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SITUATION ROOM

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FM GENERAL GOODPASTER SHAPE BELGIUM
TO DR KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
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S E C R E T SHP 2267 EYES ONLY

1. THIS RESPONDS TO THE REQUEST YOU MADE WHEN I SAW YOU FOR MY COMMENT CONCERNING THE FITZHUGH REPORT. AS I MENTIONED TO YOU, I THINK THAT SOMEONE SHOULD TAKE A VERY HARD LOOK AT IT PRECISELY AND SPECIFICALLY FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE PRESIDENT.

2. IN TRYING TO DO THIS MYSELF, I HAVE IMMEDIATELY CONCENTRATED MY ATTENTION ON THE PROPOSALS FOR REORGANIZATION IN THE OPERATIONAL CHAIN. HERE I THINK THE EFFECTS WOULD BE VERY BAD INSOFAR AS THE PRESIDENT'S INTERESTS ARE CONCERNED.

3. BASICALLY, AT THE PRESENT TIME THE PRESIDENT HAS DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE JCS (CUSTOMARILY WITH THE CHAIRMAN IN THEIR BEHALF), ON OPERATIONAL MATTERS, AND THE JCS (OR THE CHAIRMAN) HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE UNIFIED COMMANDERS. THE PROPOSED REVISION WOULD IMPAIR THIS ARRANGEMENT IN SEVERAL WAYS:

A. FIRST, THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE "LAYERED AWAY" FROM THE UNIFIED COMMANDERS. THE CHAIN WOULD RUN FROM HIM EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS. THENCE, THE CHAIN WOULD GO TO AN OPERATIONS STAFF OF OBVIOUSLY DIMINISHED STATURE, DIVORCED FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND HAVING A DIRECTOR WHO MIGHT BE THE CHAIRMAN, BUT IF SO, NOT IN AN EX-OFFICIO CAPACITY. THENCE IT WOULD RUN TO ONE OF TWO "SUPER UNIFIED COMMANDS," AND THENCE, ALTHOUGH THIS IS NOT QUITE CLEAR, TO THE EXISTING UNIFIED COMMANDS, SOME OF WHICH MIGHT BE AMALGAMATED. WHERE THE CHAIN NOW HAS TWO LINKS, WITH THE TOP LINK A DIRECT CONTACT OF THE PRESIDENT WITH THE JCS (ALSO PARALLELED BY A LINKAGE BETWEEN HIM AND THEM THROUGH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE) IT WOULD HAVE SOMETHING LIKE FOUR LINKS OR MAYBE FIVE UNDER THE NEW SCHEME, BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE UNIFIED COMMANDERS.

B. REMOVAL OF THE JCS FROM THE CHANNEL FOR HANDLING OPERATIONAL MATTERS SEEMS TO ME EXTREMELY UNWISE. THE FUNCTIONS OF PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE CLOSELY RELATED TO EACH OTHER, AND TO THE JCS FUNCTION OF ADVISING IN THEIR ROLE AS THE SENIOR MILITARY ADVISORS TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. PLANNING AND OPERATIONS ARE IN FACT THE HEART OF THE MATTERS ON WHICH THEY ADVISE. THE JCS BRING A DEEP AND BROAD KNOWLEDGE OF PROFESSIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND FEASIBILITY FOR EACH OF THEIR SERVICES TO THE MEETING TABLE, AS WELL AS INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE PRACTICAL CONSTRAINTS DERIVING FROM DEPARTMENTAL-LEVEL PROBLEMS. A FURTHER POINT IS THAT THE CHAIRMAN AND THE JCS HAVE WORKED OUT WAYS IN WHICH HE CAN REPRESENT THEM AND ASSURE TIMELY ACTION BOTH IN THE HIGHER CONSIDERATION OF OPERATIONAL MATTERS AND IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS. (THIS, I MIGHT SAY, IS A TREND THAT SHOULD CONTINUE -- I.E., STRENGTHENING THIS PARTICULAR ROLE OF THE CHAIRMAN.)

4. IT WOULD NOT REMEDY THE FITZHUGH PROPOSAL SIMPLY TO RE-INSERT THE JCS, BUT CONTINUE TO PRESCRIBE A DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS THROUGH WHOM ALL OPERATIONAL MATTERS WOULD FLOW. THEIR DIRECT ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT, AND HIS TO THEM, MUST BE PRESERVED.

5. NOR COULD THE SUPER UNIFIED COMMANDS TAKE OVER THE JCS FUNCTION OF DELIBERATION, WHICH NOW BRINGS TO BEAR THE COMPLETE RANGE OF MILITARY FACTORS -- OPERATIONAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, RESOURCES, ETC. THE COMMANDERS WOULD NOT BE INFORMED

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6. I THINK A MORE FRUITFUL LINE OF ENDEAVOR IS TO STRENGTHEN THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CHAIRMAN IN THE TWO AREAS I MENTIONED ABOVE, AND TO PUSH ON WITH THE SHIFT OF OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND SUPERVISION TO THE JOINT ARENA BY STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE JOINT STAFF, CUTTING A FEW MORE OF THE APRON STRINGS THAT TIE THEM TO THE SERVICE STAFFS AND MAKING A SIGNIFICANT, THOUGH NOT RADICAL, CUT IN THE ROLE AND THE SIZE OF THE SERVICE STAFFS THAT NOW CONCERN THEMSELVES (THROUGH THE JOINT MACHINERY) WITH JOINT AND OPERATIONAL MATTERS. THE PROPOSAL OF A DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS SHOULD, IN MY OPINION, BE REJECTED. ALSO, I QUESTION VERY STRONGLY THE IDEA OF SINGLE, GREAT TACTICAL COMMAND, AND HAVE CONSIDERABLE DOUBT ABOUT THE FEASIBILITY OF A SINGLE STRATEGIC COMMAND. IF THE LOGISTICS COMMAND WERE ESSENTIALLY A GATHERING TOGETHER OF THE MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND, THE MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND AND MTMTS, IT MIGHT HAVE SOME USEFUL POSSIBILITIES, ALTHOUGH I WOULD HAVE TO KNOW MORE ABOUT IT THAN I DO TO MAKE A JUDGMENT ON IT.

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