

PROJECT 10073 RECORD CARD

1. DATE 22 Jan 52		2. LOCATION HENANA, ALASKA		3. CONCLUSIONS ☐ Was Balloon ☐ Probably Balloon ☐ Possibly Balloon ☐ Was Aircraft ☐ Probably Aircraft ☐ Possibly Aircraft ☐ Was Astronomical ☐ Probably Astronomical ☐ Possibly Astronomical ☒ Unusual atmospheric conditions ☐ Insufficient data for evaluation ☐ Unknown	
4. DATE OF PICKUP Local 22/0120 AST GMT 22/1020 Z		4. TYPE OF OBSERVATION ☐ Ground-Visual ☒ Ground-Radar ☐ Air-Visual ☒ Air-Intercept Radar			
5. PHOTOS ☐ Yes ☒ No		6. SOURCE Varied Military Personnel			
7. LENGTH OF OBSERVATION --		8. NUMBER OF OBJECTS 1		9. COURSE Varied	
10. BRIEF SUMMARY OF SIGHTING At approximately 1020Z, 22 Jan 52, ground radar site picked up an object traveling at estimated speed of 1350-1500 knots. The radar site lost the object and picked it up again at 1052Z. At 1200Z, F-94 a/c picked up a target and tried to locate it with negative results.				11. COMMENTS 1. Several targets were located the radar scopes but objects were not seen visually. 2. It is believed that the various pick-ups on the radar screens were due to abnormal atmospheric conditions.	

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

3. Upon completion of this investigation, the following information should be furnished to the Bureau (Form FD-302):

1. The first group of people who are interested in the study of the history of the United States are the people who are interested in the history of the United States.

1911-12-12

60. $\frac{1}{x^2} = x^{-2}$

Timothy H. Jones
 1000 14th St. N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20004

10/2

1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

1944-1945

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

1. The first step in the process of the development of a new product is the identification of a market need. This is often done through market research, which can be conducted in a variety of ways, including surveys, focus groups, and interviews. The goal is to understand what customers want and need, and to identify any gaps in the current market.

2. Once a market need has been identified, the next step is to develop a concept for a new product. This involves brainstorming ideas and creating a rough sketch of the product. The concept should be based on the market need and should be something that is novel and different from existing products.

3. The third step is to create a prototype of the product. This is a physical model of the product that can be used to test the concept and to get feedback from potential customers. The prototype should be made of a material that is easy to work with and that can be modified easily.

4. The fourth step is to conduct a feasibility study. This is a study that is designed to determine whether the product is technically feasible, financially viable, and commercially viable. It involves a detailed analysis of the product and the market, and it should be completed before any significant resources are committed to the development of the product.

5. The fifth step is to develop a business plan for the product. This is a document that outlines the business model for the product, including the target market, the distribution strategy, and the financial projections. The business plan should be used to secure funding for the development of the product.

6. The sixth step is to develop a marketing plan for the product. This is a plan that outlines the marketing strategy for the product, including the advertising, promotion, and sales efforts. The marketing plan should be developed in conjunction with the business plan and should be used to guide the marketing efforts for the product.

7. The seventh step is to launch the product. This is the final step in the process, and it involves getting the product into the hands of customers. The launch should be done in a way that creates a buzz around the product and that attracts as many customers as possible.

8. The eighth step is to monitor the performance of the product. This involves tracking sales, customer feedback, and other key performance indicators. The goal is to determine whether the product is successful and to make any necessary adjustments to the product or the marketing plan.

9. The ninth step is to evaluate the success of the product. This is a final evaluation of the product and the process of its development. It involves a comparison of the actual results with the goals that were set at the beginning of the process. The evaluation should be used to identify any lessons learned and to inform the development of future products.

10. The tenth step is to continue to improve the product. This is an ongoing process that involves making changes to the product based on customer feedback and market trends. The goal is to keep the product relevant and competitive in the market.

1. The following information was obtained from a review of the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Prisons, and the United States Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, regarding the activities of the above named individual:

2. 1985-1986

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SECRET

Subject: Investigation of Aviation Incident, 1954, 1955-2
12 January 1955 (Cont'd)

On 12 January 1955, School of Aviation, with Air Force, was on a flight over the Pacific Islands. It was found that a number of the crew were not properly briefed for this purpose.

5. The Pilot and other members of the crew in aircraft were not briefed on the purpose of the flight. It was found that a number of the crew were not properly briefed for this purpose.

6. It was found that the Pilot and other members of the crew were not properly briefed on the purpose of the flight. It was found that a number of the crew were not properly briefed for this purpose.

7. Recommendations: It is recommended that a number of the crew be properly briefed on the purpose of the flight. It was found that a number of the crew were not properly briefed for this purpose.

5. Incidents
Statement

[Signature]
Chief of Staff
Air Force
Washington, D.C.

[Signature]
Investigating Officer
12 January 1955
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SECURITY INFORMATION

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Conclusion

[Illegible text]

2. 3. 4. 5.

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(1925) 74. 1-2. 16.

1. *Chamaecyparis* *modica* (L.) Link.
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6. 2008年12月15日，甲企业向乙企业销售一批商品，售价为10000元，增值税税额为1700元，该批商品的成本为6000元。甲企业于2008年12月25日收到乙企业支付的货款，并开具增值税专用发票。甲企业应确认的收入为（ ）元。

8. 2000年10月1日起，凡在我国境内销售货物的单位和个人，均应按销售额的一定比例缴纳增值税。

1925

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APPENDIX VII

Nenana, Alaska - 22 January 1952

I. DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

At 1020Z on 22 January 1952, a radar station at Murphy's Dome, Alaska, observed an unidentified radar return. The target was going away from the station on an azimuth of 210° , at a speed of about 1500 mph when first observed but appeared to reverse its direction and returned toward the station. The set was adjusted so that the target could be observed as it closed in on the station but after this change was made the target was again observed, however, at about its original location, and again going away from the station. Just before it faded, it appeared to be making a turn back toward the station.

At 1030Z an F-94 was airborne to search for the object. At this time the object was going away from the station at a high rate of speed so the F-94 was told to orbit. About this time the ground station lost contact with the object but continued to track the F-94.

At about 1100Z as the F-94 was approaching Nenana (near Fairbanks), the radar observer in the F-94 observed two targets, one faint and one bright. The aircraft was at 30,000 ft. and the target was at 25,000 ft. The targets crossed from right to left and appeared to be traveling slowly and as the F-94 approached the target a high rate of closure was indicated. The contact was lost at a range of 200 yards.

Approximately one hour later, again near Nenana, another contact was made by the F-94. In this instance the target was kept dead ahead and level. When the target was at a range of 200 yards, the pilot pulled up and the target was lost. The rate of closure during the run was 100 knots even though the F-94 had flaps down. No other contacts were made and the aircraft was released at 1210Z.

During the two airborne contacts the F-94 was being tracked by the ground station but the object was not being picked up.

The weather was clear but no visual sighting was made. On the same night, the same crew had visually identified a C-54, a C-47, and a small civilian aircraft from 300 to 500 yards. There were no clouds in the sky but it was a dark night.

No malfunctions were found in either radar set.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERV
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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in the past, and only in the past, before an air interception
to the fact that the same type of radio intercepts may be
obtained in the future.

WILLIAM H. HENRY
Captain, Radar Observer, 1st Squadron

This is a classified item copy

William H. Henry
WILLIAM H. HENRY
Captain, Radar Observer, 1st Squadron

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-10-01 BY 60322
EX-100

MEMORANDUM

20 SEP 1950

TO : SAC, NEW YORK (100-100000)
FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-100000)
SUBJECT: [Illegible]
[The following text is extremely faint and largely illegible due to the quality of the scan. It appears to be a multi-paragraph memorandum.]

[Handwritten Signature]
Special Agent in Charge

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DATE 10-10-01 BY 60322 EX-100

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[Handwritten Signature]
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140TH BOMBING SQUADRON
140TH BOMBING SQUADRON
APO 431, D. S. AIR FORCE

140TH BOMBING SQUADRON

25 January 1962

Richard B. Peterson, Captain, USAF, 1408 A, while flying in combat missions from Fuchu Air Force Base have picked up and located on our aircraft radar set, what we called "ghost targets".

In one particular mission, we looked only a target dead ahead and high at approximately 17,000 yards on two different occasions and in both cases the same target was maintained on the target indicator with no change in the target position. Investigation revealed no aircraft flying in that area. Weather was not a factor. Missions were flown during the period of 14 to 16 June 9, 1961.

Richard B. Peterson
Richard B. Peterson
Captain, USAF
1408 A

140TH BOMBING SQUADRON

Richard B. Peterson
Richard B. Peterson
Captain, USAF
1408 A

SECURITY INFORMATION

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Handwritten signature: J. L. S. [illegible]
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STATION: 197-419

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NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20340
JAN 27 1962

NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20340
JAN 27 1962

21 January 1962

STATEMENT
(Frank G. Long, Captain)

STATEMENT OF INFORMATION

I presented a theory which would tend to explain the radio signals reported sighted over Mr. McKinley. I present this as a possibility, though I would find it hard to duplicate the condition.

By coincidence, on that night we stopped our listening for marine since some time between 1100Z and 1115Z with the beam pointed on Mr. McKinley, or within 5° of that point. This was known since we had had reason to check the bearing shortly after stopping rotation. If we are wrong, none of the marine or equipment were changed until some time between 1045Z and 1100Z. These times coincide closely with the time of initial pickup and time fade of the signal.

Three things are necessary to give this result:

1. Our transmitter frequencies must, in at least one case, be the same as one of their receivers.
2. Our antenna must be pointed at a target (P.R.) which can be seen by the receiver.
3. The radio reception frequencies of the two sets should be nearly equal (almost identical).

Condition 1 is probably present at least once a week by the time of average time each transmission is operated over a limited frequency range and the two systems use the same range of frequency.

But, though close, it is improbable that they would be quite so identical. However, such a condition is always possible.

Our antenna was stopped on Mr. McKinley, which can be seen by both sides.

The conditions could be possible, and even though unlikely, it (as) that the possibility should be considered.

The reason the track appeared as dots rather than a line may be that, even though our beam hit a considerable land that could reflect energy to the other side, the receiver (or many) could have been so situated to their antenna by way of several land bodies that the energy being close together would give them a point plot.

Frank G. Long

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A black and white photograph of a textured surface, possibly a book cover or endpaper. A prominent diagonal crease runs from the upper right towards the lower left. Near the center of this crease, there is a small, dark, circular mark or hole. The surface has a grainy, mottled appearance with various small specks and fibers visible.

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1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a cursive script, and the addresses are listed below them.

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HEADQUARTERS
ALASKA AIR COMMAND
WAINWRIGHT AIR FORCE BASE
10925, U. S. AIR FORCE

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STATEMENT

31 January 1964

The main objective of the program was to attempt to duplicate the results of the previous program. We stopped the program at the first result and changed the program frequency over a considerable range. No data were received by 1-2-64.

16/ JAMES S. HARRIS
1110 Central Expressway
General Electric Co.

22-23-24 Jan 1964

James S. Harris
1110 Central Expressway
General Electric Co.

DECLASSIFIED
STATEMENT

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SECRETARY INFORMATION

1-2-64

James S. Harris
1110 Central Expressway
General Electric Co.

II. STATUS OF INVESTIGATION

Report by Electronics Branch of ATIC.

Target being slanted instead of perpendicular to radii from radar station indicates possible weather target. Speed may be accounted for by the momentary appearance and disappearance of other weather targets. Further explanation cannot be made.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Target caused by weather phenomena.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
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22 Jan, 1952

NENANA, ALASKA

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APPENDIX II

Nenana, Alaska - 22 January 1952

I. DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

At 1020Z on 22 January 1952, a radar station at Murphy's Dome, Alaska, observed an unidentified radar return. The target was going away from the station on an azimuth of 210°, at a speed of about 1500 mph when first observed but appeared to reverse its direction and returned toward the station. The set was adjusted so that the target could be observed as it closed in on the station but after this change was made the target was no longer observed. Seven minutes later (approximately 1030Z) the target was again observed, however, at about its original location, and again going away from the station. Just before it faded it appeared to be making a turn back toward the station.

At 1030Z an F-94 was airborne to search for the object. At this time the object was going away from the station at a high rate of speed so the F-94 was told to orbit. About this time the ground station lost contact with the object but continued to track the F-94.

At about 1100Z as the F-94 was approaching Nenana (near Fairbanks), the radar observer in the F-94 observed two targets, one faint and one bright. The aircraft was at 30,000 ft., and the target was at 25,000 ft. The targets crossed from right to left and appeared to be traveling slowly and as the F-94 approached the target a high rate of closure was indicated. The contact was lost at a range of 200 yards.

Approximately one hour later, again near Nenana, another contact was made by the F-94. In this instance the target was kept dead ahead and level. When the target was at a range of 200 yards, the pilot pulled up and the target was lost. The rate of closure during the run was 100 knots even though the F-94 had flaps down. No other contacts were made and the aircraft was released at 1210Z.

During the two airborne contacts the F-94 was being tracked by the ground station but the object was not being picked up.

The weather was clear but no visual sighting was made. On the same night, the same crew had visually identified a C-54, a C-47, and a small civilian aircraft from 300 to 500 yards. There were no clouds in the sky but it was a dark night.

No malfunctions were found in either radar set.

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II. STATUS OF INVESTIGATION

Report is being studied by the Electronics Branch of ATIC.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Pending.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
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AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

FROM (Agency)	REPORT NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGES
Intelligence Directorate, Hq AAC	IR-1-52	2	3	

At approximately 1020Z, 22 January 1952, Radar Site F-2 made an original contact with an unusual target in the area of Nenana (Point "Jig"). The scope presented the target clearly but on a slant of 15° - 20° instead of perpendicular to radii, the normal manner of presentation. The speed was estimated at 1350 to 1500 knots.

At 1030Z an F-94 (pilot, Lt C.E. Garrett; radar operator, Capt V.D. Ramey) was airborne and vectored to Nenana. F-2 lost the target prior to the aircraft's arrival in the vicinity, so the aircraft was given a patrol mission along the Alaskan Range. At approximately 1052Z, F-2 again contacted this target and held it for about one (1) minute. Due to the fact that the target was outbound in relation to F-2 and to the aircraft and moving at a high rate of speed, no attempt was made to vector the aircraft on the target.

At approximately 1200Z, while the aircraft was en route to Ladd Air Force Base, the radar operator received indication of a target in the Nenana area. Finding the target ahead and low (approximately 24,000 feet altitude), the pilot made an intercept pass from 24,000 yards to 200 yards with a good target on the radar scopes. The overtaking speed was better than 100 knots.

At 200 yards the pilot pulled up and over the apparent target location. Aircraft speed on the run was approximately 250 knots indicated. After going over the target, two (2) 360° turns were made and a search of the area conducted for several minutes without making further radar contact or visual sighting.

During this time F-2 was able to track the F-94 but had no other target visible. The F-94 landed at 1225Z. The weather in the Fairbanks area during this period - 1030Z to 1230Z, 22 January 1952 - was: ceiling unlimited; visibility 15 miles or more. The pilot reported that the Aurora Borealis was brilliant but not exceptionally so.

A pilot and a ground observer reported what appeared to be a comet or meteor to the southwest of Ladd Air Force Base, approximately four (4) hours earlier, this date.

On 23 January 1952, from 1020Z to 1140Z, the same F-94 (pilot, Lt R.R. Diment; radar operator, Lt C.A. Hayward) was dispatched on a mission to see if a target similar to that of 22 January could be found. At approximately 1050Z a radar contact was made at 20,000 yards. The aircraft at this time was between Clear and Nenana at 18,000 feet in a shallow climb. An intercept run was begun and followed through to 2700 yards, at which time the target disappeared. The overtaking speed was more than 100 knots, the aircraft indicating 230 knots.

After radar contact was lost, further search was made in this area. Contact was not made either by radar or visual observation. The weather was clear, with visibility unlimited; the pilot reported that the Aurora Borealis was very active and in his opinion, unusual.

At approximately 1030W, 23 January 1952, a team checked the aircraft, utilized in these flights, for radiation, but with negative results. Due to the time lapse between the flight on 22 January and the time at which this check was made, it is possible that the negative report is not of value.

Dr. C.T. Elvey, Director of the Geophysical Institute, University of Alaska, stated, in effect, that in his opinion it is unlikely that a meteor would produce an indication on a radar set that is not specifically designed or modified for that purpose.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
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(CLASSIFICATION)

AUTHORITY OF CG AAC
DATE FEB. 52 INITIALS

COUNTRY Territory of Alaska, U.S.A.		REPORT NO. IR-1-52	(LEAVE BLANK)
AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT			
SUBJECT Unusual Unidentified Radar Targets			
AREA REPORTED ON Ladd Air Force Base, Alaska		FROM (Agency) Intelligence Directorate, Hq AAC	
DATE OF REPORT 8 February 1952	DATE OF INFORMATION 22 and 23 January 1952		EVALUATION F-6
PREPARED BY (Officer) TIMOTHY J. FLANAGAN, Capt, USAF Chief, Elect Intel Br		SOURCE Statements by observers of incidents.	
REFERENCES (Control number, directive, previous report, etc., as applicable) None			
SUMMARY: (Enter concise summary of report. Give significance in final one-sentence paragraph. List inclosures at lower left. Begin text of report on AF Form 113-Part II.) This report contains a narrative statement based on observer reports and on conclusions of preliminary study of the unusual radar targets which appeared near Ladd Air Force Base, Alaska, on 22 and 23 January 1952.			
17 Incls (1 ea)		APPROVED: Francis H. MacDuff FRANCIS H. MacDUFF Lt Col, USAF Director of Intelligence	
1. Msg, 5001st Composite Wg, 22 Jan 52 2. Ltr, Hq Alaskan Comd, 24 Jan 52 3. Ltr, AAC, 25 Jan 52 4. Rept, 5004th Air Intel Sv Sq, 23 Jan 52 5. Statement, Lt A.L. Boyd, Jr., Controller, F-2 6. Statement, Lt J.C. Frost, Maint, F-2 7. Statement, Lt C.E. Garrett, Plt 8. Statement, Capt V.D. Ramey, Radar Observer 9. Statement, Lt R.R. Diment, Plt 10. Statement, Lt C.A. Hayward, Radar Observer 11. Statement, Capt R.B. Peterson, Plt 12. Statement, Lt G.A. Garrett, Plt 13. Statement, J.S. Bangs, Gen Elec Co Tech Repr 14. Statement, J.S. Bangs, Gen Elec Co Tech Repr 15. Statement, A.G. Wedin, Opr Anlys 16. Statement, Lt G.H. Wilkinson, Controller, F-1 17. Overlay, Ftr Track and Unidentified Track			
XXXX		DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10 	
DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR Alaskan Comd, ATTN: J-2 5001st Composite Wg, ATTN: Wg Intel Off			

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AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

FROM (Agency)	REPORT NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGES
Intelligence Directorate, Hq AAC	IR-1-52	3	3	3

COMMENTS of Preparing Officer:

The following hypotheses are advanced concerning the aforementioned radar targets:

1. That the energy transmitted from F-1 might have reflected from Mt. McKinley in such a manner as to create these radar targets.

Comment: Due to the frequencies and the pulse repetition frequencies of the radar sets involved (AN/CPS-6B at F-1 and F-2, and the AN/APG-33 in the aircraft) it is thought highly improbable that this hypothesis is a valid one for technical reasons.

2. That ionized gases due to meteor activity might have produced these radar targets.

Comment: It is thought that the presence of a meteor southwest of Ladd Air Force Base at approximately 2000Z, 21 January 1952, might have some bearing on the subject. It is not considered likely, in view of Dr. Elvey's statement, that the meteor itself caused this target return. There is the possibility that the ionized gases, which may have been present with the meteor's passage, might have broken into small clouds (irregular masses of ionized gas) and have been floating around in the upper air. One or more of these clouds, being at the mercy of upper air currents, may have drifted into the area of Ladd Air Force Base. Further, the possibility exists that an ionized cloud may give a radar return. The passage of an aircraft near such clouds, such as happened when the fighter broke off the intercept on both nights, would tend to disturb the surrounding air in such a manner as to disperse the ionized cloud. This would tend to explain the aircraft's inability to re-establish radar contact with the target after an intercept pass. The failure of F-2 to contact a target on 23 January 1952 is not explainable.

3. That the activity of the Aurora Borealis might have produced these radar targets.

Comment: Due to the known effect of the Aurora Borealis on radio in this theater, it is thought that some effect on radar also might be experienced. This is believed to be beyond the scientific capabilities of this Command to determine.

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