

70
72
"Secrecy Daniel Patrick
Fogarty, Yale University
1998
New Haven 1998

a report of an all but fictional "enormous Soviet espionage ring in Washington," inform the president of the possibly less than enormous but *real* Communist spying when *real* evidence became available?

This seemed a simple matter to sort out. Surely the FBI's archives contained documents that would answer the question one way or another. The commission decided to ask the current director of the FBI, Louis J. Freeh, for help. This was done, and agents were immediately placed at the commission's disposal. Or rather, the agents came round one morning, professed not to know much about the matter, but promised to look into it. They were never heard from again.

Bureau "property," the commission members surmised. After the commission report was completed and published, I wrote, as chairman, to Director Freeh, recounting what had happened, or rather had not happened, expressing a measure of disappointment. Freeh was quietly indignant; a statutory commission had made a legitimate request for information and been stonewalled, as it were, by his own agents. He ordered his personal staff to sweep the basement. In short order they produced a loose-leaf binder of Top Secret files: some thirty-six documents, now at last available.

And we have our answer. President Truman was never told of the Venona decrypts.

It gives one pause to think now that all Truman ever "learned" about Communist espionage came from the hearings of the House Un-American Activities Committee, the speeches of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, and the like. But, as the commission discovered, the decision not to tell the president was made not by J. Edgar Hoover, who hated Truman. It was made by Omar Nelson Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who admired Truman in a most personal way and served him with the highest professional standards. The proof was in the binder. On October 18, 1949, an FBI agent, Howard B. Fletcher, sent to Ladd a memorandum describing a recent conference with General Carter W. Clarke, then chief of the army security agency, "regarding

the dissemination of [Venona] material to the Central Intelligence Agency" (Figure 1).

General Clarke stated that when Admiral Stone* took over in charge of all cryptanalytical work he was very much disturbed to learn of the progress made by the Army Security Agency in reading [Venona] material. Admiral Stone took the attitude that the President and Admiral Hillenkoetter should be advised as to the contents of all of these messages. General Clarke stated that he vehemently disagreed with Admiral Stone and advised the Admiral that he believed the only people entitled to know anything about this source were [deleted] and the FBI. He stated that the disagreement between Admiral Stone and himself culminated in a conference with General Bradley. General Bradley, according to General Clarke, agreed with the stand taken by General Clarke and stated that he would personally assume the responsibility of advising the President or anyone else in authority if the contents of any of this material so demanded. General Bradley adopted the attitude and agreed with General Clarke that all of the material should be made available to [deleted] and the FBI.

General Clarke stated the reason that he recently called upon you was for the purpose of informing you as to the difference of opinion between himself and Admiral Stone and to acquaint you with the opinion of General Bradley. He stated that he wanted to be certain that the Bureau was aware of this and to make sure that the Bureau does not handle the material in such a way that Admiral Hillenkoetter or anyone else outside the Army Security Agency, [deleted,] and the Bureau are aware of the contents of these messages and the activity being conducted at Arlington Hall.⁵

Army "property." And so Truman was never told.

* Admiral Earl E. Stone was the head of the newly created Armed Forces Security Agency, which in 1952 became the National Security Agency.

† Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter was the first director of Central Intelligence (1947-50).




Figure 1. The October 18, 1949, memorandum reporting Omar Bradley's decision not to inform President Truman of the Venona decrypts. Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C.

Here we have government secrecy in its essence. Departments and agencies hoard information, and the government becomes a kind of market. Secrets become organizational assets, never to be shared save in exchange for another organization's assets. Sometimes the exchange is in kind: I exchange my secret for your secret. Sometimes the exchange resembles barter: I trade my willingness to share certain secrets for your help in accomplishing my purposes. But whatever the coinage, the system costs can be enormous. In the void created by absent or withheld information, decisions are either made poorly or not made at all. What decisions would Truman have made had the information in the Venona intercepts *not* been withheld from him?

The question tantalizes, for the president was hardly a passive figure. Claude D. Pepper would tell a story about Truman from the days when they were fellow senators; it now seems to suggest how different things might have been. One midday in the late 1980s, I was walking with the former senator from Florida back from the Senate to the House, he having returned to Congress as a member of the House of Representatives. We left the Senate chamber by the west entrance, turned left, and were soon passing S-224, one of those nameless rooms in the Capitol where members assemble for assorted activities (one of which, in an earlier time, was a morning tumbler of bourbon). "See that room?" Pepper remarked. "I was walking just where we are now one morning in 1940, when Harry Truman came out. 'Claude,' he said to me, 'don't you think we ought to get up a committee to look into the profits all these defense industries are making these days out of the Army and Navy? If we don't, the Republicans will!'"

By March 1, 1941, the year after this exchange, the Truman committee, formally known as the Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, was created. It wasn't that many years later that Truman became president. It is surely logical to suppose that such a man would sense the political peril of a Communist espionage ring operating



encountered a swiftly flying disc nearly 300 feet in diameter. The pilot hastily banked to avoid a collision. In seconds, the UFO reversed, heading back toward the interceptor. The pilot armed his guns, but the disc's fantastic maneuvers kept him from firing. After ten minutes of terrifying head-on approaches, the UFO abruptly stopped, flashed its lights, then streaked away.

The pilot and his radar officer were silenced by this official Project Sign admonition:

"WARNING. This document (the UFO report) contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of the Espionage Law, Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 793 and 794. Its transmission, or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, is prohibited by law." (Penalties for violations range from five years in prison to a fine of \$10,000.) Years later, the AF explained the huge, high-speed disc as a drifting balloon.

2. An even more frightening encounter with a giant spaceship was experienced by a Navy torpedo-plane squadron. In 1953, the squadron had just finished offshore combat maneuvers when a gigantic rocket-shaped craft dived toward the formation. Abruptly reducing speed, it leveled off a thousand feet above the planes. Despite its menacing appearance the squadron leader and his pilots climbed steeply toward the spaceship. The huge craft swiftly whipped around at a sharp angle from the zooming planes. Then a terrific blast of flame burst from the tail and the space machine shot into the sky. But for the hasty turn, the pilots would have died in the sudden inferno. Some UFO researchers believe this indicates a lack of alien hostility. This report was revealed to me by Admiral Delmar S. Fahrney, creator of the Navy missile project. It is still concealed by the AF.

These two cases are just a small part of the confirmed proof that our world is under constant alien surveillance.

What could possibly justify hiding such vital information from the President of the United States, from Congress and the public?

To see the full, incredible picture we have to go back to the first outbreak of UFO sightings, in 1947. Hundreds of high-speed disc-shaped flying objects were seen all over the world. In the U.S., UFOs were reported by AF, Navy and airline pilots, by missile experts and other trained observers, and by citizens in 40 states.

The AF was badly worried and HQ admitted they were baffled. Then a rumor started: The discs were weapons based on Nazi space plans seized by the Soviet at the end of World War II. Headquarters did not believe it, but in fear of panic, top commanders hastily switched to debunking the reports as delusions, witnesses' stupid mistakes, and hoaxes. Most of the public fell for it, laughing at the "flying saucer nonsense."

Back of all this, a secret investigation of the verified evidence

was being made by Technical Intelligence officers, scientists and engineers of the Air Materiel Command. On Sept. 23, Lt. Gen. Nathan Twining, head of AMC, sent this secret conclusion to Headquarters: The "flying saucers" are real, not delusions. Most of them are disc-shaped, metallic, flat on the bottom, domed on top, sometimes seen in formations, obviously under intelligent control.

The AMC conclusion had a strong effect. Under new orders, pilots were told to get closer to UFOs, and to look for clues to their revolutionary power system. Early in '48, Capt. Thomas Mantell, World War II ace, tried to close in on a huge UFO over Kentucky.

"It looks metallic...it's tremendous in size," he radioed Godman AF Base. "I'll try to climb closer..."

Moments later, Mantell's plane disintegrated and he was killed.

For six months, Project Sign made a top secret investigation of verified evidence from pilots, radar operators, and other competent observers. Included were reports of rocket-shaped UFOs with two rows of windows. One encounter was described by two veteran Eastern Airlines pilots. The other report, sent to the AF by the Netherlands Government, described an identical UFO.

The Top Secret Project Sign conclusion: "The UFOs are spacecraft from an advanced civilization, observing the Earth for an unknown purpose. . . Such a civilization might observe that on Earth we now have atomic bombs and are fast developing rockets. In view of the past history of mankind (constant wars) they should be alarmed. We should therefore expect at this time, above all, to behold such visitations."

The window evidence shocked most investigators. It hadn't seemed possible that any living thing could withstand UFOs' terrific speed and violent maneuvers. But here was proof that some spaceships were built to carry crews and other aliens. The obvious answer was some unknown method of controlling and neutralizing gravity.

The possibilities, according to scientific researchers, were almost unbelievable. Using the aliens' G-control system we could make round-the-world flights in less than two hours -- and passengers would not feel the tremendous speeds or sudden turns. UFO bombers would be able to deliver surprise attacks 10,000 miles away in less than thirty minutes. So would any Earth nation which secured the secrets of the UFOs' G-control.

For our own security, AF high commanders came to a hurried decision. The Soviet, they knew, was already trying to shoot down UFOs. We had to get the technical secrets first and duplicate the alien spacecraft -- or the USSR might dominate the world.

The only answer was to capture a UFO -- without serious damage -- as quickly as possible. Then a secret crash program would create our

own UFO fleet.

Trying to capture a UFO would be highly dangerous. An alien crew might destroy our jets, killing our pilots. Even if the pilots forced down an unmanned spacecraft, crews in other UFOs might swiftly retaliate. But with the threat of Soviet success, HQ could see no way to avoid the hazardous gamble.

In late '48 the secret operation began. But every time jets dived in, the UFOs raced away. In '49 the AF announced its investigation was ended, with all sightings explained. But the capture attempts never stopped. In '51, AF censors had powerful help from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when they created an emergency radio system to report any aerial action which appeared as a threat to the United States. Labeled CIRVIS, Communications Instructions for Reporting Vital Intelligence Sightings, with a code name "JANAP 146," it included UFO reports as of vital importance to the defense of the U.S. Citing Espionage Law penalties, it warned military and airline pilots and other observers never to reveal such emergency radio reports. These witnesses are still silenced.

During 1952, nearly 2,000 sightings were reported in the U.S. One of the first witnesses was Secretary of the Navy Dan Kimball. On a flight to Hawaii, Kimball and his veteran pilots saw two UFOs circle their Navy executive plane at terrific speed. Kimball sent a coded radio report to AF Headquarters, but he told me later the AF refused to let him see their evaluation. Later, a Navy photographer filmed a group of UFOs over Utah. Kimball ordered a full analysis of the film by Intelligence and Navy photo experts. The answer: Unknown objects under intelligent control. To discredit the report, the AF called the objects "seagulls."

Fear of mass landings, with the public unprepared, gripped Headquarters. Major Dewey Fournet, HQ UFO Monitor of all UFO reports, tried to start releasing the facts, but the CIA blocked the plan. Fournet was put on inactive duty, silenced.

Early in '53, the CIA persuaded the AF to go all out in debunking, even discrediting veteran AF pilots. One victim was Wing Commander D. J.M. Blakeslee, leading Air Corps ace in World War II. One night, guided by AF ground radar, Blakeslee climbed up and sighted a UFO, which had already been observed by two other AF pilots. He could see a revolving center section and three shafts of light. When he tried to close in, the UFO disappeared at tremendous speed -- confirmed by his AF base radar. A confidential report was cleared for me just before the CIA pressured the AF to stop all releases. It praised Blakeslee highly and said the sighted object was "definitely in the family of UFO." When the CIA learned I was going to make the report public, it managed to secure a false explanation for rebuttal. Blakeslee, the AF said, had mistaken the planet Jupiter for a UFO. That night, Jupiter was 366,000,000 miles from the Earth. The range of the radar which tracked the object was less than 200 miles. But the lie is still on record.

Truman from CIA book Chapter 2

Secretary of War Henry Stimson did the briefing of Truman about the bomb ✓
Truman launched the Central Intelligence Group in 1946 ✓
February 1946 Daily summary started ✓

Central Intelligence Group became the CIA in September 1947 ✓
Office of Current Intelligence OCI formed in January 1951 ✓
Truman raised the idea of briefing Eisenhower and Stevenson to Smith in the summer of 1952
Meredith Davidson did the briefing of the candidates...was the officer who helped prepare the daily briefings for Truman.

In a November 21, speech at CIA headquarters on November 21, 1952 Truman said "I am giving this president-this new President— more information than any other president had when he went into office"

"referring to a widely publicized meeting he held with Eisenhower at the White House to discuss foreign policy issues earlier that same week, Truman said "It was my privilege a few days ago (November 18) to brief the General who is going to take over the office on the 20th of January."

Eisenhower wrote that they added little.

Truman told Walter Bedell Smith that he had kept them general for political reasons

Eisenhower wrote that he had been briefed occasionally by Smith and some assistants at CIA

Truman send telegram August 19 offering weekly briefing

Eisenhower turned him down...only communications from outgoing administration that could be read by the American people

First CIA briefing August 30 at Eisenhower's Manhattan address, plus three others before th Election

November 5 election...Eisenhower goes to Georgia for two week vacation...Melvin Hendrickson, head of miliary unit at OCI ... no longer briefing...now Bedell Smith accompanied by Davidson

A November 28 visit to brief Eisenhower on Korea...Eisenhower ordered no publicity....army security people took Smith thro and drugstore and out the back door to ensure the security for the visist.

Smith appointed Undersecretary of State under John Foster Dulles...Allen Dulles got DCI which did not please Smith...he wanted to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

Eisenhower used high level briefing. Allen Dulles briefed the national Security Council once a week...Lay vetted the subjects beforehand....Lay, Cutler, and Eisenhower

Herbert Scoville Jr., the Assistant Director for scientific Intelligence briefed on scientific subjects

Ike read no daily intelligence reports...relied on daily oral reports prepared by Goodpaster Lt. Col John Eisenhower

No memorandums for the record in CIA files for postelection briefing of Eisenhower. CIA doubts there are any. Davidson who accompanied Walter Smith on the first two briefings said in an interview with the CIA, he had asked Beedle, and he said No. "Beedle would have been happy if nothing had been written."

Eberstadt, who spoke with his old friend. Forrestal said that people were out to get him, that he was a complete failure, and was considering suicide. We do not know for certain who Forrestal was actually referring to, although Eberstadt gradually surmised that Forrestal meant Communists, Zionists, and White House people. The Air Force immediately flew Forrestal to Hobe Sound, Florida, home of Bob Lovett, recently the Undersecretary of State and a future Secretary of Defense. Forrestal's first words on arrival were "Bob, they're after me." He met with Dr. William Menninger, of the Menninger Foundation, and a consultant to the Surgeon General of the Army. They were soon joined by Captain George N. Raines, chief psychologist at the U.S. Naval Hospital at Bethesda. During the next few days Forrestal had several hysterical episodes and made at least one suicide attempt, certain (according to friends) that the Communists were planning an imminent invasion.⁶⁴

On April 2, 1949, "for security reasons," Forrestal's coterie flew him to Bethesda. During the trip from the Air Field to the hospital, Forrestal made several attempts to leave the moving vehicle, and was forcibly restrained. He talked of suicide, of being a bad Catholic, and several times of those "who are trying to get me." He was admitted to Bethesda under care of Raines, who diagnosed Forrestal's illness as Involutional Melancholia, a depressive condition sometimes seen in people reaching middle age, often who saw their life as a failure. Upon arrival at Bethesda, Forrestal declared that he did not expect to leave the place alive. In a highly unusual decision for a suicidal patient, Forrestal's doctor was instructed by "the people downtown" (eg. national security, not medical, personnel) to place him in the VIP 16th floor suite.⁶⁵

During Forrestal's first week in Bethesda, he received a treatment called narcosis, essentially sedatives and tranquilizers. Electro-shock therapy was considered but not used. No visitors were allowed initially, except members of the immediate family, who visited rarely. Forrestal's brother, Henry, visited him the most at four times. Menninger visited twice. Other early visitors were Sidney Souers, Louis Johnson, Truman, and Congressman Lyndon Johnson.⁶⁶

WHITE SANDS PROVING GROUND: II

UFO-related events progressed on a gradual crescendo during the spring of 1949. Investigations into the green fireballs continued, a major magazine attacked UFOs, the CIA gained legal spending authorization with practically no congressional debate, the Air Force released a major report on UFOs, and Donald E. Keyhoe entered the UFO field.

Military and intelligence people continued to discuss what UFO sightings represented, and held different opinions. A March 15 CIA memo on UFOs by a Dr. Stone of the Office of Scientific Investigation (OSI) dismissed the idea of UFOs as foreign aircraft, and suggested the possibility that they were misidentifications of other phenomena. On March 25, an FBI memo sent to a large number of offices and officials stated that:

a reliable and confidential source has advised the Bureau that flying discs are believed to be man-made missiles rather than natural phenomenon. It has also been determined that for approximately the past four years the USSR has been engaged in experimentation on an unknown type of flying disc.⁶⁷

This information, however, flew in the face of the conclusion drawn by scientific personnel at Wright Field - that the Soviets were *not* responsible for flying saucer sightings. On March 31 another CIA memorandum on Project Sign and UFOs stated the belief that UFOs "will turn out another 'sea serpent.' However, since there is even is a remote possibility that they may be interplanetary or foreign aircraft, it is necessary to investigate each sighting."⁶⁸ On April 19, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations at Kirtland AFB sent a list of fireball reports to Air Force Headquarters. The cover letter noted:

The common characteristics of most of the incidents are: A. green color, sometimes described as greenish white, bright green, yellow green, or blue green. B. horizontal path, sometimes with minor variations. C. speed less than that of a meteor but more than any other type of known aircraft. D. no sound associated with observation. E. no persistent trail or dust cloud. F. period of visibility from one to five seconds.⁶⁹

Although AFOSI wanted to continue investigating the fireballs, it received no cooperation from Air Material Command

Several sightings seem to have occurred at White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexico on April 6, 1949, but little has been reported about them.⁷⁰ A key event, however, took place during the launch of a top-secret Skyhook balloon on the morning of April 24, about 50 miles from White Sands. Several well-qualified observers, such as scientists, engineers, and officers, saw a UFO visually and measured its movement with a 25-power theodolite.

Interestingly, one of the observers was Charles B. Moore, whose name appeared in the Air Force's explanation of the Roswell incident of 1947. Moore checked the crosswinds, launched the balloon at 10:20 a.m., and observed it through a theodolite with an assistant. Accompanying him were five others, including Navy men and balloon personnel from General Mills. At 10:30, someone saw a whitish-silver, elliptical object in another part of the sky, and everyone turned to observe and track it with the theodolite, where it filled the scope. The object was

Mickelson actually had a private line straight to Langley that bypassed the CBS switchboard. He later went on to become president of Radio Free Europe, another CIA-controlled organization. During the 1950s, at least two CBS employees were actually undercover CIA operatives. Time-Life founder Henry Luce was another friend of Dulles, and an especially cooperative CIA asset. Luce often encouraged his foreign correspondents to meet with CIA officials after returning from trips abroad. Another senior executive at Life was C. D. Jackson, a man with a long intelligence background, who had even served as a top consultant to President Eisenhower. During the early 1960s, Jackson approved plans to grant cover to CIA operatives.

Propaganda and disinformation spread abroad through the CIA's worldwide network of news services, and for years was (is?) unwittingly reprinted as bona fide news by U.S. newspapers. Officially, this situation ended around 1975, after such activities were discovered, and after which the CIA stated that it no longer engaged in such activities.^{*104}

(5) The expansion of Camp Detrick's biological and chemical weapons research and production facilities.

(6) Human plutonium injection experiments, for the purpose of determining safe levels of plutonium exposure for individuals involved in the manufacture of American nuclear weapons. As early as 1945, the Manhattan Project was asked to consider "that a hospital patient at either Rochester or Chicago be chosen for injection from 1 to 10 micrograms of material [plutonium] and that the excreta be sent to this laboratory [Los Alamos] for analysis." The first human plutonium injection took place on April 10, 1945, without the informed consent of the patient. This was not an isolated incident. Experiments of this type continued in various American hospitals and universities over the next three decades. In 1982, researcher Dorothy Legarreta found a 1950 memo advising that large primates such as chimpanzees be substituted for humans in the planned studies on radiation's cognitive effects. The use of humans, the memo's author wrote, might leave the Atomic Energy Commission open "to considerable criticism," since the proposed experiments had "a little of the Buchenwald touch." To say the least. Six years later, Dorothy Legarreta died in a "mysterious" car crash, the briefcase carrying her "hot docs" missing forever.¹⁰⁵

(7) The continued operation of such older programs as the CIA's (and military's) mind control research and Army Signal Security Agency's Operation Shamrock.

Thus, some of the flavor of the less publicized world of 1950. At

* It quietly admitted again in the 1990s that it did.

the risk of restating the obvious, each of the aforementioned programs was completely unknown to the American public at the time, and remained so for many years, in most cases more than twenty. Americans simply had no idea of the activities of their national security/scientific apparatus. And Congress provided no oversight.

UFO SECRECY AND PUBLICITY IN EARLY 1950

Such levels of secrecy also extended to UFOs. On the night of January 22/23, 1950, near the Bering Sea at Kodiak, Alaska, Navy patrol pilot Lt. Smith made a routine security flight. At 2:40 a.m., he obtained a radar reading of an object 20 miles north, which quickly vanished. Eight minutes later, he picked up either the same or a different object. He radioed Kodiak to learn that no known aircraft were in the area. The Kodiak radar officer then reported that *he* was receiving interference, the likes of which he had never experienced.

At about 3 a.m., the USS *Tillamook* was south of Kodiak when one of the men on deck saw "a very fast moving red glow light, which appeared to be of exhaust nature." The object came from the southeast, moved clockwise in a large circle around Kodiak, and returned to the southeast. Another officer came out to look, saw it in view for 30 seconds, and described it as like "a large ball of orange fire." No sound came from the source of the light.

At 4:40 a.m. Lt. Smith, still on airborne patrol and experiencing no radar problems, now picked up another blip on his radar – so fast that it left a trail on his screen. Smith called his crew, who immediately saw the object close a five mile gap in ten seconds, an apparent speed of 1,800 mph. He tried to pursue the object, but it was too maneuverable. Witnesses described two orange lights that rotated around a common center. At some point the object made a sharp turn and headed directly toward Smith's plane. He "considered this to be a highly threatening gesture" and turned off his lights. The UFO flew by and disappeared.

At least 36 copies of the Navy's detailed report were sent to various security agencies, including the CIA, FBI, Air Force Intelligence, and the Department of State. None of these copies were ever released or published, although a truncated FBI copy surfaced in the 1970s as the result of a Freedom of Information Act request. The document's explanation: "the objects must be regarded as phenomena . . . the exact nature of which could not be determined."¹⁰⁶

And yet publicly, the Air Force had stopped investigating UFOs! Ruppelt claimed that UFO investigations at this time rated "minimum effort."¹⁰⁷ The old Project Grudge files, he said, had been "chucked into an old storage case," and many reports were missing when he sifted

CHADWELL AND UFOs

On September 24, 1952, the final day of the Mainbrace UFO sightings, H. Marshall Chadwell wrote a letter to CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith, stating that since 1947 unexplained sightings were running at 20 percent, and that for 1952 they were at 28 percent. Chadwell wrote:

I consider this problem to be of such importance that it should be brought to the attention of the National Security Council in order that a community-wide coordinated effort toward its solution may be initiated.⁷⁸

Chadwell played the familiar themes of mass hysteria and the potential for Soviet mischief. Parts of the letter showed concern about the UFOs themselves and the need to identify them. His memo did not, however, indicate any interest in the possibility that UFOs represented alien intelligence. Rather, the CIA consultants he spoke with:

stated that these solutions would probably be found on the margins or just beyond the frontiers of our present knowledge in the fields of atmospheric, ionospheric, and extraterrestrial phenomena, with the added possibility that the present dispersal of nuclear waste products might also be a factor.

By extraterrestrial, Chadwell did not mean alien life forms, but any phenomena originating from space. Overall, he strongly suggested the conclusions later arrived at by the Robertson Panel: to keep the profile of UFOs as low as possible while the real investigation and activity could continue. At all cost, mass hysteria and panic must be avoided.

Around the time of Chadwell's letter, sometime in late September 1952, Ruppelt briefed General Chidlaw and his staff at Air Defense Command on the past few months of UFO activity. One of the attendees was Major Verne Sadowski, the Air Defense Command Intelligence's liaison officer with Project Blue Book. During an informal exchange, Ruppelt encountered a great deal of skepticism – not regarding UFOs, but of Project Blue Book's honesty in analyzing UFOs. Sadowski said that no one "can understand why Intelligence is so hesitant to accept the fact that something we just don't know about is flying around in our skies – unless you are trying to cover up something big." Ruppelt tried to reassure Sadowski, and a general discussion ensued about the possibility of UFOs being extraterrestrial, with no agreement. Throughout the fall, as during the spring, Ruppelt gave standing-room only lectures on UFOs for military and scientific groups, and continued to be struck by the strong interest in UFOs within scientific circles.⁷⁹

During the fall, the Navy delivered its evaluation of the Tremonton, Utah film to the Air Force. The Navy's conclusion:

"Unknown objects under intelligent control." As if this were not bad enough, the Navy study had an impressive amount of technical support. Clearly, the Air Force efforts to dismiss UFOs had not yet succeeded. Navy Secretary Dan Kimball appeared to be moving toward acknowledging UFOs. The good news, from the perspective of the Air Force and CIA, was that Kimball would probably be gone soon. Most likely, they decided their best strategy would be to ride out the remainder of the Truman administration in anticipation of the nearly certain victory by Republican Dwight Eisenhower for the Presidency.⁸⁰

On November 5, 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected to the presidency of the United States. While his election was the main public news of the latter part of the year, it occurred amid a scramble of UFO-related activity. November 18 is the alleged date of the MJ-12 briefing papers that Roscoe Hillenkoetter, late of the CIA, was to have presented to Ike. As discussed earlier, the documents may well be faked, although they are not as easily dismissed as some writers on the subject would have it. But even if the national security state was not preparing Eisenhower for UFOs, it was preparing the UFO problem for the Eisenhower administration.

THE WAVE SUBSIDES – A BIT

While the CIA and ATIC worked toward a "final solution" for the UFO problem, the UFOs themselves continued to be seen just about everywhere. The pace had slowed down a bit from the summer, but by no means were unidentified flying objects absent from the skies of America, or for that matter, other nations. Press coverage of flying saucers was once again nonexistent, so this was a non-issue as far as the public was concerned. Still, many unsettling sightings continued to occur over restricted military areas, and jets continued to pursue unknown objects.

On September 30 at Edwards AFB in California, several people, including an aviation photographer, saw two discs hovering and darting around. On October 11, a GOC spotter in Newport News, Virginia, saw a disc-shaped UFO with a domed top. On the 13th, in Oshima, Japan, an Air Force pilot and engineer saw a round or elliptical object in the clouds which sped away and rapidly disappeared. ATIC received a report from October 29 from Hempstead, Long Island involving a sighting by the pilots of two F-94s. The report included a statement by one of the pilots:

Based on my experience in fighter tactics, it is my opinion that the object was controlled by something having visual contact with us. The power and acceleration were beyond the capability of any known U.S. aircraft.

COVERT OPS

In the months preceding the Robertson Panel, other noteworthy activities occurred within the secret government. By the fall of 1952, the CIA's Frank Wisner controlled a covert ops staff of nearly 3,000 people (up from 300 in 1949). This number did not reflect the much larger number of CIA "assets," only official, paid staff. Wisner's OPC also had 47 overseas stations (up from 17 in 1949), and an annual budget of \$82 million (up from \$4.7 million). CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith, meanwhile, expressed his conviction that the agency was penetrated by enemy agents.⁹⁴

In mid-October, the 4602nd AISS was reorganized and expanded, increased to 61 officers and 133 airmen. Its mission remained to support ADC in the rapid reporting of combat intelligence. Its new plan called for 19 strategically deployed intelligence teams with a heavy emphasis on Russian/Soviet intelligence collection. Around this time, five officers and 44 airmen went on a nine-week course at ATIC in Dayton, with additional courses scheduled from early January through mid-March 1953. There is no direct evidence that these seminars were UFO-related. As General Burgess stated in a January 1953 AISS meeting, their mission was "to get combat intelligence when the bell rings."⁹⁵

The most significant event of late 1952 was the creation of the National Security Agency. On October 24, 1952, President Truman signed National Security Council Directive 6, a seven-page document that eliminated the first attempt at uniting all military signal intelligence (SIGINT) operations, and now replaced it with the NSA. Directive 6 remains classified to this day. The U.S. *Government Manual* says only, "The National Security Agency performs highly specialized technical and coordinating functions relating to the national security." It would be many years before Americans learned about the sprawling apparatus that lay behind that bland phrase. No public law defines or limits its powers. According to *Blank Check* author Tim Weiner, the only known mention of the agency in the public laws of the United States is a 1959 statute: "Nothing in this act or any other law . . . shall be construed to require the disclosure of the organization or any function of the National Security Agency." The first NSA Director (DIRNSA) was Major General Julian Canine; his first Deputy Director (D/DIRNSA) was Joseph Wenger. Over the years, D/DIRNSA evolved into the office responsible for daily NSA operations.⁹⁶

The NSA describes its main function as planning, coordinating, directing, and performing foreign signals intelligence (SIGINT) and

information security (INFOSEC) functions. That is, to safeguard all American national security electronic and signals communication, and to intercept all foreign communications. It is widely acknowledged to possess the world's leading cryptologic (e.g., code making and breaking) capability. Therefore, it was only logical that the newly-created organization also inherited responsibility for Operation Shamrock. Only three NSA staff members – the DIRNSA, the D/DIRNSA, and one lower-level manager – knew the full extent of the project. It is unclear whether Harry Truman knew about Shamrock when he signed the order creating the NSA.

The NSA quickly became involved in UFO reports. 239 UFO documents, dating from 1958 to 1979, were recovered from NSA through FOIA requests. 160 of those documents originated from within NSA itself.⁹⁷ This is surely a tiny proportion of actual NSA-UFO documents, but obtaining anything at all from NSA is no easy task. As authors Barry Greenwood and Lawrence Fawcett pointed out:

The NSA shreds 40 tons of documents per day in its operations, but 279 UFO documents are saved. Why? Certainly not for reference to NSA interception techniques and personnel. These are easily available to NSA personnel elsewhere within the agency. It is evident that these are saved for the UFO subject matter. Simple narrative accounts of UFO incidents will not be released by NSA under any circumstances despite our efforts to purge the documentation of any reference to NSA operations. Why?⁹⁸

NSA's collection of UFO reports began no later than 1953.

THE ROBERTSON PANEL

In 1952, concern about UFOs had peaked within the United States military, the intelligence community, and – as far as we can tell – the Presidency itself. Chadwell's December memo, written four months after the public debunking of UFOs, showed extreme bewilderment about the nature of UFOs, as well as concern over what exotic things were over American skies. The Navy and Air Force both had a strong contingent, possibly a majority, that believed UFOs were extraterrestrial. The FBI continued to report on UFO developments to Hoover. Most importantly, American jets continued their efforts to intercept unidentified craft over their air space, craft that seemed to be posing greater dangers to American personnel than they had before. Every indication was that the American government was taking this problem very seriously, and that the problem itself continued in a state of crisis.

Moreover, since the summer of 1952, it had been fairly clear that Dwight Eisenhower would win the Presidential election against Democratic opponent Adlai Stevenson. Truman's staff knew the Republicans gleefully awaited a major housecleaning after November.

Administration changes, especially Party changes, always bring their share of difficult adjustments. Even within the CIA, a Republican victory would likely mean changes for DCI Walter Bedel Smith. But what about adjustments for a UFO control group? Ever since UFOs had been a recognized problem, Truman had been President. With that prospect ending, surely those managing the problem wanted to keep it away from the wrong people. Mere changes in the Presidency and controlling party could not be permitted to affect the handling of this all-important problem.

At the same time, something else was happening: a nascent "UFO Party" was forming, within the military (e.g. Fournet and a few higher-ups) and in the civilian sector (e.g. Keyhoe, Frank Edwards, and the civilian groups). Of course, this had been a problem for some time. Now, in the aftermath of the Great Wave, and facing the prospect of the uncertainties inherent in a new administration, this "UFO Party" most assuredly needed to be silenced and discredited, posthaste. Otherwise, they might make even bigger waves (and generate bigger leaks) within the new administration.

I believe it is reasonable to speculate that during the final months of 1952, men like W. B. Smith – and who knows who else, Vandenberg? Marshall? Truman? – had two basic goals: one for the immediate period, and one for the long-term. The immediate goal was to silence and discredit the UFO party. The long-term goal was to insure that no major mistakes would occur by the new people about to take charge.

Hence the significance of the Robertson Panel, which officially functioned from Wednesday, January 14 to Sunday, January 18, 1953. This was the last matter of any consequence in Truman's eight years in the White House. Eisenhower was sworn in as President two days later, on Tuesday, January 20.

Seen in this perspective, the panel's significance is not that it merely served to "debunk" UFOs – something all researchers have acknowledged. Rather, *it was a final insurance policy to steer the UFO issue away from the wrong people*, to keep it from being investigated by too many individuals and departments in the Eisenhower presidency. The Robertson Panel was the Truman administration's final bit of housecleaning.

Obviously, this was no job for the nascent National Science Foundation. It is a matter of some importance that the organization entrusted with organizing the panel was the same organization involved in mind control experiments, disinformation, foreign coups (Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954), media manipulation, the secret collection of UFO reports, and surveillance against American UFO

researchers.* If the job was not to get to the bottom of a scientific question, but rather to control a multi-headed hydra, then the CIA was the ideal choice.

Thus the setting for the Robertson Panel, held in secrecy and denied until 1958.

ROBERTSON PANEL: AGENDA

The initial meeting convened at 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday, January 14. Its panel members included: Dr. H. P. Robertson, Dr. Luis Alvarez, Dr. Thornton Page, and Dr. Samuel A. Goudsmit. In addition, CIA members Philip G. Strong, Lt. Col. Frederick C. E. Oder, David B. Stevenson, and Frederick Durant also attended. A fifth panel member, Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner, was absent until Friday afternoon, when the panel was almost over.

The Wednesday meeting reviewed the CIA interest in the matter, including the OSI study from August (authored by Strong, Eng, and Durant), the ATIC November 21 meeting, the December 4 IAC decision, the visit to ATIC by Chadwell, Durant, and Robertson, and CIA concern over "potential dangers to national security indirectly related to these sightings." The group also saw the Tremonton and Montana films that morning.

In the afternoon, Ruppelt, Hynek, and Fournet were present, as were Captain Harry Smith and Dr. Stephen Possony. Navy analysts Harry Woo and Robert Neasham of the USN Photo Interpretation Laboratory in Anacostia presented their analysis of both films, which "evoked considerable discussion." This segment lasted two hours. Ruppelt then spoke for forty minutes on Blue Book's methods of handling UFO reports. The meeting adjourned at 5:15 p.m.

The group met again on Thursday. In addition to Panel members and CIA personnel, Ruppelt and Hynek attended. Ruppelt spoke some more about Blue Book, Hynek described the work in progress at Battelle. The CIA also showed a motion picture film of seagulls, a clear hint at the conclusions they were seeking to reach. (Why would the CIA obtain motion pictures of seagulls flying, anyway?) Lt. Col. Oder gave a 40-minute presentation on Project Twinkle. That afternoon, General Garland attended, and stated his desire to: (1) increase the use of thoroughly briefed Air Force intelligence officers to investigate UFO reports, (2) "declassify as many of the reports as possible," and (3) enlarge Blue Book.

* Indeed, just days before the panel convened (1/9/53), it was reported that the CIA had been tapping the telephone of newly-elected President of Costa Rica, Jose (Pepe) Figueres; the agency continued to wage a disinformation campaign against him.

himself – the man who shot the Tremonton film. Ruppelt himself only did so later and was much impressed. According to Ruppelt, Newhouse “didn’t think the UFOs were disc-shaped; he knew that they were.”

There is good reason to believe the panel’s conclusions were foregone. Hynek said he discerned the panel’s debunking mood right from the beginning. Fournet thought that the actual author of the conclusions was not Robertson but Durant, and that he wrote them late on Friday. Work by UFO researcher and historian Michael Swords pushes the date further back: “Fournet did not know that the report, in draft form, existed before Friday and possibly before the panel was even convened on Wednesday.” Kevin Randle believed the Panel wrote its conclusions before its first session. It was “loaded with men who not only didn’t believe in UFOs but were hostile to the *idea* of UFOs.”

Many have questioned whether the CIA could manipulate a group of scientists to reach their desired conclusion. Ordinarily, the question is valid. Randle, for example, doubted that “someone in the government [would be] confident enough in his own abilities to micromanage the data [and] influence the conclusions . . .” But micromanaging data is not necessary when the right people are selected. The members of the Robertson Panel were classic power scientists, men who were heavily connected with the military and national security state. They were certainly no detached, impartial jury, withholding a decision until an objective review of the evidence. Quite the contrary.

Keyhoe believed the panel was a CIA program to bury the UFO. Hynek years later stated he was “negatively impressed.” Ruppelt, however, was thoroughly misled. He believed the panel accepted Garland’s recommendation that Blue Book be expanded. He also misinterpreted the panel’s education and debunking recommendation, thinking it meant that “the American public should be told every detail of every phase of the UFO investigation.”

The Lorenzens understandably came down hard against the Panel, calling it “not a bona fide unbiased scientific study since the panel members were only given a small group of cases (selected by ATIC) from Blue Book files for consideration.” Moreover, “Blue Book was never a research project in any true sense of the word.”

Even one of the Panel members, Dr. Thornton Page, said in 1980 that the Panel “tended to ignore the five percent or ten percent [sic] of UFO reports that are highly reliable and have not as yet been explained.”

Authors Barry Greenwood and Lawrence Fawcett called the Panel not so much a “scientific” panel as a “propaganda” panel. In their

words:

Labeling a twelve-hour round table discussion of UFOs a “scientific study” is ludicrous, especially considering the fact that, in at least one instance, 1,000 man hours was spent on one case ... by Navy analysts and the conclusion was unknown.

Point well taken. It seems odd, does it not, that following such a grave crisis of well-documented UFO sightings from 1952, the best the scientific-military-intelligence establishment could come up with was . . . the Robertson Panel? A study of the problem that was, from a scientific perspective, utterly inadequate and inept? On the face of it, it makes no sense at all.¹⁰¹

After all these years, the Robertson Panel still leaves a bad taste. In part, this is because Nobel-caliber scientists were involved in such scientifically shallow and deficient work. But how could that be? Berkner showed up just in time to put his name on the final document. The rest sat around for a few hours – precious time away from busy calendars – to listen to a few presentations, probably feeling bored with a subject they all thought was nonsense long before they arrived. Would the CIA really entrust policy-making authority to a group which, prestigious though it certainly was, was incapable of getting up to speed quickly enough to render an informed decision on the subject? Here we may arrive at the core meaning of the Robertson Panel: a group that, by its very prestige, was able to sanction a policy already decided upon. Within the classified as well as the public world, it is always a good idea to cover your vulnerable areas. What better way than with a panel composed of Nobel caliber scientists needed to help defuse the UFO problem – certainly not to figure it out. Here is the point that the people at Battelle missed. What the CIA and Air Force wanted was not an actual *study* of the problem. Goodness no; they had enough of those, already. What was needed, and fast, was adequate justification for a policy decision.

The policies that followed as the result of the Robertson Panel, what we may with justice call the true crackdown against UFO publicity, were not the *result* of the Robertson Panel’s decisions. They were the result of the same policy that created the Panel itself, and which since the summer of 1952 had determined that UFOs were finally and truly going to go to sleep, as far as the public was concerned.

ROBERTSON PANEL: AFTERMATH

On January 20, 1953, Dwight Eisenhower was inaugurated as the 34th U.S. President. On that day, Robertson wrote a letter to his good

DRAFT NO. 1

UNCLASSIFIED

SUMMARY

WATCH COMMITTEE

I. PROBLEM

1. To establish a "Watch Committee" which shall be responsible for forecasting possible "crash" or contingency operations and advising the director thereof with recommended courses of action.

II. DISCUSSION

2. Past experience in the field of responsibilities assigned PSB has shown that unless a special group is established to deal with contingencies, as mentioned above, the entire organization will be continually seized with such problems (which it is felt are inescapably the director's responsibility) and its main functions of broad policy guidance and planning effectively stultified.

3. The staff section charged with this responsibility must be completely segregated from all other planning functions and must not be permitted to enmesh other planning sections in its operations.

4. It must combine

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

87-59

1/31/91

Box 26, PSR-T. LIB

S E C R E T

- 2 -

4. It must combine top level intelligence and planning ability so that it may discharge equally well both its forecasting and advisory capacities.

III. CONCLUSIONS

A "Watch Committee" initially composed of two highly qualified persons, preferably drawn from P/POL (for recommendations and planning) and from an intelligence division of the services, State, or CIA, with a secretary-stenographer should be established as soon as possible.

This section shall be located directly under the Assistant Director of the Office of Coordination with a direct emergency channel authorized to the director.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) That two GS-14s and one GS-7 vacancies be established in this area at once.

(2) That the following persons be approached immediately with

the view

S E C R E T

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

the view of filling these positions:

Mr. Edward Roberts (P/POL, State)

(Mr. (Col.) Wm. Godel (G-2, Army)

(Mr. Davis E. Boster (EE, State)

TMP/P-1dp
7/23/51

~~SECRET~~

(SECRET)

WATCH COMMITTEE

BACKGROUND, ORGANIZATION, OPERATING PROCEDURE

It is assumed that the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board should have a staff unit to follow current operations being conducted by member departments and agencies. The functions of such a unit would be concerned principally with anticipating immediate developments and correcting mistakes. These functions are not in the responsibilities of the Planning, Coordinating and Review sections of the PSB staff as now anticipated.

Attached as Tab A are examples, selected by one of the authors of this paper, of typical operations which would have been of concern to the Director.

The Director may be kept informed of current operations through the members of the Board, one or more of whom will be concerned in all such operations. As the Board is not in constant session, however, this source of information will not be sufficient to allow the Director to keep abreast of fast-moving developments. Staff level contact with the operating agencies is required.

The type of operation with which this staff unit will deal are principally in the overt field. This is the field where the actions of the Board and the Director will be most open to criticism. Hence, the personnel of the unit should be familiar with the techniques of public relations. However, to anticipate developments will require skill in intelligence and public opinion analysis also.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

The operating agencies now deal with current emergencies through their own mechanisms. To avoid duplication and muddle the PSB staff unit will work through these mechanisms. This suggests that the proper location of the unit within the PSB staff would be in the Office of Coordination.

Experience has shown that a large part of the difficulties of operating agencies in dealing with emergencies now comes from the fact that the same individuals are charged with both long-range and current operations. (There does exist an interdepartmental Intelligence "watch committee" but it has no authority to influence a covert development.) The PSB staff unit will only function efficiently if set up to operate exclusively as a "watch committee" to follow current developments.

Organization

A unit of two persons located within the Office of Coordination will be able to carry out the required function. Names of individuals with the proper qualifications are included in the Summary.

Operating Procedure

Following is a compilation of "do's" and "don'ts" for the watch committee:

- (1) Does not participate in planning or sit with planning groups except as they concern current operations.
- (2) Maintains liaison with our specified individual within each operating agency. This individual need not be one who is involved in all current operations but should be able to arrange the necessary contacts for the PSB representative.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(3) Keeps abreast of world public opinion affecting current operations, especially watching for unfavorable trends.

(4) Advises the Director where necessary to inspire statements or actions to forestall or correct unfavorable developments. As this will usually be a rush operation, the approach should be directly to the Director or his Deputy, keeping the Assistant Director for Coordination informed.

Note: The Director may wish to inspire statements or actions through a member, or members, of the Board. But, with the approval of the Director, this may also be done directly by the "watch committee" with the operating agency concerned. Only with the approval of the Director and the agency concerned will the "watch committee" go directly to the person, inside or outside the government, who is to make the statement or take the action required.

(5) Does not clear speeches by officials of the government but maintains contact (through (2) above) with those who have this responsibility in the operating agency, so as to:

(a) Suggest themes for inclusion in speeches or statements.

(6) Analyzes mistakes in current operations; and

(7) Prepares for the Director reports on mistakes for the operating agency concerned.

(8) Reports at staff meetings on current operations.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON

November 1, 1951

MEMORANDUM TO: MR. GRAY

FROM: Bill Kornes

SUBJECT: Watch Committee

NOTED BY MR. GRAY

After six weeks' experience as a one-man Watch Committee, it is my opinion that this function should be abolished.

I have acted in three matters: The Iranian crisis, the disarmament question, and the issue of public statements on fantastic weapons.

Of the three, I feel only the first was properly a spot, crash or watch operation. With the assistance of the staff, I surveyed the interested departments and agencies, and within 48 hours filed a report that stressed the absence of a coordinated policy in Iran and the Middle East as a whole and recommended that PSB go further into the matter. The problem was dealt with, if not correctly, at least directly and quickly.

The other two matters, while of fairly immediate concern, called for action which might appropriately fall to the Office of Coordination at any time. I came on the disarmament proposal by chance, during the course of a P/POL meeting. My initial query to Mr. McWilliams led to Mr. Sherman's talk with Mr. Hickerson, and there the matter ended. Similarly, my talks with AEC and Defense on fantastic weapons were followed by a meeting between the Director and Mr. Dean and the subsequent decision that PSB should prepare a policy paper. In both cases, the information which I gathered could just as easily have been contributed by PSB coordinating officers assigned to the respective agencies.

If this experience has been valid, it would seem that the watch function is at best a sporadic one. It has been agreed from the start that the function would eventually disappear altogether. I feel that time is at hand.

There is, however, a continuing need for information on plans on foot, new ideas, prospective bottlenecks, etc., both in and out of government. The entire staff takes a hand in gathering this information. But the staff will increasingly be burdened with duties which in themselves are limiting. One man, with sufficient contacts and stature to move quickly in any direction, could provide a valuable supplemental flow of information.

UNCLASSIFIED

87-59

11/31/91

TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

15 OCT 1951

SD-134080

TOP SECRET CONTROL

G-2, DAT

15 OCT 1951

6 OCT 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

SUBJECT: Request for Publication

1. Reference is made to Memorandum from Psychological Strategy Board, dated 1 October 1951.

2. The request for one (1) copy of the White Committee Report is approved, effective with issue Number 61 dated 1 October 1951. Copies will be mailed regularly each Friday, commencing with issue Number 61. One copy of issue number 61 is enclosed herewith.

3. The Intelligence Summary produced by Central Headquarters, Far East Command is not available at present in sufficient quantity to fill the request. However, it is hoped later to increase the number of copies received, and the request will be available as soon as the increase is met.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

Johnson B. Caudle

EXCLUDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER
Control: 13000-100-1
G-2, 100, 100-100-100-100

For: Subj: Copy

COLL: 150

15 OCT 1951

15 OCT 1951

15 OCT 1951

15 OCT 1951

15 OCT 1951

15 OCT 1951

15 OCT 1951

15 OCT 1951

15 OCT 1951

15 OCT 1951

15 OCT 1951

15 OCT 1951

15 OCT 1951

15 OCT 1951

15 OCT 1951

TOP SECRET

101604

~~TOP SECRET~~

WATCH COMMITTEE
of the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

TOP SECRET

From: 28 September 1951
To : 3 October 1951
Washington 25, D. C.
4 October 1951

No. 61

SUMMARY OF INDICATIONS DURING PERIOD

1. KOREA: Enemy activity during the week continued to provide no definite indications of immediate Communist military intentions although the enemy retains the capability of launching a general offensive at any time. There were no significant enemy unit movements suggesting that a general offensive is impending, and no new Communist units were identified. Heavy vehicular sightings were indicative of a continued enemy effort to improve his logistical position. There are some suggestions that the enemy may be fearful of U. N. landings on the North Korean coasts.

The Communists continued to put up jet fighters in sufficient strength to challenge the U. N. air effort over northwest Korea, and the enemy fighter effort is no longer confined to a defense of the Yalu River area but it is being extended southward to interfere with the U. N. interdiction of the Communist supply lines. Unconfirmed reports that two additional airfields in the Antung area are being readied for operations may point to a further expansion of the enemy air effort, and 20 TU-2 light bombers have been moved to Liaoyang, Manchuria, the closest to the Korean border such aircraft have been noted. There is some further evidence of the training of North Korean pilots in Manchuria.

Propaganda on the cease-fire talks continues to provide no clear indication of the Communists' political intentions. Chinese Communist statements on the 1 October anniversary reasserted their faith in ultimate victory and maintained that the Communists must continue fighting in Korea.

2. CHINA: The Chinese Communists have again asserted their intention to conquer Formosa, but there are no indications of an early attack. The

~~TOP SECRET~~

Truman

Thomas Ballen & Norman Polmar

"Code - Name Downfall" Simon & Schuster

New York 1995

P. 124

120,000 at 37 facilities

- unknown to most of Roosevelt's cabinet and
nearly all senior military commanders

P. 125

Groves handed Truman 24 page memo

Truman said he did not like to read long
memos.

P. 122

Roosevelt dies April 12 1st meeting no one says anything

P. 123

Map room - 24 hrs a day nation's most
vital secrets