



From: "Kennedy Library" <Kennedy.Library@nara.gov>
To: <presidentialufo@presidency.com>
Cc: "File File" <File.File@nara.gov>
Subject: Re: November 12, 1963 Speech
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2003 08:40:00 -0400

Dear Mr. Cameron:

Many references to this fictitious speech exist in assassination theorist material. Supposedly, the President was discussing changes in the Federal Reserve and the gold standard, and this topic was somehow linked to his assassination. Others also claim he said, "The high office of President has been used to foment a plot to destroy American freedom, and before I leave office I must inform the citizen of his plight." But the simple fact is that President John F. Kennedy did not speak at Columbia University in November of 1963, or at any other time.

Those who believe in the "fact" of President Kennedy having made such a speech, either at Columbia or some other place, will simply deny this denial. At best, they will say that because "all or most records" have been destroyed, we simply don't know the truth; at worst, they will claim that there is a conspiracy to keep this issue silent. If someone chooses to believe in the existence of this speech, he or she does so as a matter of faith, which is fine, as long as that person realizes that it is religion and not history in which he or she is dealing.

Yours truly,

Reference Archivist
 John F. Kennedy Library

>>> "Grant Cameron" <presidentialufo@presidency.com>
 10/18/03 12:24PM >>>

Was there a Kennedy speech at Columbia University on November 12, 1963?

Grant

"I still believe in $e=mc^2$, but I can't believe that in all of human history, we'll never ever be able to go beyond the speed of light to reach where we want to. I happen to believe that mankind can do it." General Wesley Clark

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In 1960, radioastronomer Frank D. Drake, then at the National Radio Astronomy Observatory (NRAO) in Green Bank, West Virginia, carried out humanity's first attempt to detect interstellar radio transmissions. Project Ozma was named after the queen of L. Frank Baum's imaginary land of Oz -- a place "very far away, difficult to reach, and populated by strange and exotic beings." The stars chosen by Drake for the first SETI search were Tau Ceti in the Constellation Cetus (the Whale) and Epsilon Eridani in the Constellation Eridanus (the River), some eleven light years (66 trillion miles) away. Both stars are about the same age as our sun.

From April to July 1960, for six hours a day, Project Ozma's 85-foot NRAO radio telescope was tuned to the 21-centimeter emission (1420 MHz) coming from cold hydrogen gas in interstellar space. A single 100 Hz channel receiver scanned 400 kHz of bandwidth. The astronomers scanned the tapes for a repeated series of uniformly patterned pulses that would indicate an intelligent message or a series of prime numbers such as 1, 2, 3, 5 or 7. With the exception of an early false alarm caused by a secret military experiment, the only sound that came from the loudspeaker was static and no meaningful bumps superimposed themselves on the formless wiggles on the recording paper. After Project Ozma's pioneering steps, systematic searches for the technological manifestations of civilizations on the planets of other stars became a feasible scientific objective.

Project Ozma

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383. Memorandum From Maxwell W. Hunter II of the National Aeronautics and Space Council to Robert F. Packard of the Office of International Scientific Affairs/1/

Washington, July 18, 1963.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960-63, SP 16. Official Use Only.

SUBJECT

Thoughts on the Space Alien Race Question

During recent discussions the question has occasionally, though rarely, arisen that perhaps we should consider the policy question of what to do if an alien intelligence is discovered in space. Some discussion of this occurred, as you will recall, during deliberations on BNSP Task I. This memo contains some miscellaneous thoughts on the question.

The consensus of scientific view says, with quite good reasons, that the possibility of running across an alien intelligent race in our solar system is negligible. This is due primarily to the presumed unsuitability of conditions upon other planets to support life as we know it. The flying saucer advocates claim, of course, that the scientific viewpoint is nonsense, and that there is overwhelming evidence of such beings. In my own mind, I find it difficult to side with the flying saucer advocates, but the almost total impossibility envisioned by most scientists also is disturbing. Therefore, I present the problem in current perspective, as I see it.

Up until a few decades ago it seemed very improbable that intelligent life existed anywhere outside of the solar system. The chief reasons for this were a combination of scientific theory, scientific knowledge, and religious belief. The most widely accepted scientific theory as to the formation of the solar planetary system held that it was a result of the near collision of two stars. Since such a precise near-miss of two stars would be an extremely rare event, it followed that there would be very few other planetary systems in the universe and, indeed, perhaps this was the only one. Religious belief said, furthermore, that life was a gift bestowed by God. This was a relatively undisputed point since no scientific data existed to bridge the gap between non-living and living materials.

The situation today is vastly changed in these respects. The most widely held theory of stellar formation would predict the formation of planetary systems to be a natural consequence of stellar evolution. On this basis, most stars would possess planetary systems, and the number of habitable planets in our galaxy would be tremendous. Our biggest telescopes cannot resolve planets at the distances even of the nearest stars, so no direct confirmation is yet available. In my own mind, however, the wide prevalence of multiple stars is an overwhelming hint in support of this theory. In addition, the biological sciences have almost completely traced a series of natural occurrences which lead from inanimate molecules to elementary living viruses. Thus, we have the current scientific theory and data not only that there are a huge number of planets in the galaxy, but that life is quite likely to arise spontaneously on a large number of these. This, of course, does not necessarily imply intelligent life. Modern theology is not necessarily incompatible with this. The description in Genesis of the Creation certainly is a better picture of the current theory than of a stellar collision, and since God only spent seven days on this system, He has clearly had lots of time to create many more systems.

Even granting a probable existence of much life in the galaxy, there is still the question of whether another intelligent race exists in our solar system. There are, of course, two methods of its establishment in our system. One of these is that it originated on some other planet, for instance, Mars. Some of the spectacular markings of Mars have been interpreted as indicating intelligence. In particular, the famous "Canali" are rather narrow, and always run from one prominent marking to another, frequently with round splotches at intersections. As far as I know, no one has discovered a "Canali" which goes nowhere. This has quite understandably stimulated much conversation. In fact, a number of decades ago, when scientists thought that any life on other stellar systems was very remote, they seemed to feel that intelligent life probably existed on our other planets. Some of the discussions about life on Mars at the turn of the century seem to indicate a strong urge to want to find intelligent life elsewhere. Today, the situation is completely reversed, and although intelligent life is considered quite probable among the stars, it is held to be quite unlikely within the solar system. We seem more eager to listen with Ozma than to look closely at Canali.

One school of flying saucer advocates claims that the Martians have been mining our moon for natural resources for some time. At first thought, one would think they would rather mine earth. It is interesting to speculate, however, upon space flight from the point of view of a Martian. The escape speed of Mars is only 16,500 fps, and, of course, braking speed on our moon is less than 10,000 fps. Thus, Martians looking at earth would tend to view it the same way Terrestrials look at Jupiter. Our moon might not be less work to get to, since atmospheric braking to earth is possible, but would be very much easier to return from, while the energy requirements to go to and return from the surface of the earth might well be so high as to discourage interest, at least initially. Interestingly enough, even a normal high energy chemical rocket could make a trip from Mars to our moon at favorable times while carrying almost 10% of its gross weight in payload. Space flight starting from Mars, then, is a much easier prospect than starting from Terra. If a suitable refueling base had been painfully established on our moon, the operation could be done quite commendably with merely chemical energy. (The aforementioned high energy chemical rocket could carry at favorable times almost 50% payload back to Mars.) Of course, many flying saucer advocates claim that the discovery of both Martian moons within a week in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century indicates that they are large artificial space stations, otherwise they would have been found earlier. If we were to discover Martians on the moon, it would result in surprisingly little readjustment of our scientific thinking. The biggest question would be why they were there rather than among the Asteroids.

In fact, if we were not as scientifically sure of ourselves as we are, three recent events would be hailed as broad hints of intelligent life on the moon. (1) The discovery of hot gasses emanating from the crater Alphonsus when the moon was supposedly dead. This would be considered evidence of civilization and, since Alphonsus is close to the visible edge, interpreted to mean that the other side of the moon was teeming with population which had begun to spill around to this side. (2) The infra-red scans which show hot spots. These would be interpreted as indications of cities or at least mining camps. (3) The fact that no lunar or planetary probe of significance has been successful, in spite of major efforts on the part of two very successful earth orbitfaring nations. It would be supposed that someone was denying us deep space. (The other-side-of-the-moon pictures from Lunik III show no details of consequence, and the same can be said of the data from Mariner II compared to what we had already known about Venus from earth-based measurements.) Should the Martians have colonized the moon without discovering nuclear energy, then they represent no real problem, and our current national policy would be made to order for the situation. If all of this were true, of course, I would expect the Martians to be scared to death of what they have seen recently on this planet, and would expect that the highest priority development program in the solar system is being conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission of Mars.

Even if we are secure in our belief that intelligent life never would develop on Mars or some other solar planet, there is still the question of visitors to the solar system from other stellar systems. This is normally written off as an extremely low probability, due to the tremendous distances between stars, and the Einstein limitation on travel faster than the speed of light. Therefore, even if there are a large number of intelligent life forms in the galaxy, and even if they are continuously searching for other races, the frequency of investigation of any stellar system would be only once in many thousands of years and contact would rarely, if ever, be achieved. It might never be achieved, since presumably intelligent races die out. (What happened to the planet whose pieces now are spread around the Asteroid Belt? Or, for that matter, why is Uranus lying on its side?) I am not sure that this travel restriction is quite as infallible as it sounds. I believe that it is possible with what we now know about nuclear energy to envision ships driven at half to three-quarters of the speed of light. This, since the galaxy is 100,000 light-years across, still does not make a search of the entire galaxy feasible within the life span of the average man. But suppose some race under pressure of population explosion were expanding as fast as technically feasible from star to star throughout the galaxy. If their ships averaged half the speed of light, and if, on the average, they stopped every 10 light-years for a twenty-year stay at a stellar system to deposit colonists, refuel, and build extra ships, they would only take two hundred thousand years, starting at the center of the galaxy, to spread throughout the whole system. Since the earliest known remains of man have recently been dated at approximately one million seven hundred thousand years, a sustained drive for merely two hundred thousand years may not be unreasonable. Of course, if we were to run across representatives of this kind of interstellar race, they would not be nearly as tame as the previously hypothesized chemical Martians, and our policy would need to be revised accordingly. Fortunately, travel time restrictions would inhibit their ability to bring all forces to bear, in case we should develop differences of viewpoint.

The third possibility, scientifically abhorrent, is that the Einstein theory may only be an approximation, and an alien race which actually travels faster than light exists. If we were to meet such a race, our policy had better be to negotiate fast, because the implications of their far better understanding and control of the fundamental forces of nature would be obvious. If all the scientific speculation were to turn out wrong and we

were to stumble across an alien race, we would want to know as quickly as possible which of the three types I have indicated it was, as our diplomatic policy would damned well be influenced by the results.

Conclusions

Although all plausible scientific thinking suggests that we will not find any other intelligence race, the probability that we will is finite, and perhaps should not be completely ignored. Were we to find one, the question of whether it was a race with primitive chemical space flight, space flight equivalent to our best understanding of nuclear energy, or space flight based on physics beyond Einstein should be ascertained as rapidly as possible, since our policies would be affected in the most drastically possible way. In any event, a policy of the immediate burying of all Terrestrial hatchets would likely be in order. Even if we only found tame chemical Martians, or merely the debris from some intragalactic survey mission, it would be a good idea to proceed on the assumption that the human race would finally have found a bigger problem than the ones it has created for itself. There likely is nothing to be done at the moment to prepare for these possibilities (the only body of writing on the subject available in an emergency is science fiction), because no one of consequence is going to take this rubbish seriously unless it happens. At that point, our policy will be determined in the traditional manner of grand panic.

Maxwell W. Hunter, II

John F. Kennedy

John F. Kennedy was the first President born in the Twentieth Century. Among his attributes, he read much, wrote some history. But he contributed to the history of astronautics despite his tragically-terminated presence. Perhaps his inner sense of history as well as the greatness of his contribution to man's initial voyages away from planet Earth are not even fully appreciated today. The horror of Dallas yet seems to block some memories of what happened thereafter of those most close to him. The aerospace community remembers his history. And, a hundred years from now, what else will be remembered? Because of President Kennedy's choice and commitment to "go", two Americans made rendezvous with the surface of our moon sixty-eight months after he was dead.

He was a Cape Cod sailor and drove *PT-109*. But it was an unknown Russian Major of the Soviet Air Force who first circled the Earth in space on April 12, 1961, that moved Kennedy to a space decision long before the first American orbited the Earth. And it was he who moved the Congress and the American people and NASA with his recommendation on May 25, 1961, "to take longer strides" and "achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon, and returning him safely to earth." That very same day, President Kennedy was seated in his rocking chair in the White House, with members of his family. He told them, "I firmly expect this commitment [of going to the moon] to be kept. And if I die before it is, all of you here now just remember when it happens, I will be sitting up there in heaven in a rocking chair just like this one, and I'll have a better view of it than anybody."¹

Jack Kennedy's sense of history was enlivened in 1940 when his father was Ambassador in England planning to go for the nomination against Franklin D. Roosevelt while Hitler's *Luftwaffe* threatened and then took air war to England. His senior thesis with some editorial help was published as *While England Slept*. His own combat experience and "Brother Joe" who was lost before bail-out of a guided-bomber did not make him philosophical about the risks test-pilot astronauts were to freely take-- "A man must do what he must," he said in *Profiles of Courage*.

Senator John F. Kennedy had met Wernher von Braun in Boston at the making of a "Person to Person" with Edward R. Murrow in October 1953. Von Braun remembered but there seems to be no record that the young-looking

THE U.F.O. Investigator

FACTS ABOUT FLYING SAUCERS (UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS)

— Published by the National Investigations Committee on Aerial Phenomena

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CONGRESSMEN CONFIRM AF SECRECY Pressure For Investigation Increasing

Withholding of UFO information from Congressional committees has been confirmed to NICAP by House Majority Leader John W. McCormack and other Congressmen, including Rep. Joseph E. Karth of the House Science and Astronautics Committee.

After receipt of NICAP's Confidential Report, the Majority Leader suggested that both the House and Senate space committees also be contacted.

"I am glad you wrote me on the subject," he told NICAP's director. "Some three years ago as Chairman of the House Select Committee on Outer Space, out of which came the recently established NASA, my Select Committee held executive (closed) sessions on the matter of 'Unidentified Flying Objects.' We could not get much information at that time, although it was pretty well established by some, in our minds, that there were some objects flying around in space that were unexplainable."

The confirmation by Congressman Karth was contained in a letter to NICAP members Mr. and Mrs. Julius Neuman, Stillwater, Minnesota:

"As a member of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, I of course have had contact with high Air Force officers and have had opportunity to hear their comments on and off the record on the subject of unidentified flying objects. Despite being confronted with seemingly unimpeachable evidence that such phenomena exist these officers give little credence to the many reports on the matter. When pressed on specific details the experts refuse to answer on grounds that they (UFOs) are involved in the nation's security and cannot be discussed publicly. I share your interest and concern for the nation's well-being and will continue to seek a definite answer to this most important question."

These disclosures, added to NICAP's documented evidence, have disturbed many Congressmen who previously accepted the AF answers. In the last few years, the majority of legislators have received AF denials of UFO reality and censorship, as shown by letters given to NICAP or its members. To name a few: Senators Byrd, Goldwater, Hart, Javitz, Keating, Kefauver, Kuchel, Long . . . Reps. Baumhart, Holmes, Milliken, Scherer . . .

Despite mounting disbelief, the AF still tells Congressmen that hearings would benefit "only the sensation-seekers and publishers of science fiction." But the NICAP evidence has led an increasing number of legislators to seek a showdown

(see next column)

and get the facts. One powerful Democratic senator informed us he is carefully studying the NICAP report "pending hearings before the Armed Services Committee." Other new supporters suggest the Government Operations Committees. (To avoid AF pressure, all the names will not be released until hearings are scheduled.)

Possibly the new Administration will decide to end the secrecy. President Kennedy is on record that the UFO subject is important. Vice Pres. Johnson appears to have changed from his earlier full acceptance of AF claims; in 1960 he revealed he had ordered the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee to keep close watch on the UFO situation and the AF investigation. But even without top support, action in Congress seems certain.

INCREASED UFO SURVEILLANCE

In the last part of 1960, reports of strange flying objects noticeably increased. Since this coincided with the approach of Mars to the earth -- as in all Mars oppositions since 1948 -- it renewed speculation about a possible Martian civilization, or a space base on the red planet. (Dr. Fred Singer, former White House space adviser, gave impetus to the Martian theory with his recent statement that the moons of Mars probably were artificial satellites launched by an earlier civilization.)

One group of UFOs, sighted at Crescent City, Calif., on Oct. 30, was observed by FAA flight specialist Fred Boulden and other witnesses. The six "brilliant" objects, Boulden said, were in groups of two and three, with the sixth UFO operating "like a patrol craft" between them.

On Oct. 10, a Church of England minister on the island of Tasmania revealed he had seen "six flying saucers and a mother-ship" a week before but had kept silent until other witnesses in the area reported seeing unknown flying objects.

On Nov. 11, a "large, silver object with an antenna protruding from one side" was reported by Moline Airport weather observers. Two hours later, a UFO was sighted at Rockford, Ill., and also tracked by radar at Cedar Rapids, Dubuque and Des Moines, Ia.

Sightings from September to the end of 1960 included:

A. UFOs reported as or linked with square-shaped objects (a relatively new and peculiar category.)

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NEW DEBUNKING CAMPAIGN BACKFIRES

The nationwide Air Force debunking campaign, launched in December to avoid Congressional hearings on UFOs, now has backfired severely on AF Headquarters and its official UFO spokesman, Lt. Col. Lawrence J. Tacker.

Col. Tacker's chief aim, as he unguardedly admitted in a national broadcast on Dec. 5, is to discredit NICAP and its director. This officially-approved attack proves that NICAP is recognized as the biggest threat to UFO secrecy, because of the documented evidence confidentially given to Congress.

After Col. Tacker's appearance on Dave Garroway's "Today" program, a wave of protest-mail flooded Garroway, the Air Force and NICAP, criticizing the AF representative for ridiculing expert observers' reports and for his constant interruptions to block evidence by NICAP's director.

At one point in the program, Tacker derided the NICAP Confidential Report to Congress as the "worst bunch of drivel I ever read." (The NICAP report, citing documented UFO evidence and containing the majority conclusions of our Board of Governors and technical advisers, was discussed with the AF by several Congressmen seriously concerned with the secrecy dangers.)

The AF debunking campaign, which to date has included numerous broadcasts and press interviews by Lt. Col. Tacker, is centered around the spokesman's book, "Flying Saucers and the U.S. Air Force," cleared and endorsed as "The Official Air Force Story." Consisting largely of previous AF claims, denials and case explanations, this officially-approved book contains at least nine statements contrary to documented facts, as this report will show later.

In these nationwide press and broadcast interviews, supervised by AF Public Information Officers, the official strategy of denial-and-ridicule has been carried out as follows:

1. Col. Tacker has denied that any Member of Congress ever was refused UFO information by the AF. (Disproved by signed statements from House Majority Leader John W. McCormack, Rep. Joseph E. Karth, Rep. Gordon H. Scherer and other Congressman. See separate story on this page.)

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The CIA, UFOs, MJ-12, JFK & James Jesus Angleton

As the CIA's Counterintelligence Chief, James Jesus Angleton had access to the Agency's most closely guarded secrets, including MJ-12 files on UFOs.

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James Jesus Angleton was born on December 9, 1917 in Boise, Idaho, to NCR businessman/OSS Colonel James Hugh Angleton and Mexican-born Carmen Mercedes Moreno. Upon graduation from Yale in 1941, Angleton moved to Harvard Law School where he met his future wife, Cicely d'Autremont, of Duluth, Minnesota. Inducted into the US Army on March 19, 1943, Angleton was recruited into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in August through the efforts of Angleton's father and Norman Pearson, his old English professor from Yale who at that time was head of the OSS Counterintelligence division in London.¹

OSS COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS DURING WW II

James Jesus Angleton was assigned the Rome desk after Italy's capitulation to the Allies, and was made an OSS Lieutenant who ran counterintelligence (CI) activities in such countries as Austria, Germany, Spain and Switzerland as well as the Mediterranean area. As part of OSS operations in the European

theatre, Angleton mastered the arts of "black" propaganda and "playback" - that is, the method of reading the effectiveness of one's own disinformation on the enemy. In 1944, he was given charge of the OSS Special Counterintelligence Unit Z, made up of US and British agents, and was the youngest member of X-2 and the only American member allowed access to the top-secret British ULTRA code-breaking intelligence.

After the war, Angleton was promoted to Captain and was awarded the Legion of Merit from the US Army which cited him for successfully apprehending over a thousand enemy intelligence agents. He was also decorated by the Italian Government and was awarded the Order of the Crown of Italy, the Order of Malta/Cross of Malta and the Italian War Cross for Merit.

In October 1945, President Truman dissolved the OSS and had all research and analysis units moved to the State Department and operational units to the War Department, and redesignated it as the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). Angleton stayed on in the SSU in Rome and became the vital station chief in charge of the 2677 Regiment, which made Angleton the senior US intelligence officer in Italy until the SSU became the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in 1946, forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).²

THE MAKING OF JAMES ANGLETON AS A MASTER SPY HUNTER

Angleton's war experience in counterintelligence operations had affected him to the extent that he became absorbed into the "hall of mirrors" world of intelligence and refused to leave the service, despite much insistence and disappointment from his father. James would pour over the many CI files he had amassed while in Italy and was forever changed by the intrigue and the possibilities of a career in the CIG.

In the summer of 1947, Angleton returned to the United States to live in Tucson, Arizona, to be with his wife and family, but his love for the service was overpowering. On December 30, 1947, he was hired by the CIA as a senior aide to the Director of the Office of Special Operations (OSO).³ It was during this period that Army G-2 and other intelligence agencies were trying to crack the Soviet *Venona* code, used by espionage agents operating in the United States to send back sensitive information regarding the Manhattan Project based at Los Alamos, New Mexico. It is possible that Angleton was on special assignment prior to officially reporting to the OSO, which had the responsibility of running counterespionage operations.⁴ Angleton's primary mission in the OSO included overseeing a classified component that operated espionage and counterespionage activities abroad, and reading all sensitive material coming across his desk and passing it to OSO operators in countries where the CIA had interests. In 1949, he moved up the chain of command within the OSO and held a GS-15 position.

Angleton developed the philosophy, "If you control counterintelligence, you control the intelligence service". He quickly realised the significance of the B-29 detection of Joe-1, the Soviet's first atomic weapon detonation in August 1949, and knew that the technology acquired by the Soviets was not home-grown but the product of espionage. He immediately set out to discover who the moles were who passed on America's most guarded secret to Moscow. As with all covert actions, counterintelligence operated without specific mention in the National Security Act of 1947, so Angleton set out to acquire information on the most guarded secret of all.

ANGLETON AS CHIEF OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Aside from the theft of atomic secrets, the most guarded secret within the CIA was the scientific and technical information regarding new weapons developments, including the planned use of a new generation of thermonuclear weapons and high-altitude reconnaissance platforms for spying on countries hostile to US strategic interests. One of the technical secrets was the study and transfer of advanced electronics gleaned from US Air Force studies of unconventional aircraft and missile research carried on at several Atomic Energy Commission facilities and proving grounds.

The FBI and the CIA were aware of Soviet espionage rings operating in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. The main task of these rings was to provide any and all technical and scientific information on advanced technologies which would give an advantage to the Soviet Union in the event of another world war breaking out.

By 1949, military intelligence authorities had classified the "flying saucer" phenomenon as Top Secret, and the Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) had passed on information that the Soviets could have developed saucer-shaped aerial weapons, capable of delivering atomic bombs or dissipating radioactive materials over NATO countries, as a stopgap measure to make up for the nonexistent nuclear weapons arsenal. In early 1947, the nonexistent nuclear arsenal in the United States was a closely guarded secret as well; and no doubt this fact set in motion the nuclear arms race, which terrified Angleton. The OSO was probably aware of Soviet knowledge of the bomb gap existing within both superpowers. Moreover, the flying saucer invasion of the United States - reports of which crossed Angleton's desk - put a scare into Angleton's psyche which is reflected in a credo he shared with other OSO staff members: "You who believe or half believe, I can say this now, that I do believe in the spirit of Christ and the life everlasting, and in this turbulent social system which struggles sometimes blindly to preserve the right to freedom and expression of spirit. In the name of Jesus Christ, I leave you."

After General Walter B. Smith was appointed Director, Central Intelligence (DCI), Angleton continued on with OSO Staff A (foreign intelligence operations) inside the CIA's clandestine division. In 1951, he was assigned the all-important Israeli desk, which he held under tight control for 20 years because it was a vital source of Soviet information in the Middle East. As more and more UFO⁵ sighting reports made their way to CIA headquarters, unevaluated reports were forwarded to Counterintelligence when the locations were identified as coming from Soviet Bloc countries. During this period, Angleton established good links with FBI contacts who were equally concerned with protecting vital atomic research facilities, and no doubt he read many domestic reports as they came across his desk in the "L" Building across from the Lincoln Memorial.

When Smith was coaxed away from his power base as DCI, Allen Dulles - Angleton's friend from OSS days - became the new Director. In late 1954, he promoted Angleton to the position of Deputy Director and Chief of Counterintelligence, with direct access to Dulles and all foreign UFO intelligence from the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) which had been established to look into national security implications involving the UFO phenomenon.⁶ In order to cement Angleton's counterintelligence charter, Dulles commissioned General James H. Doolittle to conduct an outside survey of CIA counterintelligence operations. Doolittle concluded that the CIA was losing ground to the KGB, and recommended that more stringent and ruthless measures be taken against Soviet penetration. Dulles endorsed the Doolittle Report by ordering a more powerful tool to stop and interdict the moles within the CIA, and he personally chose Angleton to head the CI Staff. Perhaps this is why foreign and domestic UFO sighting reports diminished in number shortly afterwards.

During Dulles's tenure as DCI from 1953 to 1961 (the longest in CIA history), Angleton enjoyed a privileged position not shared by other directors. This was despite the fact that Angleton reported to the Deputy Director of Operations (DDO), and on many occasions bugged the phones and residences of various high-ranking US Government officials and foreign dignitaries with Dulles's approval and over the objection of the DDO. If the situation called for it, Angleton could go around proper channels to acquire personal data on anyone within the CIA and other agencies, which was clearly outside the CIA charter and violated FBI jurisdiction.

As the new head of CI, Angleton had to organise a staff, write the rules and oversee all clandestine operations aimed at the Soviet Intelligence Service military and security organs, the GRU and KGB.⁷ The CI Staff was primarily tasked with preventing penetrations at home and abroad and protecting CIA operations through careful research and analysis of all incoming intelligence reports. By keeping the most vital and sensitive files to himself, Angleton became a storehouse of secrets, which helped him consolidate his power base. Officially, Angleton was allowed access to everyone's personnel, operational and communications files within the CIA, and he reviewed all proposed and active operations and approved the recruitment of agent assets. This did not engender trust or cooperation, but Angleton did not concern himself or his staff with such intrusions. One of Angleton's former Chief of Operations, "Scotty" Miller, described the environment in which CI Staff operated as that of a "watchdog" snooping around, sniffing out Soviet deception and manipulation.

ANGLETON AND THE MJ-12 DIRECTIVE

Among the controversial documents leaked to the public in the last 20 years regarding state secrets and the UFO phenomenon, are the CIA's unacknowledged Majestic Twelve/MJ-12 files which disclose the most guarded of all classified subjects: extraterrestrial life-forms and their technologies.⁸

In order to secure this knowledge and prevent foreign countries from learning this vital secret and getting an edge on the United States, President Harry S. Truman signed a directive that basically said that no one (including a chief executive) was to be in possession of or disclose the finding without a "need to know" clearance which was above Top Secret.⁹

The directive was secretly implemented without the knowledge or consent of Congress and was concealed by the wording of the National Security Act of 1947, which prohibits the disclosure of classified matters without presidential approval and prior agreement by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, as amended in later versions of the National Security Act.

Knowledge of the finding was limited to only a select few within the government's intelligence and scientific communities. As long as the secret remained unresolved, there would be no official acknowledgement. The only official study program, Project *Blue Book*, was taken over by the CIA in 1953 as a public experiment and used as a debunking tool to discount the extraterrestrial reality, and possibly to quash any attempts by the KGB and GRU to glean any technological or defence secrets from the study.

Like the Manhattan Project group, Majestic Twelve or MJ-12 (as used in some leaked documents) was a joint government/military/private-sector undertaking that encompassed every facet of national security functions. The CIA was the premier intelligence agency tasked with maintaining the first line of defence of the United States during the 55-year Cold War between the capitalist West and the communist East. When Angleton assumed his throne as Chief of Counterintelligence, no doubt Truman's directive was a

most inviting instrument, allowing him to carry on his mole-hunting career within the CIA against the KGB and GRU.

Majestic Twelve enjoyed greater protection than did the hydrogen bomb program of the early 1950s. With that, the Soviets were driven to penetrate not only the secrets of the H-bomb program itself, but the ultimate prize that lay scattered throughout the US Government's maximum security research facilities located in the southwestern and eastern United States.

The shocking truth of the Soviet atomic weapons espionage program, *Enormous*, dealt a tremendous blow to US and British security when it was learned that British diplomats operating within the US State Department, as well as US Army technicians at Los Alamos National Laboratories, had not only supplied blueprints and materials for the atomic bomb to their KGB handlers in New York, but had stolen the proposed plans for the hydrogen bomb as well. Security officials were left guessing as at what else the Soviet spies had stolen from under their noses.¹⁰

As far as we know, there was no successful penetration by KGB or GRU agents into the CIA's UFO program - in large part, due to the disgraceful and unlawful actions taken by Angleton's CI Staff. After the fallout from the Burgess-MacLean-Philby defections and the execution of the Rosenbergs, Angleton tightened security and dedicated himself to safeguarding whatever secrets still eluded the Soviets. Thus he embarked on a vicious mole-hunt that would almost paralyse the CIA until his departure in 1974.

During the time of the Eisenhower administration (1953&endash;1960), the CIA was at its apex in covert operations, piling up one success after another where cores of Soviet moles were detected and sent home to Moscow. However, comments from the White House were nil when it came to the UFO problem, although Eisenhower's supposed meeting with extraterrestrials in 1954 was given some publicity. While it was largely discounted by the Press, some did try to connect Eisenhower's heart attack with the meeting. The national media were downplaying the UFO sightings in the US and abroad as part of a Cold War hysteria that accompanied the "duck and cover" scare that seemed to grip the country. No real problems popped up until the 1960 presidential elections when Democratic candidate Senator John F. Kennedy accused the Republican incumbent President Eisenhower of allowing a "missile gap" to exist, and charged that the United States was getting too close to the Soviet Union through *détente*.

Soon after Kennedy became President, he began to needle the CIA for information on UFOs,¹¹ which was unnerving at the outset to Allen Dulles after he was burned over the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Castro's communist-enslaved Cuba in April 1961. The once cordial relationship that had existed fell apart, and Dulles knew his time as DCI was short - as evidenced in his 1961 draft directive to MJ-12.¹² He knew that the explicit instructions contained in the September 24, 1947 Truman directive - prohibiting the DCI from making disclosures to a chief executive who obviously did not have a "need to know" clearance - would compromise the CIA, but also that the lengthy and costly UFO program, deemed so necessary to national security by all involved, simply could not be jeopardised for anyone - not even the President of the United States.

Knowing the character of Allen Dulles and James Angleton, I can only speculate as to what kind of response Kennedy got. The DCI Top Secret/ MJ-12 document leaves no doubt that Dulles was not going to cooperate with Kennedy's request of June 28, 1961, which he forwarded to Angleton for consideration and feedback.

Majestic Twelve/MJ-12 included spin-off projects that were obviously equally sensitive activities of the CIA, such as *Parasite*, *Parhelion*, *Enviro*, *Psyop*, *Green*, *Spike* and *House Cleaning*. Other sensitive and

covert programs could be affected as well, such as *MK-ULTRA*, *Artichoke* and *Domestic*, which all appear to have been operational projects associated with Majestic Twelve. The full implications of the above are not clear at present, but it is obvious that the other projects were held in readiness for some kind of mass indoctrination and deception undertaking in a national crisis.

MARILYN MONROE AND MURDER, INC.

The pressure put on the CIA by Kennedy was reaching a flashpoint of wills; and with the Norensko affair¹³ driving Angleton to obsession, a UFO leak crisis brought new strains on Angleton. He learned that Hollywood screen star Marilyn Monroe's phone conversation with a New York art dealer¹⁴ - in which she discussed Kennedy's secret visit to an undisclosed military base to see alien artifacts, and her disdain over her soured relationships with President Kennedy and his brother, the United States Attorney General - had been recorded by CIA domestic electronic surveillance experts. Since 1955, Monroe had been under surveillance by the CIA, and the FBI had maintained a security dossier on her because of her marriage to a well-known American writer suspected of having communist affiliations, and her trip to Russia and the Press coverage she received while she was there.¹⁵

The wire-tap report also mentions nationally recognised New York syndicated reporter Dorothy Kilgallen as having conversations with Monroe regarding the Roswell UFO crash of 1947 and President Kennedy's politically motivated NASA *Apollo* Moon program. Dorothy Kilgallen made headlines in 1955 when she disclosed a private conversation with a British Cabinet official who told her that UFOs are real and that the US and British authorities consider the matter as of the highest importance.

The significance of the wire-tap has to do with the fact that Monroe was murdered the following day in her Brentwood condo. According to Milo Speriglio, internationally recognised private investigator and director of the Nick Harris Detective Agency, Monroe was the victim of a national security management hit by the CIA and the Mob.¹⁶ The suggestion that somehow the CIA was involved in a domestic murder of an American citizen is not too far-fetched when considering the past abuses coming from Angleton's CI program with its "absolute security at any cost" philosophy. Whether Angleton authorised the hit is not known, but the *modus operandi* of the way her body was found and moved around, the fashion in which the autopsy records were changed to reflect suicide, and the theft of her secret red diary one day after her autopsy, all have similarities to the methods used by Angleton's covert CIA Counterintelligence operators.

JFK AND THE CIA'S UFO FILES

The final straw for Angleton came when President Kennedy fired off a Top Secret memorandum to him,¹⁷ outlining a previous discussion concerning a classification review of all CIA UFO files that could affect national security. It was dated November 12, 1963 - just 10 days before he would be gunned down in the streets of Dallas, Texas.

Kennedy informed Angleton that he was setting things in motion to share sensitive CIA UFO intelligence data with the Russians through the director of NASA, James Webb.¹⁸ This request was made on the same day he requested Webb¹⁹ to begin Kennedy's peace overture to the Russians via joint space exploration. Webb, being a board member of the intelligence community,¹⁹ most likely

interpreted Kennedy's program to mean the sharing of classified UFO data, which was forbidden under the current directive.

In Kennedy's Top Secret memorandum,²⁰ he outlined for Angleton the specific items he wished to have disclosed to Webb, such as "[to] have the high-threat cases reviewed with the purpose of identification of bona fide as opposed to the classified CIA and USAF sources", and "that we make a clear distinction between the known and unknowns in the event the Soviets try to mistake our extended cooperation as a cover for intelligence-gathering of their defense and space programs". Finally, Kennedy wanted Angleton to "arrange a program of data-sharing with NASA mission directors in their defensive responsibilities".

This was unprecedented and was totally unacceptable to Angleton and the CIA. Here, Kennedy was requesting the Central Intelligence Agency - the agency he swore he would "break into a thousand pieces" - just to hand over the most guarded secret ever! This memo was passed on to William Colby, who indicated to someone in Angleton's staff in a handwritten note, "Response from Colby: Angleton has MJ directive".²¹ The note is dated November 20, 1963 - just two days before Kennedy's assassination.

It seems that Kennedy's request was bounced to and from Angleton's desk; either consensus was being sought, or the buck was being passed back to Angleton. In any case, it was a hot potato that Angleton had to deal with. It is also significant that NSAM No. 271 was the last to come from Kennedy's desk, just before he left Washington for Dallas. Whatever the real significance, it was buried somewhere within the CIA, and Angleton spent many a day trying to figure out who ordered Kennedy's execution.

Was Angleton set up, or did he unintentionally supply the needed ingredient for the murder of the century? In either case, the secret remained safe.

NSA SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

One of the few former CIA officers to speak publicly on the Kennedy assassination and the UFO secret is Victor Marchetti, who at one time was Assistant to the Deputy for Plans and Operations under DCI William Colby. In a rare interview with *Second Look* magazine in 1979, Marchetti - author of the sensational book, *Cult of Intelligence*, which was vetted and censored by the CIA prior to publication (the only book to include the redacted portions within the text) - made some interesting observations regarding the CIA's UFO intelligence-gathering program and why the subject is not open for discussion.

Retired Air Force intelligence officer Robert Collins produced for his website an insightful foreword to an extract from the Marchetti interview, in which he quotes Marchetti as saying: "My theory is that we have, indeed, been contacted - perhaps even visited - by extraterrestrial beings, and that the US Government, in collusion with other national powers of the Earth, is determined to keep this information from the general public."

Marchetti alluded to "rumors" at the highest levels within the CIA that the NSA has information as well, and that this must be kept away from public viewing.

We know now that the National Security Agency does have sensitive COMINT files, which for reasons of national security it cannot disclose. One of these NSA files that Marchetti speaks of might be the NSA intercept of Kennedy's phone conversation with Khrushchev on November 12, 1963, in which

Kennedy spoke of a "situation that affects both our countries and the world" and "a problem that we share in common".

It is believed that the UFO problem became a national security issue when President Truman authorised the covert establishment of the National Security Agency, whose primary responsibility bordered on "special activities" - perhaps as outlined in an alleged Intelligence Estimate prepared by national security officials on September 30, 1947, in which one of the concerns stated that "what we are up against is controlled by intelligent operators" and that "these objects are real and not illusionary".

It is not surprising that, in 1968, an NSA employee drafted a significant analysis of the intelligence community's ambivalence towards the UFO camouflage and warned of dire consequences unless the defence establishment woke up and recognised the danger these phenomena pose in the nuclear age.

On a final note, the legend of James Jesus Angleton and his "wilderness of mirrors", as he often referred to his daunting task of protecting vital state secrets, faded into obscurity on May 11, 1987. But the secret that went with him re-emerged almost precisely the day he died.

Perhaps Jim was not the real bad guy in the counterintelligence game. Maybe he was its victim.

Endnotes:

1. September 25, 1943 OSS memo, released through the FOIA in September 1989.
2. US Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, Book VI, April 23, 1976, pp. 154-55.
3. JJA personal records. Angleton took a seven-month leave of absence to remain in Tucson, Arizona, for unspecified reasons, not substantiated by the need to be with his wife and family - as is believed by other writers regarding Angleton's absence from CIA's Washington headquarters during May through December 1947. See Tom Mangold, *Cold Warrior James Jesus Angleton: the CIA's Master Spy Catcher*, Touchstone Books, Simon & Schuster, 1991, p. 361.
4. On December 12, 1947, the National Security Council (NSC) adopted measures to counter the espionage and counterespionage threat, as specified in NSCID 1, later amended in NSCID 5, that authorised the Director of Central Intelligence to "conduct all organized Federal espionage and counterespionage operations". According to CIA historian Arthur B. Darling, atomic weapons research became an overriding issue, and coordination with the Office of Scientific Research and Development with the AEC was through CIA consultant Dr H.P. Robertson, through General Vandenberg's directive containing an agreement between Dr Vannevar Bush which facilitated the transfer of Manhattan Engineering District files to the Director of Central Intelligence for proper collection of foreign atomic energy research. Secret OSO activities in this area were not allowed to fall into administrative control of the AEC nor FBI, as Vandenberg thought they should remain within CIA intelligence operations. See Arthur B. Darling's *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950*, Penn State Press, 1990, pp. 197-239.
5. The term "UFO", as defined by Air Force intelligence directives, is used here to reflect unconventional aircraft and missiles, not interplanetary spacecraft.
6. CIA FOIA response letter, dated March 26, 1976, to a July 14, 1975 FOIA request made by Ground Saucer Watch of Phoenix, Arizona, in which it stated that the NSC tasked the CIA with a requirement to determine the actual UFO threat. The CIA responded through the Office of Scientific Intelligence by creating the Intelligence Advisory Committee to study the threat aspects. Military members of the IAC fought vigorously to maintain participation in areas relating to AEC intelligence collection. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, represented by General Todd (who is mentioned in an FBI memo regarding Joint Staff

Council ignorance of flying saucer data in 1947), were at odds with the CIA about duplication of efforts by the Military Intelligence Division in producing UFO intelligence data for the IAC. See Arthur B. Darling, *ibid.*, pp. 349-356.

7. The KGB, the Committee for State Security, was a non-military arm of the Soviet Intelligence Service. The GRU was the military arm. The KGB received its title in 1954. When mentioning the Russian Intelligence Service, KGB and GRU are referenced generically to include both organisations.

8. This remarkable fact is substantiated in the mistakenly downgraded Top Secret Canadian Department of Transport intra-departmental correspondence, dated 21 November 1950, from Wilbert B. Smith to Dr Robert I. Sarbacher, an American physicist and science consultant in the US Defense Department's Research and Development Board and a member of the Guidance and Control Panel. Smith acknowledged that UFO studies were "considered by the United States authorities to be of tremendous significance" and that the "matter is the most classified subject in the United States Government, rating higher than the H-bomb".

9. September 24, 1947 Top Secret/MAJIC/ Eyes Only Project *White Hot* Preliminary Estimate in Five Parts (unacknowledged by the US Government). See Robert M. Wood, PhD, and Ryan S. Wood, *The Majestic Documents*, Wood & Wood Enterprises, 1998, pp. 43-81.

10. November 25, 1955 Top Secret memorandum from Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, ref. JCS 1712/5. This report deals with the Burgess-MacLean defection, after it was learned that sensitive weapons research information had been sent to Moscow through diplomatic means and after the CIA was informed of the defection. Angleton was devastated to learn that Kim Philby, a longstanding friend of British intelligence, was part of the spy ring.

11. Unacknowledged June 28, 1961 Top Secret National Security Memorandum from President John F. Kennedy to The Director [Dulles], Central Intelligence Agency, Subject: Review of MJ-12 Intelligence Operations as they relate to Cold War Psychological Warfare Plans. It is a one-line request that reads: "I would like a brief summary from you at your earliest convenience."

12. Unacknowledged CIA Top Secret/ MJ-12 Counterintelligence carbon copy of draft directive from Director of Central Intelligence to MJ-12 members 1 to 7, with eight tabs on government watermark onion skin paper, circa 1961.

13. Yuriy Ivanovich Norsenko was a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1962. Angleton had him detained and tortured for three years, believing the warning given by another KGB defector, Anatoliy Mikaylovich Golitsyn, that Norsenko was ordered to defect and act as a disinformation plant to spread misleading information to the CIA regarding Soviet capabilities and intentions. Later CIA analysis suggested that it was Golitsyn, not Norsenko, who was the real mole planted within the CIA. Angleton was convinced that Golitsyn was a bona fide defector and he used Golitsyn's information, but the CI mole-hunt virtually destroyed the CIA's covert operations for some time.

14. Top Secret CIA wire-tap report, dated August 3, 1962, of discussion between Marilyn Monroe and Howard Rothberg, with references to Project 40, *Moon Dust*, the 5412 Committee and MJ-12. The report was given to Angleton and has his signature at the bottom right-hand portion of the document, establishing that CI was aware of Monroe's desire to blackmail the Kennedys over their indiscretions during a sexual affair with her prior to August.

15. FBI file No. 105-40018-1, formerly classified Secret. CIA is copied on an August 19, 1955 FBI document from Mr Dennis A. Flinn, Director, Office of Security, Department of State. A copy was sent to Director, Central Intelligence Agency, for the attention of Deputy Director, Plans, and was marked Secret. It was declassified on November 11, 1978, but the subject matter was redacted.

16. See Adela Gregory and Milo Speriglio, *Crypt 33: The Saga of Marilyn Monroe & endash; The Final Word*, Birch Lane Press, 1993.

17. This would be amazing, since no one in government knew that James Angleton worked for the CIA, much less of his existence, since there were few pictures of Angleton and very few within the Agency knew who he was and what he did. It is also interesting that until his appearance before the Church Committee in 1975, the public did not know about Angleton or his CIA Counterintelligence position.

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His identity had been kept secret for 20 years.

18. National Security Action Memorandum No. 271, dated November 12, 1963, to The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Subject: Cooperation with the USSR on Outer Space Matters. President Kennedy instructs James Webb as Administrator of NASA to "...assume personally the initiative and central responsibility within the Government for the development of a program of substantive cooperation with the Soviet Union in the field of outer space, including the development of specific technical proposals. I assume that you will work closely with the Department of State and other agencies as appropriate." Kennedy had requested an interim report on NASA's progress in this adventure by December 15, 1963. Of course, after Kennedy was killed, this program was never acted upon.

19. It should be pointed out here that James E. Webb served on President Truman's Psychological Warfare Strategy Board and assisted in revising NSC 10/2 for the Office of Policy Coordination (Covert Operations) in 1948 for the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for emergency plans in case of war. He also was the author of the Webb Staff Study that worked out cooperation between the military and the CIA concerning IAC intelligence-sharing of foreign atomic research with the AEC, which allowed the DCI prerogatives in the dissemination to key executive officials. Webb considered the DCI slot after Rear Admiral Hillenkoetter left office in 1950.

20. Top Secret Kennedy memorandum to the Director [of Counter Intelligence], Subject: Classification review of all UFO intelligence files affecting National Security, dated November 12, 1963.

21. *ibid.*

Additional References:

For further updates and reports, see:

¥ http://home.sprintmail.com/~rigoletto/tim_cooper_documents.html

¥ http://home.sprintmail.com/~rigoletto/Sanctuary_Of_The_Birds.htm

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Timothy S. Cooper is an independent researcher and writer who has worked in security and investigation fields for 15 years. A Vietnam veteran, he began researching military UFO intelligence operations in 1988 and has collected extensive CIA and NSA files. He has also acquired the largest collection of MJ-12 documents and privately owned, original Project *Blue Book* files in the USA.

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Chapter 3

Into Politics With Kennedy and Johnson

The CIA's early relationship with presidential candidate John Kennedy could hardly have been more different from the one it had established eight years earlier with General Eisenhower. In 1952, the Agency's briefings in the preelection period had been undertaken by working-level officers who, for the most part, delivered current intelligence summaries in written form. With few exceptions, the reports and analyses offered by the briefers steered clear of policy issues. In 1960, by contrast, the briefings were handled personally by the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, and included extended discussions of sensitive matters.

In 1960, the CIA and its programs for the first time became involved in the political campaign, sometimes within public view and sometimes behind the scenes. Issues arose relating to the need for, and the protection of, the US Government's intelligence capabilities, specific intelligence collection programs such as the U-2 aircraft overflights, and substantive analytic findings related to Soviet economic and strategic capabilities. Charges were made regarding the allegedly selective use of intelligence information by the White House and the Agency. And, for the first time, CIA faced the question of what obligation it might have to brief a presidential candidate on a major covert action program.

The Presidential Debates

Many of these issues were on display during the presidential debates, held for the first time in 1960. The first debate, in Chicago on 26 September, focused exclusively on domestic issues, but in the second debate, on 7 October in Washington, Republican candidate Richard Nixon attacked Senator Kennedy's earlier statement that the United States should have apologized to the Soviets for the incident in which Francis Gary Powers' U-2 aircraft was downed over the USSR during a CIA reconnaissance mission. "We all remember Pearl Harbor," the Vice President began. "We lost 3,000 American lives. We cannot afford an intelligence gap. And I just want to make my position absolutely clear with regard to getting intelligence information. I don't intend to see to it that the United States is ever in a position where, while we are negotiating with the Soviet Union, that we discontinue our intelligence effort, and I don't intend ever to express regrets to Mr. Khrushchev or anybody else...."

In the third debate on 13 October, featuring Kennedy from New York and Nixon from Los Angeles, Kennedy cited the DCI as his authority for an invidious comparison of US and Soviet achievements: "The economic growth of the Soviet Union is greater than ours. Mr. Dulles has suggested it is from two to three times as great as ours." In that debate and in the fourth and final encounter in New York on 21 October, Kennedy pursued the theme that the Soviets were surpassing the United States economically and militarily, a topic that headed the list of CIA intelligence production priorities.

Perhaps the most crucial foreign policy issue raised in the 1960 debates, which derived directly from US intelligence analyses, was the alleged gap between US and Soviet intercontinental missile production. Kennedy charged that the Soviets had "made a breakthrough in missiles, and by '61-2-3 they will be outnumbering us in missiles. I'm not as confident as he (Nixon) is that we will be the strongest military power by 1963." Kennedy added, "I believe the Soviet Union is first in outer space. We have made more shots but the size of their rocket thrust and all the rest. You yourself said to Khrushchev, you may be ahead of us in rocket thrust but we're ahead of you in color television, in your famous discussion in the kitchen. I think that color television is not as important as rocket thrust."

During three of the debates, Nixon attacked Kennedy for his lack of willingness to defend Quemoy and Matsu, the small Nationalist-held islands off the coast of Communist China. The extensive discussion of the Quemoy-Matsu issue did not create any direct problem for the CIA, but it led directly to a controversial dispute between the candidates over policy toward Cuba, where a popular revolution had established a Soviet-supported Communist government. The politically charged clash had a number of repercussions in the White House and at the CIA.

Kennedy adviser Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. later described the relationship of these China and Cuba issues and the sequence of events in his memoir of the Kennedy administration, *A Thousand Days*: "The Kennedy staff, seeking to take the offensive after his supposed soft position on Quemoy and Matsu, put out the provocative statement about strengthening the Cuban fighters for freedom." The controversial press release, crafted late one evening in the Biltmore Hotel in New York City by speechwriter Richard Goodwin, said "We must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista, democratic, anti-Castro forces in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing Castro." According to Goodwin, the policy statement was not shown to the sleeping Kennedy because of the late hour; it was the only public statement of the campaign not approved by the candidate.

The ill-considered statement on Cuba received wide press play and was immediately attacked. The New York Times the next day ran the story as the lead item on the front page with the headline: "Kennedy Asks Aid for Cuban Rebels to Defeat Castro, Urges Support of Exiles and Fighters for Freedom." James Reston wrote in the Times that "Senator Kennedy (has) made what is probably his worst blunder of the campaign."

Coming the day before the fourth presidential debate, the statement from the Kennedy camp put Nixon in what he found to be an extraordinarily awkward position. Many years later Nixon wrote in his memoirs, "I knew that Kennedy had received a CIA briefing on the administration's Cuba policy and assumed that he knew, as I did, that a plan to aid the Cuban exiles was already under way on a top secret basis. His statement jeopardized the project, which could succeed only if it were supported and implemented secretly."

Throughout the campaign the two candidates had engaged in a spirited exchange about whether the Eisenhower administration had "lost" Cuba, and Nixon knew that the issue would be revived in the final debate, which was to be devoted solely to foreign affairs. Nixon has written that to protect the security of the planned operation he "had no choice but to take a completely opposite stand and attack Kennedy's advocacy of open intervention." And he did attack, saying, "I think that Senator Kennedy's policies and recommendations for the handling of the Castro regime are probably the most dangerously irresponsible recommendations that he has made during the course of this campaign."

Former Kennedy advisers have underscored over the years that the statement on Cuba was released without Kennedy's knowledge by staffers ignorant of the covert action planning under way at the time and was crafted solely to ensure that Kennedy would not again be put on the defensive about Communist expansionism. These same advisers differ among themselves, however, on the key question of whether Kennedy himself knew of the covert action plans. Kennedy speechwriter Theodore Sorensen said in 1993, "I am certain that at the time of the debates Kennedy had no knowledge of the planned operation. His reference to more assertive action regarding Cuba was put in by one of my assistants to give him something to say."

The assistant was Richard Goodwin, whose memory is quite different. Goodwin asserts that, "As a presidential candidate, he (Kennedy) had received secret briefings by the CIA, some of which revealed that we were training a force of Cuban exiles for a possible invasion of the Cuban mainland." Goodwin and Sorensen have both made clear that they were not in attendance at any CIA briefings.

The US Government's planning for a covert action program intended to undermine Castro had been approved by President Eisenhower in March 1960 and was in progress throughout the period of the presidential campaign. The question of when and to what extent Kennedy--or any presidential candidate--would be informed of the covert action deliberations was important to CIA because it raised the delicate question of informing individuals outside the normally restricted circle in CIA, the Congress, and the executive branch.

In 1960 this was uncharted territory. In subsequent presidential campaign years, the Agency's practice came to be one of delaying briefings even on established covert action programs, as well as on sensitive technical and human-source collection programs, until after the election had determined who would be president. This meant denying such briefings to presidential candidates, creating the risk that they would inadvertently make statements during the campaign that might embarrass themselves and the Agency, or--more important--complicate the future execution of US foreign policy.



Well before the Cuba liberation issue came to a head in October, the outgoing Eisenhower administration had realized that covert action planning on Cuba could be a political bombshell. Following one of Allen Dulles's briefings of the National Security Council in early August, for example, the Vice President pulled the DCI aside to ask him whether Kennedy and his running mate, Senator Lyndon Johnson, were being provided information on covert action projects, specifically those related to Cuba. Dulles gave a carefully crafted answer to the effect that Kennedy was being told a little but not too much. According to former Agency officials familiar with the exchange, Nixon reacted strongly to Dulles's reply, saying, "Don't tell him anything. That could be dangerous."

In his own account of these events, published in 1962, Nixon charged that Kennedy, before the election of 1960, had knowledge of covert action planning "for the eventual purpose of supporting an invasion of Cuba itself." This charge prompted a formal press release from the White House on 20 March 1962 denying that Kennedy had been told of any plans for "supporting an invasion of Cuba" before the election. The White House denial was backed up by Dulles, by then a former DCI, who explained that Nixon's comments were apparently based on a misunderstanding of what was

included in the briefings he had given Kennedy.

Preelection Briefings: What Really Was Discussed?

As early as 30 March 1960, Edward P. Morgan of the American Broadcasting Company used the occasion of a presidential press conference to ask Eisenhower if the presidential nominees to be selected in the summer would be given high-level intelligence briefings. At that early date the DCI had not yet raised the subject with the President, but Eisenhower did not hesitate, saying "We always do that. They did it for me in 1952 and I did it in '56, as quick as the nominees are named they begin to get it." Indeed, on 18 July, Eisenhower sent telegrams to the Democratic nominees offering them briefings by the CIA. Undoubtedly recalling his own difficult exchange with President Truman eight years earlier, Eisenhower included in his telegram a paragraph saying, "Because of the secret character of the information that would be furnished you, it would be exclusively for your personal knowledge. Otherwise, however, the receipt of such information would impose no restriction on full and free discussion."

Senator John F. Kennedy, the Democratic presidential nominee, immediately accepted the offer, and the first intelligence briefing was held five days later, on Saturday 23 July. The briefing was conducted at Kennedy's vacation home in Hyannisport, Massachusetts, by the DCI alone in a session that lasted approximately two and a quarter hours. Dulles then briefed Senator Lyndon Johnson, the vice-presidential nominee, at his ranch in Texas on 28 July.

In that first round of briefings, the DCI put heavy emphasis on Soviet issues, including Soviet progress in strategic delivery capabilities, missiles, and bombers, and discussed the nuclear testing issue. He also reviewed Soviet statements on Berlin and Sino-Soviet cooperation. Dulles went over the latest intelligence on the Taiwan Straits situation; Middle East politics, particularly events in Iran; France's anticolonial problems in Algeria and Belgium's in the Congo; and Cuba. The Johnson briefing differed from that of Kennedy only because the Texas Senator was also interested in discussing Mexico.

Dulles recorded that both wanted to know what developments might arise during the campaign, especially in Berlin, Cuba, and the Congo. Kennedy asked Dulles's opinion about the likelihood of an early Chinese attack on the offshore islands in the Taiwan Straits and inquired about the status of the conference on limiting nuclear testing. Johnson, in addition to his interest in Mexican and Caribbean matters, asked about Soviet missile developments, reflecting his position as Chairman of the Senate Preparedness Committee.

At the conclusion of the first briefing, Kennedy stated that in future briefings he wanted the DCI to cover potential trouble spots all around the world, but subsequent scheduling difficulties delayed the next (and, as it turned out, the last) preelection briefing session almost two months. On 17 September, a Saturday night, Dulles was dining with friends in Georgetown when he was surprised by a telephone call from a member of the Kennedy staff at about 9 p.m. Could the DCI meet with the Senator on Monday morning, 19 September, at the Kennedy home in Georgetown?

When the DCI arrived with his hastily prepared briefing package, he found Kennedy engaged in discussion with Senator Albert Gore, Sr., while various other people, including Prince Sadruddin Khan, uncle of the Aga Khan, waited their turns. When the other visitors had departed, the DCI had approximately 30 minutes with Kennedy to give him an update on world trouble spots. Dulles's memorandum for the record notes that he discussed Cuba, the Congo, Berlin, Laos, Jordan, Syria, the

*Kennedy
Johnson
separate*

Sino-Soviet dispute, and the Soviet space program.

During this second briefing Kennedy was interested in learning what Khrushchev's objectives would be in his coming visit to the UN and what the Agency believed the Soviet leader was likely to say or do. The Senator said he wanted to be alerted to any critical areas that CIA thought might blow up over the next six or seven weeks before the election, but Dulles apparently took no specific action at the time to meet this request.

More than a month later, with the election looming, Robert Kennedy contacted Acting DCI Gen. Charles Cabell to repeat the request for information on possible trouble spots. This brought a response within 24 hours. On 2 November, Cabell traveled to California, where Kennedy was campaigning, to deliver a memorandum that discussed a number of potentially troublesome developments. These included the Soviets' October Revolution anniversary, Sino-Soviet developments, tensions in Berlin and the Taiwan Straits, possible Chinese nuclear tests, a Soviet space spectacular, the French-Algerian impasse, events in Southeast Asia, King Hussein's delicate position in the Middle East, the unsettled situation in the Congo, and possible action by Cuba against Guantanamo Naval Base. In this review of explosive international situations, the Agency cautioned that, in fact, "we do not estimate any of them are likely to occur prior to 8 November."

A search of CIA records has failed to confirm that Dulles briefed Kennedy on the status of Cuban covert action planning in either of their two sessions held before the election in 1960. The DCI's memorandums recording the sessions in July and September mention Cuba only as one of many trouble spots around the world. Taken alone, this would suggest that their discussion concerned what was going on in Cuba rather than what the United States might be planning to do about it.

An internal CIA memorandum of 15 November 1960 discussing an anticipated postelection briefing mentions that "The following draft material is much more detailed and operational than that prepared for the candidates in July." This formulation suggests that the message on Cuba Dulles conveyed in July was at least a bit "operational," even if not detailed. Such an inference would be consistent with Dulles's answer to Nixon's question in early August that he had told Kennedy, in effect, a little but not too much.

When Dulles met with Kennedy in July (their only meeting before the exchange between Dulles and Nixon in early August), the planning on Cuba and the limited operational activities already launched related almost entirely to propaganda and political action. Paramilitary planning at that point envisaged the deployment of extremely small, two- or three-man guerrilla units. Contingency planning within the Agency for more forceful action intensified over the next several months, but the idea of a conventional assault by Cuban exile forces was not put before the interagency Special Group until 3 November and was rejected.

The Missile Gap

In the two preelection briefings in 1960, the most challenging issue the DCI is known to have discussed at length was that of Soviet strategic capabilities. Without intending to do so, Dulles had created a considerable political problem for himself by giving a number of public speeches in which he asserted that Soviet capabilities were growing and raised the question of what the US response ought to be. He had highlighted the USSR's progress in basic science, in training large numbers of scientists, and its research and development efforts as well as its demonstrated achievements in building spacecraft and missiles.

In early 1960 the United States was aware of the Soviet missile flights from the Tyuratam test site, but did not know with certainty if any operational Soviet missiles had been deployed. In the search for deployed missiles, among other priority missions, U-2 aircraft had been flown over the Soviet Union since July 1956. On 1 May 1960, Gary Powers was shot down. In the United States, the West Virginia primary election campaign was at its peak; there was no doubt that the U-2 incident would figure in the impending general election campaign.

In his formal memorandums for the record, Dulles did not provide much detail regarding exchanges he may have had with Kennedy about the U-2 shootdown. He did note that the Senator, in the September briefing, had asked him about a book by Maj. Gen. John Medaris, entitled *Countdown for Decision*. The Medaris book had criticized the US government for its failure to replace the U-2 with a more sophisticated aircraft or an invulnerable satellite reconnaissance system.

In a memorandum sent to Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, the staff secretary of the White House, on 25 September, Dulles recorded that Kennedy and Johnson had separately inquired about intelligence techniques or capabilities to replace the U-2. Dulles was clearly uneasy about the security hazards in these questions and noted that he had replied only in a general way, indicating that research and development work on advanced aircraft and satellites was progressing "with reasonably satisfactory prospects." Dulles added, "Unless I hear from you to the contrary, I shall not give any more detailed briefings on this subject." In fact, the first US satellite reconnaissance system was being used in an experimental way in the late summer of 1960; it was launched in August. Significant amounts of analytically useful imagery did not become available from the new system until December 1960, after the election.

During the preelection period, Dulles was also in an awkward position owing to a minor dispute or misunderstanding between the White House and the Kennedy team about whether the Senator should receive a briefing from Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates. During the preelection period, in the interest of fairness to each candidate, Eisenhower wanted Kennedy to receive general overview briefings on the world situation from the CIA, and these were being provided. On the other hand, the President initially declined the Kennedy team's request that he receive a briefing from the Secretary of Defense. By the end of August, however, the White House had changed its mind and approved a briefing by Gates.

Dulles had weighed in with the White House on at least two occasions, including once with Eisenhower personally, to urge that Gates brief Kennedy. The DCI knew that he would be courting political trouble if he answered what had been Kennedy's first question: "Where do we ourselves stand in the missile race?" As he had done on innumerable occasions in Congressional appearances, Dulles insisted that the Defense Department "was the competent authority on this question."

The White House was obviously uneasy that Kennedy would hear several versions of the story concerning Soviet strategic capabilities. Democrats on the Preparedness Committee, led by the uniquely well-informed Senator Stuart Symington, were attacking the White House with claims that the Soviets were outdistancing the United States. Gates had been trying to play down the importance of the issue, but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Air Force Gen. Nathan Twining, was emphasizing the more alarmist views of the Air Force. As DCI, Dulles had been charged with pulling together a collective view of this intractable problem of collection and analysis, but everyone, including Eisenhower, knew the Agency did not have the detailed technical intelligence or the bureaucratic clout to referee the contentious issue.

In responding to Kennedy's questions about Soviet strategic capabilities, Dulles did not improvise. On this critical and technical subject he stuck very closely to the findings laid out in numerous National Intelligence Estimates. During the period from 1957 to 1960, the Intelligence Community published from two to four Estimates annually evaluating Soviet progress on space and ballistic missile programs. In December 1957, the Community had published one of its most ominous Estimates, referring to the Soviets' "crash program." That Estimate had projected that the USSR sometime during calendar year 1959 would probably have its first operational capability with 10 prototype ICBMs. The same Estimate projected that the Soviet Union probably would have "an operational capability with 100 ICBMs about one year after its first operational capability date, and with 500 ICBMs two, or at most, three years [that is, 1963] after first operational capability date."

By early 1960, the Community as a whole was using somewhat more moderate language to discuss probable Soviet missile capabilities, but, nevertheless, early that year three separate Estimates were published whose findings were sufficiently alarmist to fuel the missile gap debate. The bottom line of an Estimate published in February was especially important because it came as close as the US Intelligence Community ever did to a net assessment. The Estimate stated, "Our analysis leads us to believe that if the US military posture develops as presently planned, the USSR will in 1961 have its most favorable opportunity to gain a decided military, political, and psychological advantage over the United States by the rapid deployment of operational ICBMs." The February Estimate went on to observe that the Soviet ICBM program did not appear to be a crash program but was designed to provide a substantial ICBM capability at an early date. A separate Estimate, also published in February, stated flatly: "The single-most-important development affecting the structure of Soviet military power during the period of this estimate will be the buildup of an ICBM force. Long-range missiles will enable the USSR to overcome its inferiority to the United States in nuclear strategic attack capability, as it was unable to do with bomber aircraft."

In terms of the political debate on the issue, an even larger problem was posed by the Air Force conclusion that leaders of the Soviet Union were endeavoring to attain a decisive military superiority over the United States. This superiority, the Air Force assessed, would enable the USSR "to launch such devastating attacks against the United States that at the cost of acceptable levels of damage to themselves, the United States as a world power would cease to exist." This extremely ominous Air Force view was repeated in several National Intelligence Estimates--often referred to inaccurately as CIA products--published during the period. It was shared widely with the Congress and leaked to the press.

The findings of these Intelligence Community Estimates were having a significant impact on the White House, the Congress, and the voters. In the words of Howard Stoertz, a senior CIA officer who often accompanied Dulles to his briefings of the Congress and the NSC, "Our findings were sufficiently scary that those who wanted a new administration to be elected were finding support in our Estimates."

One interesting index of the impact of this intelligence was provided by former President (and Congressman) Gerald Ford in September 1993. Responding to an open-ended question about whether he remembered occasions when intelligence findings had created particular policy dilemmas, Ford volunteered, "Mostly I remember the period from 1953 to 1964 when I was on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that provided the CIA's budget. Allen Dulles and others from the CIA would come in and paint the most scary picture possible about what the Soviet Union would do to us. We were going to be second rate; the Soviets were going to be Number One. I didn't believe all that propaganda."

The same material that was briefed to the House had been provided to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and, therefore, to one of its most prominent junior members, John Kennedy. Kennedy made effective use of this intelligence in his presidential campaign, to the discomfort of the CIA, the White House, and Vice President Nixon--the Republican candidate. Goodpaster remembers that the politics of the issue became sufficiently awkward that Eisenhower sent him to the Agency to meet personally with Dulles and Symington to get to the bottom of the problem. Howard Stoertz remembers well that "Allen Dulles had us prepare a chart to prove we had not cooked the books for the election."

Postelection Briefing on Cuba

Once Kennedy had won the election, the CIA felt free to provide him a systematic briefing on the Agency's covert action programs worldwide, and--most important--to inform him in detail about the deliberations under way on Cuba. This took place at the Kennedy residence in Palm Beach, Florida, on 18 November, some 10 days after the vote. Reflecting the importance and sensitivity of the subject, there were two high-level briefers: Dulles, whom Kennedy had announced he would keep on as DCI the day following the election (along with FBI Director Hoover, his first appointments); and Richard Bissell, the Agency's Deputy Director for Plans (Operations). Like Dulles, Bissell knew Kennedy from the Washington social scene and, in his own case, from a shared New England background.

In discussing the briefing more than 30 years later, Bissell recalled that "Allen and I felt great pressure to inform the new President. The (Cuba) operation had acquired a considerable momentum and could not just be turned off and on. We settled outside on the terrace at a table and I gave him an abbreviated but fairly complete briefing on the state of the operation. I went on at least 30 minutes, maybe 45. I was fairly detailed in outlining the plan of what we hoped would happen."

A review of the briefing papers used by Dulles and Bissell suggests that they gave Kennedy a careful overview of the Cuba plans as they existed in mid-November 1960. Their review included an explanation of the Presidential authorization, signed by Eisenhower on 17 March, for the Agency to undertake planning. The briefing described the political action initiatives already under way in which the Agency was providing support to various anti-Castro groups and individuals inside and outside Cuba. They described the propaganda operation in place at the time, including the preparation of publications and radiobroadcasts aimed at weakening Castro's rule. These included broadcasts from Swan Island, which years later came to play a prominent role in the Agency's activities against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

The briefing of 18 November occurred in the midst of a fundamental review, back in Washington, of the scope of the paramilitary aspects of the anti-Castro program. At that time, everything was in flux. Nothing had been decided, let alone finally approved. In these circumstances, Dulles and Bissell planned to brief Kennedy carefully on a range of possible paramilitary operations.

The first option envisaged the development and support of dissident groups by the Agency's Cuban assets to undertake antiregime guerrilla action inside Cuba. A group of instructors had been trained who would, in time, oversee the instruction of up to 500 additional men, and radio and flight training were being provided Cuban pilots. The two briefers were to describe all these preparations, as well as the role of a few small groups already placed inside Cuba and the airdrops of supplies and equipment that were sustaining them.

The potential second phase of the paramilitary plan to be covered by the briefers was a combined sea-air assault by trained Cuban exiles coordinated with the guerrilla activity generated on the island. This undertaking would attempt to establish a close-in staging base for future anti-Castro military operations. A last phase, should it be needed, would be an air assault on the Havana area in support of guerrilla forces in Cuba moving on the ground into the capital. Mention was to be made of a contingency plan for overt US military intervention that would include the use of Agency assets.

Bissell remembers emphasizing particularly the plans for the possible movement of exile ground and air forces to Cuba both by sea and by air. He recalls that he "put a lot of emphasis on the timing aspects, and the numbers (of men and equipment) involved." Dulles and Bissell intended to inform Kennedy that it did not appear that in-country guerrilla actions alone would be successful in sparking a successful revolt against the regime. It is unclear whether they intended to brief the President-elect of the even more pessimistic assessment expressed by some in the Agency that even an invading force of exile Cubans would be unsuccessful without direct US involvement.

Press accounts of the briefing of Kennedy in Palm Beach indicate that it went on for two hours and 40 minutes. Bissell remembers that throughout the extended session the President-elect "was almost entirely a listener--although a very good listener. Kennedy had a number of questions that grew out of the briefing, but he had no prepared list of questions ahead of time."

Available CIA records do not suggest that Kennedy volunteered any opinion regarding the wisdom, or lack thereof, of the plans presented to him. Nothing in the documentation suggests that he either authorized the operation or urged restraint. To the contrary, Dulles stated in a memorandum sent to Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the President's Special Adviser on Military Affairs, on 1 June 1961 that "the purpose of the briefing was not to solicit the President-elect's approval or disapproval of the program but merely to acquaint him of its existence." This implies, obviously, that Dulles had not previously informed Kennedy of the plans.

As Bissell put it, "We were in an absolutely untenable position until the new President knew what was going on, but we avoided seeking a yea or nay." He added that "Kennedy was favorably interested, but extremely careful to avoid a commitment, express or implied. We didn't get any negative reaction--I was interested above all in his studious neutrality. Allen Dulles and I talked about the Kennedy reaction after the fact. We had the same impression--on the whole Kennedy's attitude was favorable." This shared impression obviously cleared the way for continued Agency planning for what ultimately became the Bay of Pigs operation.

Other Covert Programs

Dulles intended to have the briefing of the President-elect in Palm Beach cover worldwide intelligence operations, of which Cuba was only one. His records indicate he wanted to establish that the Agency was fully supportive of the new President. "We made it clear to him that from this time on any information he desired was at his immediate disposal and would be willingly given." In fact, Dulles was also working hard to solidify his personal standing with Kennedy. Senior Agency officers undoubtedly had mixed feelings when Dulles announced at a special staff meeting on 10 November that "all liaison with the new Administration by CIA would be conducted by the Director."

According to handwritten notes prepared by Bissell, he and Dulles also were prepared to brief

Kennedy on a variety of issues, large and small. For example, one planned topic was the question of clearances. Although the President would be told that he possessed all clearances automatically, he should be advised of what was involved in providing special compartmented clearances that would enable his staff to receive intercepted communications and other sensitive material. Dulles also intended to discuss with Kennedy the legal basis for CIA's worldwide special operations. On the substantive side, in addition to Cuba, Dulles was prepared to brief Kennedy on operations in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere in Central America. Agency activities in Tibet were also a discrete item.

The majority of the items to be raised did not address specific countries or regions. Rather, Dulles planned a thematic discussion of Agency propaganda and political action programs, with illustrative successes from around the world. Dulles was primed to provide examples of where the Agency had succeeded in reducing the power of Communist parties abroad and in supporting the growth of constructive opposition parties. In a review of what was, at that time, still recent history, Dulles intended to inform Kennedy of CIA actions related to coups in Guatemala, Laos, and South Vietnam.

Regarding technical collection, Dulles was undoubtedly relieved to be able to discuss with Kennedy more fully the progress that had been made with aircraft and satellite systems to replace the U-2. The DCI's notes suggest he intended to discuss the existing U-2 program and two follow-on programs. One was the SR-71 aircraft, then under development, and the other the first imaging satellite, a film-return system.

Thirty years after the fact, there is no way to know with certainty how much of the material Dulles and Bissell prepared was actually discussed with Kennedy. Bissell remembers that the bulk of the time he and Dulles spent with Kennedy in Palm Beach was used to discuss Cuba. After that discussion, Bissell remembers that "Allen Dulles and John Kennedy drifted off to the end of the terrace and talked for some time about matters having nothing to do with Cuba." Bissell recalls that their conversation lasted at least 15 but certainly no more than 30 minutes. When shown several pages of his own handwritten notes concerning the issues the two had intended to raise, Bissell laughed and asserted that, "Nobody had time to cover everything that is on this list at any time prior to inauguration."

Records of the Eisenhower White House suggest that Dulles discussed, or at least was authorized to discuss, only a narrow agenda with the President-elect at the Palm Beach meeting. On 17 November, the day before Dulles traveled to Florida, Goodpaster recorded that he had informed the President that he had discussed the agenda with the CIA Director and with Gen. Wilton Persons, the White House Chief of Staff. Goodpaster had informed Dulles that CIA operations were to be disclosed to Kennedy only as specifically approved on a case-by-case basis by President Eisenhower. Goodpaster's memorandum confirms Eisenhower had approved Dulles's plan to inform Kennedy of operations relating to Cuba as well as to "certain reconnaissance satellite operations of a covert nature." No other subjects were specifically approved.

Dulles's notes state not only that Eisenhower authorized the Palm Beach briefing but also that the briefing was given at his suggestion and that it covered "worldwide intelligence operations." Bissell recalls that the scheduling of the briefing came up rather quickly. To his knowledge, Dulles received no guidance or suggestion from the White House on what the subject matter should be.

In discussing the politics of these briefings in 1993, Goodpaster remembered clearly the conflicting views the President and others in the White House had about them. On the one hand, some of Eisenhower's preelection reservations had evaporated by mid-November. He had issued a directive

that, because Kennedy was to be the next President, "We must help him in any way we can." On the other hand, Goodpaster also remembers that Eisenhower had some uneasiness about how far Dulles should and would go in his discussions. The President believed ongoing deliberations by him and his advisers should remain confidential, and he worried about the inherent problems of protecting that confidentiality while at the same time briefing Kennedy fully.

Goodpaster's records indicate he discussed with the President and Senior Staff Assistant Gordon Gray the "special problem" of Dulles's continued attendance at NSC meetings once he had been designated by Kennedy to serve in the next administration. Goodpaster informed Dulles that while the President wanted him to continue to attend NSC meetings, the proceedings of those sessions were not to be disclosed outside the NSC room. According to the records, he had the impression "Mr. Dulles had not understood that this matter was a delicate one." In 1993, Goodpaster reiterated that "there was a feeling that all this had to be explained pretty carefully to Allen Dulles."

The Mystery Briefing of Late November

A number of books and articles written about the Bay of Pigs contain the assertion that Kennedy was informed in detail of the planned operation and gave his approval in a briefing by Dulles in late November 1960. A review of the chronology of these publications suggests that most authors picked up this piece of information from the widely read account of events contained in Schlesinger's *A Thousand Days*. Schlesinger opened Chapter 10, entitled "The Bay of Pigs," with the statement that "On November 29, 1960, 12 days after he had heard about the Cuban project, the President-elect received from Allen Dulles a detailed briefing on CIA's new military conception. Kennedy listened with attention, then told Dulles to carry the work forward."

If this briefing occurred, it would be by far the most important in the series Kennedy received. This would place on the President-elect an earlier and more direct responsibility for the development of the operation than would otherwise be justified. In fact, however, the Dulles-Kennedy meeting of 29 November cited by Schlesinger appears not to have occurred at all. Available CIA records contain no mention of such a briefing. Dulles's personal desk calendar shows that he had a very full day, with 10 different appointments running from 9:00 a.m. to 5:45 p.m., none of which were with the President-elect. It would be most extraordinary if the Director's calendar or other CIA records failed to note a meeting of the DCI with the President-elect.

Similarly, there is nothing in information available about Kennedy's activities to indicate that he met with Dulles that day. The New York Times of 30 November reported that "The Senator worked at home throughout the day [of 29 November] leaving only to visit his wife Jacqueline and son John F. Jr. in Georgetown University Hospital." The newspapers also reported that Kennedy had met at home that day with prospective Cabinet appointee Chester Bowles, and with Terry Sanford, the latter visiting to recommend Luther Hodges for a Cabinet position. Other visitors to the Kennedy home in Georgetown included his father, Joseph P. Kennedy, Edward Foley of the Inaugural Committee, and Senator Dennis Chavez of New Mexico.

In thinking back on the briefings Kennedy received on the controversial Cuban operation, Ted Sorensen, his speechwriter and confidant, recalls, "President Kennedy did tell me, much later, that he had been briefed on the operation by the CIA while he was President-elect. CIA told him what they had in mind and why in some detail. That was the Palm Beach briefing." Sorensen doubted that Kennedy received a more detailed briefing by Dulles on 29 November, adding "I saw him every single day and we discussed the whole range of policy matters--the foreign issues as well as 500 domestic ones."

Schlesinger was amused that he may have described a critical briefing that appears not to have occurred. In a letter to the author in 1993, he recommended that the original draft manuscript of his *A Thousand Days* be reviewed to ascertain whether the controversial assertion was footnoted. "If nothing turns up I must take Rick's way out," he wrote, referring to the character in "Casablanca" played by Humphrey Bogart. "Bogart: 'I came to Casablanca for the waters.' Claude Rains: 'What waters? We're in the desert.' Bogart: 'I was misinformed.'"

An important meeting concerning the Cuba operation, in fact, was held on 29 November at the White House at 11:00 a.m. with the President--Eisenhower--in the chair. The President-elect was not included. Schlesinger and other authors, writing a few years after the fact, had obviously learned that on that date "the President" was briefed on Cuba and, being oriented to President Kennedy, assumed that it was he who was involved. Indeed, the meeting of 29 November was an important one. On that date, Eisenhower underscored that he wanted to continue active planning for the project. Eisenhower was pushing ahead vigorously; Kennedy was not yet responsible in any degree.

Soon after his inauguration on 28 January 1961, Kennedy did receive a full briefing on the planned Cuban operation. At that meeting the new President authorized the Agency to continue its preparations and asked that the paramilitary aspects of the plan be provided to the Joint Chiefs for their analysis. Even in late January, however, Kennedy withheld specific approval for an invasion, with or without direct US involvement.

Kennedy Visits the CIA

One unique aspect of Kennedy's familiarization with the CIA was the President-elect's decision to visit CIA Headquarters during the transition period. He was initially scheduled to visit the Agency's South Building, at 2430 E Street in downtown Washington, on 16 December. In preparation for the visit, Dulles asked Huntington Sheldon, the Director of Current Intelligence, to prepare a book for the DCI containing material he and senior Agency officials should use in discussions with Kennedy.

The ambitious agenda that was prepared for the visit envisaged presentations by the DCI and eight other senior officers. Briefings were prepared on the Agency's mission, organization, and budget, and on the legal basis for its activities. Dulles and others would describe the Agency's relationship with the Congress; the functions of such organizations as the Watch Committee and the President's Board of Consultants; and the functions of the several agencies that comprised the Intelligence Community. The Assistant Director for National Estimates would describe the estimates process and brief one specific paper, a recently published Estimate of the World Situation.

The chiefs of the Agency's key Directorates were primed to explain their roles and activities. The clandestine services portion of the briefing included a description of clandestine intelligence collection and the covert action functions. In the latter discussion, the Chief of Operations was to update "Cuban operations since the Palm Beach briefing."

Owing to scheduling difficulties, Kennedy was unable to visit the Agency on 16 December. The visit was delayed until after the inauguration and finally occurred on Thursday, 26 January 1961. Dulles's desk calendar notes that the briefings were to run from 2:40 until 4:10 p.m. In reality, they had to be abbreviated considerably, much to the consternation of the participants, because an unintended opportunity came to the President's attention.

For reasons having nothing to do with Kennedy's visit, the Agency, a few weeks before, had put together an attractive exhibit of materials relating to the history of intelligence that was located just inside the entrance of South Building. A number of exhibits were displayed under a sign that read, "These letters loaned courtesy of the Houghton Library of Harvard University." The newly elected Harvard man immediately noticed the reference to his alma mater. He stopped and read thoroughly the entire case of historical materials, much to the chagrin of Dulles and other waiting CIA executives.

Kennedy was already frustrated at press leaks from his new Administration and, therefore, was especially taken with one of the letters in the display case. Written by General Washington to Col. Elias Dayton in July 1777, that letter included the observation that "The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged--All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in Most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated. . . ." Kennedy asked Dulles if he could have a copy of the letter, which, of course, was sent promptly. The President wrote the CIA Director thanking him and the creator of the exhibit, Walter Pforzheimer, saying "The letter is both a fine memento of my visit with you and a continuing reminder of the role of intelligence in national policy."

Origins of the President's Intelligence Checklist

Within days of his election, President Kennedy sent word to the White House that he would like to receive daily briefings on the same material that was being furnished to President Eisenhower. The request from Kennedy came by way of one of his assistants for transition matters, Washington attorney Clark Clifford. Eisenhower approved the passage of this material to Kennedy on 17 November, the eve of Dulles's trip to Florida. There is no record that Dulles discussed this matter with Kennedy the next day, however, and some weeks were to go by before there was any organized follow-up.

When Kennedy visited CIA Headquarters after his inauguration, Sheldon described the current intelligence products that were available to him. Kennedy reiterated that he wanted to read the publications and designated his military aide, Brig. Gen. Chester Clifton, who was present at the meeting, to receive the material. Clifton had taken over Goodpaster's role of providing daily briefings to the new President, although Goodpaster continued to serve in the White House for a few weeks to help with the transition.

For the first few months of the Kennedy Administration, Agency couriers each morning would deliver CIA's Current Intelligence Bulletin to Clifton. Clifton or MacGeorge Bundy would then take the material to the President, reporting back his questions or comments if there were any. Unfortunately, the intelligence report was part of a large package of material Kennedy received each day and was often not read. This left the new President less well informed than he thought he was, a situation that was soon driven home to him during his unfortunate encounter with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna, when he found himself unprepared to respond to his adversary's boasting and bullying.

From the start of the Kennedy Administration, Dulles had few opportunities to present intelligence directly to the President. In large part, this was because Kennedy did not hold regularly scheduled NSC meetings as Eisenhower and Truman had done. In addition, however, there was a problem of

personal chemistry and a generational gap between the new President and the CIA Director. Agency veterans at the time had the feeling that Dulles may have been patronizing to Kennedy in his early briefings, and, thus, was not warmly welcomed to the White House. Along the same lines, Sorensen remembers Kennedy "was not very impressed with Dulles's briefings. He did not think they were in much depth or told him anything he could not read in the newspapers." In these awkward circumstances, Dulles's practice was to prepare written memorandums for the President on items that he deemed to be of particular significance, delivering them personally when possible. He also made personal deliveries when he wanted to bring certain important National Estimates to the President's attention.

The fiasco at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, reinforced by Kennedy's frustration at the meeting with Khrushchev in early June, changed everything. General Clifton informed current intelligence director Sheldon that the President was reluctant to continue receiving intelligence in the normal way. Clifton suggested that the Agency would have to come up with some entirely different way of presenting its information if it were to regain the President's confidence. He volunteered that there was no point in the DCI discussing the matter directly with the President as that would be counterproductive. Dulles took this implicit criticism calmly, possibly foreseeing that the President's disappointment with the Agency on this and other scores would lead, as it did in November 1961, to his own removal.

Dulles gamely soldiered on in his attempts to bring the new President the fruits of the Agency's collection and analysis in the traditional manner, but it was largely the unauthorized efforts of his subordinates that opened a new and less formal channel to the White House that would satisfy Kennedy and most of his successors. In mid-1961 Huntington Sheldon and other managers of the Office of Current Intelligence--working with Clifton but without the knowledge of their superiors either at the White House or the Agency--came up with a new intelligence briefing publication designed exclusively for the President. Longtime current intelligence specialist Richard Lehman worked up a dry run of the proposed President's Intelligence Checklist and Sheldon took it to Clifton for his approval. Clifton was pleased with the trial document, which eliminated the bewildering array of source classifications and restrictions common to intelligence publications and presented facts and analysis in short, vernacular paragraphs.

The first issue of the new publication was delivered to Clifton on Saturday, 17 June, and carried by him to the President at his country home near Middleburg, Virginia. The first Checklist was a small book of seven pages, measuring 8-1/2 by 8 inches, that contained 14 items of two sentences each with a half-dozen longer notes and a few maps. Agency managers spent a nervous weekend; they were immensely relieved the following Monday morning to hear Clifton's "go ahead--so far, so good."

Quickly it became clear that the President was reading the Checklist regularly and issuing instructions based on its contents. Not infrequently he asked to see source materials, estimates of developing situations highlighted for his attention, texts of speeches by foreign leaders, and occasional full-length Agency publications that provided more depth, details, and explanations. Within a few months, the Secretaries of State and Defense asked to see what the President was reading. In December, six months after publication had begun, Clifton passed the word to the Agency that those two Cabinet members should be added to the subscriber list.

No Agency officer sat with the President while he read the Checklist, but Clifton was careful to pass back to the Agency the President's reactions and questions. CIA officials regarded the new system as the best possible daily channel to a President. The relationship with Kennedy was not only a distinct improvement over the more formal relationship with Eisenhower, but would only rarely be matched

in future administrations.



Meanwhile, in November 1961, Allen Dulles had been replaced by John McCone, who served Kennedy as DCI for almost two years. In the early part of this period, McCone succeeded in rebuilding the Agency's relationship with Kennedy. McCone saw Kennedy frequently, and the President--more than any other before or since--would telephone even lower level Agency officers for information or assistance. Interestingly, McCone's prescience in alerting the President to the possibility that the Soviets would place missiles in Cuba backfired for him personally. Although he was right when most others were wrong, the President did not like McCone's public references to this fact, and their relationship cooled noticeably.

Editors of the Checklist were especially heartened in September 1963 when Clifton passed back the President's personal expression of delight with "the book." A month later, on a morning when Clifton, McGeorge Bundy, and the Agency's briefing officer were huddled in the basement of the West Wing going over the Checklist, President Kennedy called down asking where they were and when they were going to bring it to him. Clifton and his Agency contacts were also heartened by Secretary Rusk's comment that the Checklist was "a damned useful document."

President Kennedy's Checklist was published daily for two and a half years, capturing the regular attention of the President and serving his needs. Created out of an almost desperate desire to please a President who had found the Agency wanting, it proved to be the forerunner of the President's Daily Brief, the publication that was to serve all presidents from 1964 to the present.

The Transition to President Johnson

The transition to President Johnson was as abrupt for the US Intelligence Community as it was for the rest of the country. In some respects, it was also as uncertain. Johnson had received a number of intelligence briefings as Chairman of the Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee and later as Senate Majority Leader. He had met on one occasion with Allen Dulles in July 1960 while a vice-presidential candidate, but neither Dulles nor his successor, John McCone, had paid much attention to keeping Johnson informed during the intervening years.

Johnson, in turn, had paid relatively little attention to the products of the Intelligence Community while he was Vice President. Each day his office received the Agency's Current Intelligence Bulletin, a widely distributed product that contained less sensitive and less highly classified information than was included in the Checklist. Although the Checklist at the end of the Kennedy presidency was being sent also to the Secretaries of Defense and State and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Johnson was unaware of its existence. For reasons undoubtedly growing out of the earlier political rivalry between Kennedy and Johnson, Kennedy's intelligence assistant, Bromley Smith, early in the administration had ordered that "under no circumstances should the Checklist be given to Johnson."

On Saturday morning, 23 November 1963, the day following Kennedy's assassination, McCone instructed his Executive Assistant, Walter Elder, to telephone the new President's secretary and inform her that the DCI would, as usual, be at the White House at 9:00 a.m. to give the President the regular morning intelligence briefing. In reality, there was nothing usual or regular about the DCI's involvement in a morning briefing, but McCone obviously believed he needed to take an