan.

In his last moments in the Oval Office, Reagan wrote a note to incoming president George Bush on a notepad inscribed DON'T LET THE TURKEYS GET YOU DOWN and stashed it in the desk drawer. Spotting National Security Adviser Colin Powell, Reagan reached into his coat pocket and pulled out the white laminated card he had carried with him for the past eight years containing the nuclear launch codes. "Oh, who do I give these to?" Powell told him a military aide would take it from him after the new president was sworn in, but thanks in large part to Reagan's work, the card was now almost irrelevant. These last moments in the office were captured by the quiet, ubiquitous White House TV crew.

Reagan sadly looked around one last time at the now darkened and bare office.

He reached down to touch the desk, threw his shoulders back, and marched out the door.