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January 20, 1961

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This letter will constitute an efficiency report on the performance of Colonel William G. Draper, USAF (12383-A) as Air Force Aide to the President, for the period from October 1, 1960 to January 20, 1961.

X OF
 12-A-2

As you know, Colonel Draper has been with me for eight years here in the White House, and before that was assigned to me at SHAPE. He has rendered exemplary and outstanding service, and has reflected great credit on the Air Force. He is personally and professionally outstanding in every respect, and I cannot exaggerate the invaluable services he has rendered to me. He has also been, in my opinion, in great measure responsible for the acceptance by the general public of commercial jet planes, because of the skill with which he handled the jets in my overseas travels of the past year and a half.

X OF
 116-H-2
 SHAPE

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Colonel Draper's skill, judgment, and sense of responsibility are of the highest order. He has, additionally, a fine personality and has cooperated well with both military and civilian personnel at the White House.

As I say, I rate him "outstanding" in all phases of the performance of his duties.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,

X
 The Honorable Dudley C. Sharp
 Secretary of the Air Force
 Washington, D. C.

X OF
 3-C

COVER AND DECEPTION
(DEFINITIONS AND POLICY)

1. Military Cover and Deception. Military cover and deception is the art of causing the enemy to derive and accept a particular predetermined appreciation of our dispositions, capabilities, and intentions so that the enemy will react in a specific preselected manner disadvantageous to himself and advantageous to our forces. (This is the currently accepted definition of military deception. Within the military establishment, this definition has always been used in a context that assumed that the ENEMY referred to was the ENEMY'S MILITARY FORCES and that the ART is a MILITARY ART practiced in support of PURELY MILITARY plans. In the event that a national policy in this field is formalized, it may be necessary to revise this and other related definitions to clarify the restricted scope of military versus non-military cover and deception activities.)

2. Cover versus Deception. The words "cover and deception" have been used together in military thinking so frequently they are often thought of as a single term. The difference between them lies in their ends. Cover is designed to protect. Deception is designed to INFLUENCE THE ENEMY TO ADOPT A SPECIFIC COURSE OF ACTION.

3. Deception versus Psychological Warfare. The mission of deception is to provide the enemy high authority with an intelligence pattern on which he will act. This target or audience normally includes a small number of individuals of the operational or intelligence staffs, but sometimes it is limited to the commander himself or the top political leader of the nation concerned. On the other hand, psychological warfare on a strategic scale is informational warfare, the mission of which is to inform and influence large groups of people. Appealing to the masses,

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Appendix

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6(b)

MR 98-69 #1

BBM DATE 9/24/98

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psychological warfare is unlikely to influence the thoughts of or to produce military reactions by the enemy high command until the groups are turned against the high command.

4. Possible Examples of Deception

a. In order to divert attention from the Communist conquest of China, the USSR closed the German border to ground transportation to Berlin in 1948 and thereby induced a crisis which the Allies undertook to solve with the airlift. All mass communication media gave the airlift considerable comment, but little to the situation in China. While the United States and Britain pointed with pride to the accomplishments of the airlift, the Communists completed the conquest of China.

b. In June of 1951, when the UN forces were driving back the Communists in Korea, the free world was electrified by what appeared to be a genuine offer by the Soviets to cooperate in reaching a peaceful solution in Korea. The United Nations eagerly attempted to reach a solution with the Communists as month after month went by. After approximately a year elapsed, we realized we had been tricked and it was clear that the Communist military position had been repaired.

c. The basic national security objective of insuring military technical superiority in the field of weapon system research and development could be enhanced by fostering deception measures designed to divert Soviet research capacities to unfruitful projects and to otherwise employ them in a wasteful manner.

5. Definition of National Cover and Deception (Proposed).

National cover and deception is the art of causing other governments to derive and accept a particular predetermined appreciation of our resources, capabilities, and intentions so that they will react in a specific preselected manner, advantageous to us.

6. A National Policy on Cover and Deception should include:

a. A definition of national cover and deception.

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b. A definite admonition on the necessity for absolute security and an effective security program for cover and deception.

c. The designation of an over-all authority to:

(1) Analyze and assess each national security program in order to provide, if appropriate, a supporting cover and deception plan.

(2) Review and coordinate all national cover and deception plans.

(3) Exercise or delegate over-all supervision over the implementation of each national cover and deception plan.

d. A delineation of areas of primary interest for Government Departments.



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21 June 1955



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: "Cold War" Employment of Strategic Cover
and Deception in Support of Basic National
Policy and Military Operations.


1. On 25 August 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a memorandum to you on the above subject, recommending that you invite the attention of the National Security Council to the possibility of the use of national strategic cover and deception during the "cold war" period with a view to obtaining an over-all policy on this subject.

2. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in endeavoring to establish a firm military policy for the utilization of cover and deception in times other than general war, queried the commanders of unified and specified commands for comments and recommendations relative to the specific application of cover and deception plans and operations that might be made within their respective areas of responsibility in furtherance of the "cold war" effort. A summary of these comments and recommendations is contained in the Enclosure hereto for your information and consideration in connection with your action on the memorandum cited above.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE

Enclosure

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SecDef Cont. No. 73-10
SecDef Cont. No. 021

ENCLOSURESUMMARY OF COMMENTS OF COMMANDERS OF UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS ON "COLD WAR" COVER AND DECEPTION

Responses to a request by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the comments and recommendations of the commanders of the unified and specified commands as to the specific application of cover and deception plans and operations that might be made within their respective areas of responsibility in furtherance of the "cold war" effort have been received and reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Based on this review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the following to be a pertinent summary of the responses received and concur, in general, with the views expressed therein:

a. Most commanders stated that cover and deception can and should play a part in support of national policy during periods of "cold war." They considered that "cold war" employment of strategic cover and deception in support of basic national policy and military operations would accomplish much as a deterrent to war. The expected tempo of the next war makes it imperative that the enemy's initial war strategies be influenced prior to hostilities.

b. They felt that planning and control of national cover and deception during periods of international tension must be maintained at national level to permit participation by all pertinent Government agencies. Some commanders reported that they have the capability of executing deception missions in support of a national deception program, or in support of their respective "cold war" courses of action and tasks, but may not have the capability to implement a complete strategic-deception-plan of their own.

c. It was pointed out that there is a fundamental necessity for U.S. cover and deception activities to be assessed in the light of their effects upon the objectives and plans of our allies. It is also necessary to take into account the current and planned deception activities of our allies.

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Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED	
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6(b)	
MR 98-69-2	
BY <u>BBM</u>	DATE <u>9/24/98</u>

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d. The increased security requirement for planning and implementing cover and deception in peacetime was noted, as well as the fact that both the American public and allies may also have to be deceived. These difficulties should be considered; however, they should not act to preclude implementation of a deception program provided major gains against a potential enemy are anticipated.

e. Specific application of cover and deception operations suggested were designed to:

- (1) Exaggerate or demonstrate own strength.
- (2) Disperse or concentrate Communist military strength.
- (3) Weaken Soviet influence.
- (4) Misdirect Soviet scientific and technical effort.

f. Examples of cover and deception operations suggested were in support of one of the following:

(1) The commander's own "cold war" courses of action and tasks as set forth in the current Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

(2) A possible military "cold war" cover and deception plan at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(3) A possible national level "cold war" cover and deception plan participated in by not only the Department of Defense, but also, when appropriate, by other departments and agencies of Government.



NOTES ON OUTER SPACE BRIEFING GIVEN BY:

Dr. James R. Killian, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology

Dr. E. M. Purcell
Professor of Physics
Harvard University
and Nobel Laureate

Dr. Herbert York
University of California



AT CABINET MEETING, FRIDAY, MARCH 14, 1958

Dr. Killian started the briefing by saying that his group, the President's Science Advisory Committee, had been primarily concerned with civilian exploration of outer space and what it was going to cost in the future. He said there were four major factors in this whole question of space exploration. They were:

- (1) The simple human urge to explore -- to penetrate -- the Unknown -- a new age of exploration of space similar to the exploration of the new world in the 15th and 16th centuries.
- (2) Military motivation - Make sure that we are strong in space and that we are protected from attack.
- (3) National Prestige - Make sure that we are strong in space and that we are protected from attack.
- (4) The scientific observations and experiments -- Extension of knowledge of the universe.

Dr. Killian said that he and his scientific committee believe there is an additional job that must be done to overcome the over-optimistic and foolish talk that has been going on in this field.

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Dr. Purcell
Physicist at Harvard University



Dr. Purcell started his discussion by saying that he first wanted to outline a few simple "ground rules" of space exploration. These were:

- (1) Isaac Newton's Law -- Any object can be put into orbit 200 or 300 miles above the earth -- that the speed of orbiting is fixed once and for all by the size of the earth. For example, Explorer takes a speed of five miles per second to go into orbit and 1-1/2 hours to circle the globe. The speed to put something into orbit 20,000 miles above the earth would remain the same, but the time of orbiting would be 24 hours.
- (2) Payload -- Multiple station - Formula of payload to gross weight, 50 to 1.
- (3) The Moon - 250,000 miles -- To hit the moon or to orbit the moon would require a speed of 7 miles per second and would take 2.5 days.
- (4) Mars - 100,000,000 miles - Speed 7 miles per second - 8 months by the shortest route to have a Mars contact. (Mars has an atmosphere, and actually it would be easier to land on Mars than on the moon because it would be simpler to have a rocket with deceleration atmospheric mechanisms).

* * * * *

What can be learned by exploration of Space?

Everything we know about the physical world beyond the earth is learned by radiation that has come through 10 miles of air which is equal to 30 feet of water.

-3-

(1) Lookdown on Earth - We could see the pattern of the Earth's weather by studying the cloud patterns. This would surely advance science and the study of the origin of storms.

(2) Looking Out -- The advantage of putting a satellite with a telescope on it above the earth would be to permit the astronomists to see and study the source of energy of cosmic rays and ultra violet light.

(3) Space Exploration --

(a) The Moon

Facts on Moon's origin, structure of the Moon, whether it has mechanic feel, whether it has any atmosphere at all. Study of biological formations, if any, on the Moon. Believe that the Moon has very low forms of space life, particularly space spores.



(b) Mars

Much more exciting. Conditions more similar to earth -- Undoubtedly some form of life, although probably not ones which we would recognize.

(c) Communications - Roundness of earth -- Small satellites carrying communications would act as relay stations for communications, both civilian and military.

* * * * *

SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVES

(1) Early (First years)

(a) Meteorology

(b) Physics

(c) Geophysics

(d) Minimal Moon contact

(e) Communications

(f) Biology

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(2) Later - 2 to 5 Years

- (a) Astronomy - Telescope
- (b) Communications
- (c) Biology
- (d) Scientific lunar investigation
- (e) Minimal planetary contact
- (f) Human flight in orbit around the Earth

(3) Still Later - 5 to 15 Years

- (a) Automated lunar exploration
- (b) Automated planetary exploration
- (c) Human lunar exploration and return

* * * * *

EARLY MILITARY APPLICATION

(1) Communications

(2) Reconnaissance

- (a) Optical
- (b) Radio
- (c) Infrared



(3) Early Warning System

(4) Meteorological Weather Forecast

As to space war, Dr. Purcell said that in his opinion and the opinion of the scientists, this would be clumsy and ineffective. He pointed out that there had been many stories of late about satellites with bombs in them, and all one had to do was to press a button and the bomb would be delivered on any given target. He said this can't happen - that you can't drop anything from a satellite of its own free will and ~~to do~~ it you would have to carry out a full scale ICBM launching in reverse. This would be a waste of time, for the Earth itself would be the best weapons carrier, and further developments of the ICBM would just eliminate any such silly stories.

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Dr. York
University of California



Dr. York picked up where Dr. Purcell had left off, and discussed the actual mechanics of space exploration. He said that during this upcoming Geophysical Year it would be possible and in fact, practical to start with the Thor and Jupiter as far as a Moon hit was concerned.

The Thor and Jupiter presently have a speed of 2 to 3 miles per second, but additional stages could easily get them up to the necessary 5-second speed for orbit and 7-second speed for a Moon hit. The payload would be 500 pounds for a satellite and 100 pounds for a Moon hit. He was sure this could be accomplished in 1959.

* * * * *

For the 2-to 5-year period the Atlas and the Titan were the missiles that the scientists would use. The Titan would be used either with Fluorine or Lox in the third stage. The Titan and the Atlas now have a speed of 3 to 4 miles per second, and the third stage would give them the necessary 5 seconds for orbit and 7 seconds for Moon speed.

Payloads in these rockets would be as follows:

	<u>Fluorine</u>	<u>Lox</u>
Satellite	6500	3800
Moon Hit (Mars Hit)	2150	1000
Moon Landing	750	400

In all of these payloads, it would be quite possible with these weights to deal with either human flight or with greatly expanded instruments and telescopes.

* * * * *

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For 5 to 15 Years

Need is for larger rocket than we have now. Scientists anticipate that during this period, rockets will weigh 1-1/2 million pounds and have 2 million pounds in thrust at a cost per rocket of 1/2 billion to 1 billion dollars each.

The payloads would be as follows:

Satellite	35 tons (70,000 pounds)
Lunar Hit	18 tons (36,000 pounds)
Lunar Landing	9 tons (18,000 pounds)
Net Weight Return to Earth from Moon	1-1/2 tons (3000 pounds)
Net Weight Mars Aerodynamic Landing	9 tons (18,000 pounds)

Estimated Cost for a "Down to Earth Space Program"

The need is for progressively increasing research and development, rocket flights, payload development and construction, rocket development, and Moon and Planetary gear, with 20 flights scheduled per year.

The first Moon hit will happen in 1959.

The first Mars probe will happen in 1961 or 1962 with the Titan booster.

There will be men on the Moon after 1965.

Dr. York said that the scientists were sure they can do the Mars probe well ahead of the Russians.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


September 28, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes on Meeting with the President, 9:30 a.m.,
September 28, 1960



1. I first discussed the question of the extent of the involvement of PSAC in the 1962 military R&D budget. I showed the President a copy of our 1961 budget paper and he said he recalled it, and on my pointing out to him that we could undertake a similar task this year or could reduce it and do it on a more selective basis if he felt that a general paper of the type submitted to him last year was not useful, he said that he would like us to go over the 1961 paper, identify the issues where major changes have taken place in the last year and deal with this selective list of subjects only. He felt that a year's cycle is too short a time to change one's opinions or budgetary planning too much and that, therefore, there was no point in making thorough studies of everything covered in the 1961 paper.
2. Because of some proposals of General Greer regarding SAMOS, I asked the President whether he approved of our working fairly openly (i.e. announcing objectives and the existence of corresponding development contracts) on high resolution photographic reconnaissance satellites, or whether only the low resolution systems, which of course have already been made quite public, should be continued rather openly and the high resolution projects be kept as "black". He said that of course it would be futile to pretend that there can't be progress in satellite photography and that we aren't interested in it, but on the other hand he felt strongly that the really high resolution projects should be kept "black".
3. I told the President that Secretary Gates recently informed me that from his exchange with Watkinson, the British Minister of Defence, it is clear that our commitment to provide the British with Skybolt, the air-launched ballistic missile, for their bomber forces has become a very hot political issue in the UK and that the UK government could not for political reasons change its stand that this is the system they want. On the other hand, I pointed out our technical analysis of the project suggests that it will be much slower in coming than the Air Force estimates and will be exceedingly expensive. The President was quite concerned and asked me



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to tell Goodpaster so the latter could inform Secretary Herter of the technical concerns. Secretary Herter, in turn, could alert the Prime Minister, who is coming to Washington tonight.

4. I informed the President that our paper on Government Organization for Science and Technology is essentially ready and asked if he wished to have a meeting with the Committee to discuss our recommendations and if they would be useful to him in preparation of his paper to Congress on Government Reorganization. His first reaction was that the paper should be presented to the NSC, but I pointed out that it was an organization paper and that there would be another paper for the NSC dealing with broader issues of science and technology in context of national security. Thereupon, he decided the organization paper was not suitable for the NSC and asked whether everything recommended could be done by Executive action, and I told him there were a few things which could not. Then he said he didn't think that a "full dress" discussion with the PSAC would be helpful and suggested instead that we give the paper to his Committee on Government Organization - Flemming, Price and Milton Eisenhower - who might wish to incorporate some of our proposals in the paper they are preparing for him to submit to Congress.



G. B. Kistiakowsky



HISTORICAL MATERIALS RELATED TO THE FAREWELL ADDRESS

Manuscripts

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President
Speech Series, Box 38

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Post-Presidential Papers
Special Name Series
Box 6 Harlow, Bryce 1961 (3)
Harlow, Bryce 1961 (5)
Harlow, Bryce 1966

Secretary's Series
Box 1 Doubleday
Box 2 People-to-People
Box 16 Vaughn
Box 18 Ka
Box 20 K

Williams, Ralph: Papers
See finding aid.

Oral Histories

Eisenhower, Milton (OH-292)
Hagerty, James (OH91)
Moos, Malcolm (OH-260)
Williams, Ralph (OH503)

Robertson Report is located in the NSC Staff Papers, NSC Registry File, box 3, "CIA 5
(3)—CIA report on UI O's, Jan. 17, 1953

For permission to read Moos OH contact:

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