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PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE
CANADA - UNITED STATES

Journal of
Discussions and Decisions

at the

Meeting of the Board held at the Canadian Joint Air Training Centre, Rivers, Manitoba, September 28 - October 1, 1953.

(UNCLASSIFIED) The following members participated in the meeting:-

CANADIAN SECTION

General the Honourable
A. G. L. McNaughton,
Chairman
Commodore H. N. Lay,
Royal Canadian Navy, Acting Member
Brigadier T. G. Gibson,
Canadian Army, Acting Member
Air Vice Marshal F. R. Miller,
Royal Canadian Air Force
Mr. R. A. MacKay,
Department of External Affairs

UNITED STATES SECTION

Major General Robert M. Webster,
U.S. Air Force
Acting Chairman
Major General Frank A. Allen, Jr.,
U.S. Army
Rear Admiral M. E. Miles,
U. S. Navy
Mr. Outerbridge Horsey,
Department of State
(Member Designate)


The following assistants were also in attendance: -

Captain D. G. King, Royal Canadian Navy	Colonel F. J. Graling, U. S. Army
Colonel G. A. Turcot, Canadian Army	Captain T. P. Wilson, U. S. Navy
Group Captain E. M. Reyno, Royal Canadian Air Force	Colonel J. A. Cunningham, U.S. Air Force
Mr. W. H. Barton, Department of External Affairs - Secretary	Lt. Col. W. H. Price, U.S. Army
	Lt. Col. F. P. Ball, U. S. Air Force
	Mr. W. L. Wight, Jr., Department of State Secretary

The Board noted with regret the absence of General Henry, the U.S. Chairman, due to illness. Hope was expressed that he might be able to joint the Board later in Ottawa. The Board noted with regret that Mr. F. W. Jandrey had been posted to other duties, and welcomed Mr. Outerbridge Horsey as Department of State Member - designate. The Board also welcomed Lt. Col. W. H. Price as assistant to the U.S. Army Member.

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TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

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1. (SECRET) PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE INTERCEPTION OF UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT IN PEACE TIME. The Royal Canadian Air Force Member referred to Section 2 of the Board's Journal for its June 1953 meeting, regarding a proposed modification of PJBD Recommendation 51/4 on Interceptor Flights. He referred to discussions which had taken place between the RCAF and USAF on desirable changes in Recommendation 51/4 and on the preparation of mutually satisfactory operating procedures. As a result of these discussions between the two Air Forces, an agreed draft had been prepared which it was now desired to submit to the Board for its consideration.

The RCAF Member and USAF Member indicated their belief that the proposed draft Recommendation would improve the capabilities of the Air Defense Commands of the two countries for the protection of the North American continent. After some discussion, the Board decided to make the following Recommendation, which would supersede the previous Recommendation 51/4 on Interceptor Flights.

RECOMMENDATION 53/1. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE INTERCEPTION OF UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT IN PEACE TIME (This Recommendation supersedes Recommendation 51/4)

1. Aircraft controlled by the Air Defense System of the United States, or of Canada, engaged in intercepting unidentified aircraft during peace time, shall be permitted to fly over the territory of either country as may be required to carry out effective interception. These flights will be carried out under the following provisions:

- a) Investigations of unidentified aircraft by United States military aircraft over Canadian territory will only occur when it is not possible for a Canadian military aircraft to carry out the investigation; the activities of Canadian military aircraft over United States territory will be similarly restricted. For the purpose of this agreement, an unidentified aircraft is an aircraft which flies within an air defense identification zone in apparent violation of rules for operation within such zone. When the pattern of behaviour of an aircraft is sufficiently suspicious to justify a belief that it has hostile intentions, it may also be considered to be an unidentified aircraft.
- b) In accordance with published civil and military regulations, investigating aircraft will not approach closer than is necessary to establish identification. Investigation or interrogation will be performed solely on unidentified aircraft for the purpose of obtaining electronic or visual identification.

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In summary, the Canadian Government recognizes the desirability of, and is agreeable to, the joint preparation by the military planners of the two countries of realistic estimates of the forces which, in their opinion, it would be desirable to have for the defence of North America. Such estimates are not to be confused with, or construed as, "requirements plans". In order to ensure that the Canadian position is not lost sight of, every document containing estimates should be headed by a preamble worded along the following lines:

"These estimates constitute a military opinion only of the desirable future strength of armed forces and equipment, and in no sense are to be construed as commitments by either country."

I think that it might be useful if I were to supplement the above statement of principles by an informal explanation of its application to two current joint defence activities. The first of these is the work of the Canada-United States Military Study Group, which is considering "those aspects of the North American Air Defence System which are of mutual concern to the two countries". It would be in order for the Canadian Section of the Study Group to participate in studies of the ways in which the air defence system could most effectively be improved, of the relative priority which should be assigned to such improvements, and of the results which could be expected to be achieved from any specific improvement to the system. However, it would NOT be in order for the Canadian Section to engage in discussions with the United States Section which would imply any commitment or obligation on the part of the Canadian Government to provide air defence forces or equipment over and above the currently authorized program.

The second example relates to the preparation by the Military Cooperation Committee of the "Future Defence Analysis" which is intended to serve as an element of the Basic Security Plan. You will recall that this document was originally to be entitled "Security Requirements - 1957". I think the new title is much more in accord with the Canadian view of what this study is intended to accomplish. Applying the principle I have outlined above, it would be in order for the Canadian Section of the MCC to participate with the U.S. Section in the preparation of a realistic estimate of the forces and equipment which, in their opinion, it would be desirable to have in 1957 for the defence of North America, and a study of the defence benefits which could be expected to accrue if such forces could be made available. But the Canadian Section could NOT give any indication that Canadian forces might be available for this purpose, other than those currently authorized by the Canadian Government."

The United States Chairman expressed satisfaction with the statement of the Canadian Chairman, and said that in his view the statement met in full the needs of the situation as outlined in the April 1953 memorandum of the U.S. Chairman. He said further that he was confident that it would now be possible for the Military Cooperation Committee and other joint planning bodies to proceed in their important work.

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3. (SECRET) PROJECT CORRODE (RESTRICTED)

The U.S. Air Force Member referred to Section 1 of the Board's Journal for the meeting of June, 1953, and presented a report on the current status of Project CORRODE (RESTRICTED). He stated that there was every indication that the project was developing in an exceptionally satisfactory manner.


The Canadian Chairman reported that he had recently visited Project SPIDERWEB which is concerned with the operational testing of the "McGILL Fence" early warning equipment. The demonstration had been arranged by the RCAF and the Defence Research Board in order that Lieutenant-General Putt, the Commanding General of the United States Air Force Air Research and Development Command might see the equipment functioning as a system. The test had included runs at high altitude (Comet at 36,000 feet), jet aircraft at medium and very low levels (CF-100), and in all cases the apparatus registered the passage of the aircraft. In the opinion of the Canadian Chairman, the results had been most impressive and demonstrated dramatically the simplicity and reliability of the system.

4. (SECRET) PROGRESS OF CANADA-UNITED STATES MILITARY STUDY GROUP

The USAF Member presented a report on the activities of the Military Study Group up to the present time. He mentioned that at the last meeting of the Group the members had been impressed by the apparent agreement between United States and Canadian Air Defense Commands regarding the need for an Early Warning line generally along the 55th Parallel. He also mentioned that the Canada-United States Scientific Advisory Team had been requested to make an analytical study of the implications of such a line. In this connection the Scientific Team had carried out a synthetic exercise at U.S. Air Defense Command Headquarters, Colorado Springs, Colorado, during the period September 8 to 18. The results of this study were to be included in the report of the Scientific Advisory Team which should be ready for submission at the next meeting of the Military Study Group on October 7 and 8, 1953.

The RCAF

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