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Tech Exchange File

12 September 1950

STATE-DEFENSE MILITARY INFORMATION CONTROL COMMITTEE

DRAFT

U.S. POSITION PAPER

On

COMPARISON OF CERTAIN US AND UK SECURITY PRACTICES

1. The US-UK Security Agreement provides, in brief, that both countries will afford substantially the same degree of protection to classified information as that given by the originator. Stating this in even simpler terms it means that both the US and the UK shall provide like standards of safeguarding- storage, transmission, access, etc - to the different categories of classified information. This principle is embodied in the joint agreement CCS 210/4.

2. The security regulations of the British military services, like those of the United States, stem from one common source, and therefore presumably are the same except for features necessitated by the peculiarities of the individual services. The U.S. Air Force, during its Air Standardization program has noted several major differences in the underlying concepts of UK security practices. Although these differences were embodied in the regulations of the Royal Air Force they must, of necessity, exist in the British Army and Royal Navy as well. It is felt expedient at this time, in view of our forthcoming meeting in London, to draw the attention of our committee to these basic differences for the purpose of possibly drawing the standards of the two countries closer together.

3. Restricted Matter.

a. The RAF defines Restricted matter as follows:- "Restricted documents, information, and material are such - other than Top Secret,

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Secret and Confidential - as should not be published or communicated to anyone, except for official purposes."

b. The USAF (US) defines Restricted matter as:- "Information and material (matter) which requires security protection other than that determined to be Top Secret, Secret or Confidential, will be classified Restricted."

c. The differences between these definitions is a fundamental one. The US requires security protection for Restricted matter as it does for other classified matter, although in a different degree. Under the RAF definition no security protection is required. That this is not a legalistic distinction is illustrated by the fact that the RAF security regulation provides specific measures for the storage of Top Secret, Secret and Confidential matter, but makes no mention whatsoever of the storage of Restricted matter.

d. These divergent standards, from a US point of view, result in over-grading on the part of the UK, inadequate protection of US Restricted matter in the hands of the UK, and probably the release by the UK of higher classified (though undoubtedly identical) matter to foreign countries than is the practice of the US. Foreign countries may construe this as greater leniency or closer agreement by the British than on the part of the US.

4. Storage Standards.

a. Normal safeguards in the US provide for storing Top Secret matter in steel safe or container having a three-position dial-type combination lock; Secret and Confidential in the same type of container as prescribed for Top Secret or in a steel file cabinet secured by a

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steel bar and three-position combination dial-type padlock; and Restricted matter in a secure manner as shall be determined by the commanding officer of the installation concerned.

b. The normal RAF requirements are that Top Secret and Secret documents be stored in a steel safe, chest or cupboard under lock and key. It is further provided that:- "In wartime in the field, Secret documents, but not Top Secret documents, may be kept in secure wooden containers, provided that steel containers are not procurable and that, overseas, proper precautions are taken to protect containers and documents from the attacks of insect pests which may render the containers insecure or destroy the documents. Proper precautions are also to be taken against rats. Confidential documents when not in use are to be kept locked up.---" (RAF-Air Publication 3086, "Security of Personnel, Official Documents, Information and Materiel," 2nd Edition, Oct 1949, Chapter 3, Paragraph 24.)

c. The storage requirements cited verbatim above indicate that insufficient stress is placed on security protection, i.e., safeguarding against unauthorized access. The US does not believe locks and keys provide proper protection at best. When this method is used without periodic changing of locks, it becomes positively inadequate.

5. Personnel Security Investigations and Clearances.

a. The Secretary of Defense has laid down certain minimum standards for the investigation and clearance of military personnel, civilian employees and contractor personnel. In the Air Force these standards are embodied in Air Force Regulations 205-6, 205-17 and 205-18. They are substantially the same, however in all three military services.

b. The RAF criteria for the security investigation and clearance

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of their personnel, while much simpler than ours, are likewise much less thorough. For example, there is only one type of clearance in the RAF, equally applicable to military personnel, civilian employees of the RAF and employees of RAF contractors. Although the British are very sensitive about their regulations concerning this matter and none have been seen in print, it is believed that all branches of the British government clear their personnel in substantially the same manner as the RAF, as shown below.

- (1) The subject fills out a comparatively short questionnaire, minus fingerprints, and is not told of its purpose.
- (2) The RAF forwards this card to MI-5 with the request for an investigation and clearance.
- (3) MI-5 checks the subject against its own files and requests the local police at subject's places of residence to do likewise.
- (4) Based on the facts disclosed in (3) above, MI-5 grants or denies a security clearance and notifies the requesting agency of its decision. Except in very rare instances, no checks are made of former places of employment, neighbors, or credit firms.
- (5) When MI-5 grants a clearance it means that the subject is cleared to receive all categories of classified matter.

c. Since all RAF officers are given this type of investigation prior to commissioning it means that all are cleared to receive the highest grade of classified matter. This makes the case by which they sponsor and vouch for their officers all the more understandable. It is

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understood that their airmen are not so cleared upon enlistment but only as the need arises, based on their duties.

d. The British state that their investigative criteria are sufficient because of their inherent patriotism, the relatively small area of the United Kingdom and the fact that the British people, on the whole, tend to stay in one place. Recent events involving the disloyalty of some of their highly placed scientists dispute their assumptions.

6. The above observations on British security practices are by no means all that have been noted, but they appear to be the most basic, those that affect the US the most, and those which seem to be the most applicable to adjustment and reconciliation with the standards of the US. It is felt that the coming meeting of the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee, in which the component US services will meet with their British "opposite members" will provide a convenient and appropriate forum to discuss these differences, and it is so recommended.

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RDB 228/9 COVER

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File:

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.

24 January 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS, RDB COMMITTEES

Subject: Proposed Reorientation of the Board Toward its Mission

Attached: Draft 5, Memorandum to Committee Chairmen, Subject:
"Orientation of RDB to Meet Current Situation" (23 Jan 51)

1. At a recent staff meeting I outlined to you the efforts being made to revise the general approach of the Board to its responsibilities by law and directive. Attached is the latest draft of a memorandum to Committee Chairmen setting forth that revision and providing a new set of "sailing orders" for the indefinite future.

2. These "sailing orders" are peculiarly the concern of Mr. Webster and the Board members in deciding what they will ask of their committees. However, as we have approached agreement on content, discussion of the proposed memorandum has become more widespread. I therefore want you to have the latest draft so that you will know authoritatively what is in the document that is now before the Board. Your comments will of course be welcome, although it will probably be impossible to follow all of them.

3. Mr. Webster hopes to obtain Board approval of a final draft of the proposed memorandum at a special meeting this week.

Eric A. Walker

ERIC A. WALKER
Executive Secretary

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By WLD H&A Date 9/1/98

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AIR VEHICLES DIVISION

ADVISORY COUNCIL ON AIR VEHICLES

Advisory Group on Piloted Aircraft

Field of Interest:

All types of complete piloted aircraft including modifications which significantly affect their configuration or characteristics.

Advisory Group on Guided Missiles

Field of Interest:

All uninhabited vehicles moving above the earth's surface, the trajectory of which is influenced by a mechanism within the vehicle.

Advisory Group on Propulsive Systems

Field of Interest:

All forms of motive power adaptable to self propelled air vehicles, including reciprocating, turbo-prop, turbo-jet, pulse-jet, ram-jet, rocket, etc., engines.

Advisory Group on Air Vehicle Equipment

Field of Interest:

That equipment uniquely associated with aircraft and guided missiles.

Advisory Group on Launching and Handling

Field of Interest:

Equipment and techniques necessary for ground, ship, and air launching of air vehicles and their handling, including personnel safety.

Advisory Group on Test Range Procedures and Instrumentation

Field of Interest:

Equipment and techniques required by test ranges for completely testing guided missiles and for reduction of the data obtained into a readily usable form.

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RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD


CHART 1

ORGANIZATION CHART SHOWING CHAIN OF COMMAND

THE BOARD

~ Committees ~

~ Secretariat ~



Box 501-1

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RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

GM 36/170

Log No. 36682

Copy No. 1

31 May 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, RDB

SUBJECT: Assignment of Responsibility for Supporting Research in the Field of Guided Missiles

REFERENCE: RDB 226/9, Item 2, Agenda to 31st Board Meeting, "Assignment of Responsibility for Research and Development in the Field of Guided Missiles"


1. In considering RDB 226/9 at its 31st Meeting, the Board instructed the Committee on Guided Missiles to submit recommendations concerning assignment of responsibility for supporting research not covered by either JCS papers or the committee paper, GM 36/159, for consideration of the Board at its next meeting.

2. The Committee on Guided Missiles, at its 25th meeting, on 19 May:

- 2.1 Noted the instructions of the Board concerning the subject assignment of responsibility;
- 2.2 Instructed the Committee members to submit to the Exec. Dir. written comments considered pertinent to the problem;
- 2.3 Instructed the Guided Missiles Secretariat to undertake the preparation of a study to form a basis for Committee action at its 26th meeting on 12 June 1950, if practicable;
- 2.4 Noted that the magnitude of the task is such that final action by the Committee at its 26th meeting may not be possible, but that action will be completed by the earliest practicable date.

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cc: GMC distribution


FRED A. DARWIN
Executive Director
Committee on Guided Missiles

GM 36/170

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**SECRET**RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.Log No. 38318
Cy No. 1

5 December 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Walker

SUBJECT: Report on State-Defense Meeting in London
October 2-9, 1950

Supplementing my oral discussion with you of these meetings the following report is submitted for the file. At the request of Mr. Richardson I also append some observations concerning the need, if any, for an R.D.S. branch office in London.

I. Day-by-day resume of the discussions.

The American team reached London by various means of transportation, and all members were on hand by 28 September. The schedule of meetings and subjects discussed follows:

Friday, September 29 - (2-5:45 P.M.)

Afternoon meeting by US team with representatives of Joint American Military Assistance Group (JAMAG) in attendance, headed by Colonel Bell, assistant to General Kibler, chief of JAMAG.

(1) JAMAG people discussed the need for them to have authority to release military characteristics, classified up to Confidential, to members of the regional planning committees of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These frequently ask US opinion as an aid to their own projected thinking in various fields. Under the existing policy it is permissible to release to NATO countries information classified through Top Secret, provided it pertains to the achievement of NATO objectives, and concerns new equipment which has reached the engineering test (pilot model) stage of development. This limitation excludes military characteristics.

(2) JAMAG also needs to know the substance of Pentagon briefings of NATO representatives so that it can disclose the same items of discussion, at the working level, to the NATO people stationed in London.

(3) From a standpoint of "Credit where credit is due", JAMAG expressed a desire to know what US material had been agreed to by the US as disclosable by UK to the Commonwealth countries under the provisions of Document C of the Burns Templar talks. This is in order that they could talk intelligently about these matters with commonwealth country representatives, if the subject-matter

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

28TH SEPTEMBER, 1950

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should arise. (Document C provides that with respect to specific projects agreed to by the UK and the US, the UK may at its discretion include in UK training publications and instructions for issue to the Commonwealth nations US military information classified secret or lower, exclusive of r and d information and intelligence information).

(4) Brief discussion was had with respect to the UK policy on disclosure to US, copies of which had been furnished to the US team. It was noted that said policy requires the granting of US requests "whenever possible"; "an exception should be made only if the collecting of the information would be excessively laborious, or if there was some other very special reason".

It was suggested that this document be discussed with the UK team, although it was not felt that the ambiguous language quoted constituted any real bar to fluid exchange by UK. The general UK attitude, it was felt, parallels the US attitude.

For example, Air Force refused a visit clearance to a UK officer who was about to retire and go to work for a competitor of the firm which he sought to visit.

An administrative denial would be one which comprised request for transfer of a piece of equipment.

(5) It was noted that the UK should be asked about disclosures of US information to Canada, this for the reason that such disclosures chiefly had the effect of increasing the number of copies requested by UK of US, where in fact US itself was disclosing them to Canada..

Saturday, September 30 - (10:45 AM-12:45 PM)

(1) Discussion of NATO problems continued. Major factor mentioned was the fact that UK is a member of all the NATO Regional Planning Groups, with the exception of the US-Canadian group. Hence UK tends to act as broker for the NATO disclosures. The State Department and Services agreed to seek UK consent to a procedure that represented a compromise between credit where credit is due, and an undesirable crowding of the fact of US generosity down NATO throats. This medium approach was later arranged with the UK, by an agreement that the letters of trans-~~mission~~ sent by UK to NATO countries would mention fact that the material contained US-origin material that US had consented to disclose. It would avoid wrapping the documents in red, white and blue.

(2) The team examined various UK position papers that had been received; and reviewed the relevant US positions on the various points covered.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

28TH SEPTEMBER, 1950

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EC 47/2
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Log #12074
Copy # 14

21 October 1947

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INTELLIGENCE SUPPLEMENT

INTELLIGENCE FOR THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD

1. Under the authority of paragraph 4 of IAC 1, the necessary concurrences having been obtained, the Central Intelligence Agency shall:

a. Coordinate the collection of all intelligence information related to foreign scientific research developments and potentialities affecting the national security.

(Inserted: This will not operate to prevent direct contact between RDB scientists and other scientists in connection with matters of mutual interest.)

b. Accomplish the correlation, evaluation, and appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting intelligence.

c. Supervise and control the flow of intelligence material between the Research and Development Board and the departments and other agencies of the Government.

R. H. HILLMAN
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central Intelligence

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EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

EC 47/1

ANNEX "C"

DRAFT 28 Mar 47
J. N. THACH, Jr.

because of the wide range of an improved technology
phenomenon upon the broad field of weapons development
and the INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIP OF CIG WITH JRDB
assessment of the technological advance in a single field

can be carried out until the scientific factors in all fields
Memorandum for: The National Intelligence Agency
have been identified and examined.

ment of the technological strength will be of no signi-
1. The Charter of the Joint Research and Development
Board charges it with "coordination of all research and
development activities of joint interest to the War and Navy
Departments so that the War and Navy Departments will be assembled
establish and carry out a strong, unified, integrated and intel-
complete research and development program in the field of
national defense".

2. No assessment of the completeness or strength of
the research and development programs of the Services can
be considered acceptable until the best comparison possible
has been made between the state of advance of weapons develop-
ment in this country and that of our potential enemies.

3. The studies that the Board has made toward evolving
the best method of discharging its responsibilities indicate
that the comparison mentioned above will be most difficult of
accomplishment because of the lack of a central source of the
necessary scientific information. In making such a comparison,

Annex "C"

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4. It is recognized that the deficiency in factual information on current technical progress in Russia is extremely difficult to correct. But we are not convinced that everything possible is being done to stimulate the flow of such information. In our view, insufficient emphasis and skill has been placed on the covert collection of technical information. Because this deficiency is very grave, and because it has considerable bearing on our ability to wage a war successfully, it appears that a more effective approach to the collection of such intelligence should be devised by the Central Intelligence Agency and remedial action taken.

5. In summary, this memorandum submits two intelligence matters for your consideration and possible submission to the National Security Council for information and appropriate action:

- a. The official intelligence estimates of Russian technical capabilities are not based on sufficient up-to-date factual information to be reliable for planning purposes.
- b. Current practices for the collection of foreign scientific and technical information should be reviewed by the CIA with a view to immediate improvement.

R. F. RINEHART
Acting Chairman

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By WBD NARA Date 7/1/98

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RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.

Log No. 35002

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EC 47/5.1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Scientific and Technical Intelligence.

1. The Research and Development Board recognizes that reliable, up-to-date information on Russian technical progress is an essential prerequisite for planning an economical, well-balanced military research and development program. The available intelligence estimates are not sufficiently reliable for this purpose.

2. The intelligence agencies have been unable to collect factual information on Russian post-war military research and development. Consequently, the official intelligence estimates are largely conjecture based on extrapolations of German and Allied contributions to Russian knowledge, giving considerable weight to our own rate of progress in comparable fields. Four years have now elapsed since the wartime technical developments of other nations were made available to Russia. Further extrapolation, unsupported by reliable factual information on current technical progress in Russia, is susceptible of serious error.

3. An error of this kind occurred in our estimates of Russian atomic energy capabilities. These estimates were prepared by the Joint Nuclear Energy Intelligence Committee (CIA, AEC, Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives) and were the only official estimates available as of the date of the Russian atomic explosion. They were based largely on our own atomic energy experience translated in terms of assumed Russian capabilities. It is therefore not surprising that the Russian atomic bomb explosion occurred one year prior to the "earliest possible date" and four years prior to the "most probable date" predicted in these official estimates.

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By WBD NARA Date 7/1/98

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Log No. 35002A

Copy No. 20

EC 47/5

Agenda, 125 Meeting

Item 7A Scientific and Technical Intelligence.

Attached EC 47/5.1. Draft Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Acting Chairman, RDB, subject above

1. The attached memorandum, prepared for the signature of the Acting Chairman, RDB, and addressed to the Secretary of Defense, calls attention to the serious deficiency in scientific and technical intelligence, from the standpoint of RDB needs.

2. While no specific suggestions are included as to how this deficiency can be remedied, the memorandum will serve a useful function in the following respects:

- a. It records RDB's continuing dissatisfaction with the intelligence currently received, and discharges RDB's responsibility to make this serious deficiency known, both to the Secretary and to the National Security Council.
- b. It will serve to stimulate CIA action in strengthening collection of scientific and technical information. The specific method by which this can be done is an intelligence problem and not within RDB's competence to determine.

3. It is recommended that:

The Executive Council approve attached draft memorandum, EC 47/5.1 for transmittal to the Secretary of Defense.

*Item 7A
agenda
EC 2/125*

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Log No. 35003

Copy No. 20

EC 47/6

Agenda, 125th Meeting

Item 8A Exchange of RDB Information with England and Canada.

Attached RDB 49/6, Draft memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Chairman, RDB, w/three enclosures, subject "Transmittal of the RDB "Consolidated Technical Estimates" to England and Canada

1. The attached memorandum, prepared for the signature of the Chairman, RDB, and addressed to the Secretary of Defense, again raises the question of how exchange of RDB documents with England and Canada can be expedited. This memorandum calls attention to the present difficulties, as typified by the transmittal of the RDB "Consolidated Technical Estimates, 1948". It encloses a draft memorandum to the three Departments, to be signed by the Secretary of Defense, which clarifies the policy of the Department of Defense with respect to exchange of technical information with England and Canada. The draft memorandum reaffirms the liberal exchange policy announced by Secretary Forrestal, giving particular attention to the RDB problem.

2. It is recommended that:

- a. The Military Secretaries on the Council submit comments on RDB 49/6 and enclosures, after discussion with their respective departments.
- b. The comments of all members of the Executive Council be made available to the Programs Division with a view to revision of the attached draft memorandum, RDB 49/6.

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